Danelz v. Gayden

Decision Date25 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. W2012-01667-COA-R3-JV,W2012-01667-COA-R3-JV
PartiesJORDAN ASHTON DANELZ v. JOHN GAYDEN, M.D.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Shelby County Juvenile Court

No. N6141

Dan H. Michael, Special Judge

In this appeal, an adult child seeks an award of retroactive child support from his biological father. The adult child filed a petition to establish parentage, seeking retroactive child support and other child rearing costs. After genetic testing, the juvenile court found that the respondent is the petitioner's biological father, but it declined to grant an award of retroactive child support. Both parties appealed. Eventually there were two appeals and two remands. After the last remand, the juvenile court determined that the adult child's biological father was also his legal father, but held that the petitioner adult child could not receive an award of retroactive child support under the parentage statutes. The adult child then filed this third appeal. We reverse in part, holding that the parentage statutes provide for an award of retroactive child support to the adult child complainant. We vacate the finding as to the adult child's legal father and remand the case for further proceedings on the award of relief against the biological father.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court is Reversed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER, J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Adam N. Cohen and Mitchell D. Moskovitz, Memphis, Tennessee for Petitioner/Appellant Jordan Ashton Danelz

Andrew C. Clarke, Memphis, Tennessee for Respondent/Appellee John Gayden, M.D.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is the third appeal in this case. The facts in this parentage action are also discussed in this Court's prior opinions.1

During 1983, Mary Deborah Danelz ("Mother') was married to Richard Danelz, and at the same time had an intimate relationship with Respondent/Appellee John Gayden, M.D. In 1984, Mother gave birth to a son, Petitioner/Appellant Jordan Ashton Danelz ("Jordan"). Apparently Richard Danelz was unaware of Mother's relationship with Dr. Gayden; Richard Danelz signed Jordan's birth certificate and raised Jordan as his son.

When Jordan was still a young boy, Mother and Richard Danelz initiated divorce proceedings. In Mother's divorce complaint, she asserted that Jordan was a child of the marriage. Mother and Richard Danelz eventually entered into a marital dissolution agreement, in which Mother was designated as Jordan's primary residential parent and Richard Danelz was ordered to pay child support for the benefit of Jordan and his sister. A final decree of divorce was entered in 1995, incorporating by reference the parenting provisions of the marital dissolution agreement.

On November 14, 2002, within months after Jordan reached majority, he filed this parentage action in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County to establish that Dr. Gayden is his biological father. Jordan's parentage petition sought a retroactive award of child support dating back to Jordan's birth, as well as an award of attorney fees.

In the proceedings prior to the first appeal, Jordan filed an affidavit by Mother stating that she and Dr. Gayden had a sexually intimate relationship during the pertinent time period. The trial court found, inter alia, that Mother was judicially estopped from making a statement that was contrary to the sworn pleadings she filed in her divorce action, in which she asserted that Jordan was the child of her marriage to Richard Danelz. On this basis, the trial court dismissed Jordan's parentage petition without permitting DNA testing. Jordan appealed, and this Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, including DNA testing. Danelz v. Gayden, No. W2003-01649-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 1838571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004) (hereinafter referred to as Danelz I).

On remand, the DNA testing showed that there is a 99.992% probability that Dr. Gayden is Jordan's biological father. In the ensuing proceedings, Dr. Gayden filed numerous motions to dismiss, seeking to have Jordan's claim for child support dismissed on a variety of bases. These motions to dismiss were denied.2 In May 2008, the trial court made a factual finding that Dr. Gayden is Jordan's biological father. Subsequently, the trial court also held that Richard Danelz was an indispensable party to the proceeding, pursuant to Rule 19.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Richard Danelz was not brought in as a party at that time.

Dr. Gayden continued to file motions to dismiss and motions to reconsider the denial of his motions to dismiss. In March 2010, the trial court entered an order on Dr. Gayden's fifth motion to dismiss, in which it issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that an adult child has the right to file an action to establish parentage, even if the adult child's mother is judicially estopped from pursuing such an action. However, the trial court held that Jordan could not receive an award of retroactive child support from his biological father; it concluded that child support is owed only to the parent or custodian of the child. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on Tennessee's parentage and child support statutes, as well as Lichtenwalter v. Lichtenwalter, 229 S.W.3d 690 (Tenn. 2007). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(c)(2)(A). The trial court held that the statutes gave it no authority to make an award of retroactive child support to the petitioner adult child. On this basis, the trial court dismissed Jordan's claim for child support, but granted him an award of attorney fees in the amount of $50,789.08, determined as of September 2010. Jordan appealed.

On appeal, this Court noted that the parties had not added Richard Danelz as a party as ordered, so the trial court's order was not a final judgment. The appeal was held in abeyance and the matter was remanded for entry of a final order. On remand, the trial court held that its dismissal of Jordan's claim for child support rendered moot the order requiring the parties to add Richard Danelz as an indispensable party. The intermediate appellate court then took up this second appeal.

This Court issued its opinion in the second appeal on June 29, 2011. See Danelz v. Gayden, No. W2010-02308-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2567742; 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2011) (hereinafter referred to as Danelz II). On appeal, the Court held that the trial court was required to determine whether Dr. Gayden is Jordan's legal father, as well as his biological father, given the fact that the divorce court had previously indicated that Richard Danelz is Jordan's father during the 1995 divorce proceedings. Danelz II, 2011 WL2567742, at *5, 9; 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 365, at *15-16. The Court indicated that if Dr. Gayden were held to be Jordan's legal father, then the trial court would go on to determine whether Jordan is entitled to receive child support, relying in part on In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 351 (Tenn. 2006). Danelz II, 2011 WL 2567742, at *9. The intermediate appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court for the legal parent analysis, and also vacated the $50,789.08 award of attorney fees to Jordan as premature. Danelz II, 2011 WL 2567742, at *9.

The trial court conducted a hearing on remand. It held that Richard Danelz was an indispensable party. Subsequently, Dr. Gayden filed yet another motion to dismiss Jordan's claim for child support. In May 2012, the original parties and Richard Danelz, appearing pro se, presented arguments on the issue of Jordan's legal father.3

On June 19, 2012, the trial court issued a lengthy and thoughtful order on the issues before it. In the order, the trial court first noted that the proof was undisputed that Dr. Gayden is Jordan's biological father. It then looked to Tennessee's adoption and termination statutes, and specifically the definition of "legal parent" found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(28). Utilizing the two-step process outlined in In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tenn. 2006), the trial court held that Dr. Gayden is Jordan's legal father.

The trial court then framed the issue before it as "whether or not Jordan has the right to seek retroactive child support from his newly discovered biological father while the true oblige[e], his mother, is judicially estopped from enforcing her right." It noted first that the parentage statutes state expressly that, under certain circumstances, an adult child may bring an action to establish parentage, citing Tennessee Code Annotated §36-2-305(b). It then observed that, once parentage is established, the parentage statutes instruct the court to address custody and visitation, and Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) requires the court to determine child support. The trial court then stated: "Having granted Jordan relief under Tennessee Code Annotated §36 chapter 2 this court now turns to chapter 5 of this title to determine whether child support is due." Relying on a provision in the child support statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-102(c)(2)(A), and citing the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Lichtenwalter, the trial court came to the same conclusion it had reached prior to remand, namely, that the statute mandated that child support "shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or other person awarded [] custody of the child or children" or be paid to "the appropriate person or agency providing care or support for the child." See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-102(c)(2)(A), -101(d)(8). The trial court commented that the actions of Jordan's mother deprived both Jordan and Dr. Gayden of the opportunityto have a relationship while Jordan was a child. It explained its concerns about a ruling that Jordan, as an adult, can recover retroactive child support...

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