Danforth v. United States

Decision Date04 December 1939
Docket NumberNo. 309,309
Citation60 S.Ct. 231,84 L.Ed. 240,308 U.S. 271
PartiesDANFORTH v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. J. L. London, of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 272-273 intentionally omitted] Mr. Warner W. Gardner, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from Pages 274-275 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

A writ of certiorari was granted1 to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit2 affirming a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri which awarded to a property owner, against the United States, compensation in condemnation less in amount than a sum fixed by an arrangement between the parties prior to the institution of the condemnation. This judgment provided for payment of the award into the registry of the court and that upon such payment the United States should be entitled to the relief sought. Although the issue was raised by the landowner, no pro- vision was made as to interest. The writ was granted to determine important questions of federal law as to the effect in condemnation, of prior agreements by the United States as to the amount of awards and as to the running of interest.

This proceeding arose in the course of carrying out the protection from destructive floods of the alluvial valley of the Mississippi between Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and Head of Passes, Louisiana. This work of internal improvement was begun under the Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928.3 The passage of this act followed the disastrous experience with the flood of 1927 and was based upon a comprehensive report and plan known as the Jadwin Plan, Major General Edgar Jadwin, then Chief of Engineers of the United States Army, being in charge of its development.4 The plan covers the great alluvial valley of the Mississippi through its entire length from the Ohio to the delta. In essence, the plan in its entirety is based upon a levee system which constricts the water to a moderate degree and allows in periods of extreme floods the escape from some lower levees, known as fuse-plugs, of the water from the main channel to back waters and floodways.

The particular portion of the plan involved here is known as the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. Prior to the passage of the Flood Control Act, there were levees along the west bank of the Mississippi between Birds Point, Missouri, and New Madrid, Missouri, which substantially followed the meanderings of the river. To get a greater area for the spreading of flood waters, the plan provided for a second levee to be set back about five miles from the riverbank levee running from Birds Point to St. Johns Bayou, just east of New Madrid. Near its upstream connection with the set-back levee the present riverbank levee would be lowered some five feet by what is called a fuse-plug, so that at high flood the water will begin to flow into the wide floodway below. It is expected that this enlarged channel will keep anticipated floods from rising above the levees protecting Cairo, Illinois. The set-back levee will confine its diverted water to the floodway area between the set-back levee and the riverside levee and will return the water to the Mississippi through a lower fuse-plug section where a gap is left in the levee system to permit complete drainage. The land involved in this condemnation is situated in this floodway immediately east of the set-back levee and about midway between Birds Point and New Madrid.

The Flood Control Act stipulates that the United States 'shall provide flowage rights for additional destructive flood waters that will pass by reason of diversions from the main channel of the Mississippi River.' The same section authorizes the Secretary of War to 'cause proceedings to be instituted for the acquirement by condemnation of any lands, easements, or rights of way which * * * are needed in carrying out this project * * *.' Jurisdiction of the proceeding is given to the United States district court for the district in which the property is located. Commissioners were authorized to view and value. It was further provided: 'When the owner of any land, easement, or right of way shall fix a price for the same which, in the opinion of the Secretary of War is reasonable, he may purchase the same at such price; * * *.'5

There is the additional provision in Section 1 of this same Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 702a, that 'pending completion of any floodway, spillway or diversion channel, the areas within the same shall be given the same degree of protection as is afforded by levees on the west side of the river contiguous to the levee at the head of said floodway.'

Construction work began on the set-back levee on October 21, 1929, and was substantially complete on October 31, 1932. The riverside levee is maintained at its original height of about 58 feet and the upper fuse-plug, which is designed to admit water into the floodway, has not yet been created.

In January, 1937, the Mississippi River attained its highest flood stage in recorded history. Late in that month the United States Army officer in charge of Memphis Engineers, District No. 1, directed a subordinate to proceed to the area and place the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway in operation. These instructions were issued by the officer in charge of the district without orders from any superior. The directions were carried out after flood waters were trickling over the riverside levee into the floodway area through a natural crevasse and when pursuant to these orders an artificial crevasse was created by dynamiting the northern portion of the upper fuse-plug section. Later another artificial crevasse was created and other natural crevasses developed. Through these crevasses petitioner's land was flooded. As the river would have reached a stage sufficiently high to overtop the riverside levee, even with extraordinary high-water maintenance, the land of the petitioner would have been flooded without the crevassing. The set-back levee did confine the diverted water to the floodway. It increased its depth and destructiveness on petitioner's land. After the flood subsided, the riverside levee, including the upper fuse-plug section, was restored to its previous height.

Prior to the institution of this action, orders had been issued by the Secretary of War, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Flood Control Act, to purchase this tract of land. A letter containing the offer for the flowage rights here involved, dated January 14, 1932, had been received by the petitioner and the offer accepted by him within an agreed extension of the limited time. The letter, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:

'2. I am accordingly directed by the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, to offer you Thirty-one thousand six hundred eighty-one and 98/100—Dollars ($31,681.98) for a perpetual flowage easement as contemplated by the Act of May 15, 1928, over your land designated as Tract No. 243, as indicated on the inclosed plat, this being the maximum amount that can be offered you under the above authorization.

'3. Should this offer be accepted, friendly condemnation proceedings will be entered in Court, with the request that an agreed verdict be awarded in the amount of this offer. Payment cannot be made without Court action as title cannot be cleared. Acceptance of this offer should expedite final settlement and reduce legal expenses.'

After its acceptance, there was an attempted withdrawal of this offer by a letter of July 8, 1932, which advised the owner that 'after a careful review of the question of flowage over these tracts it was found by higher authority that the prices first suggested could not be properly recommended to the Court.'

After this letter, a petition was filed by the United States to condemn over the land here in question a perpetual right, power easement, and privilege to overflow, as contemplated by said project and described in House Decument 90. After the appointment and report of the commissioners for the determination of an award, petitioner filed an answer and counterclaim. In the answer he set up that prior to the filing of the suit a 'written offer of settlement for the damages and for the purchase of an easement' for floodway purposes was made by the United States and accepted by petitioner. Petitioner further alleged an offer of title to the easement sought and a request for the payment of the agreed sum. Judgment against the United States was asked in that amount, 'with interest,' to be paid into court for the benefit of the defendants, in accordance with their respective rights and against the defendants for the perpetual flowage easements 'upon payment into Court' of the agreed sum. Changing the designation of the pleading from answer to counterclaim, these allegations were repeated as a counterclaim. The Court sustained a motion of the United States to strike this answer and counterclaim on the ground that the petitioner had waived his rights under the written agreement because of his failure to plead them prior to the entry of the interlocutory order allowing the condemnation and appointing commissioners. Subsequently the reports of the first and second commissions appointed to view the property were set aside for reasons which are immaterial here. To the report of the third commission, awarding $17,921.70, the petitioner renewed the objection that the agreement between the United States and him was decisive in fixing the award at $31,681.98; asked for interest 'from such time as the Court may find that plaintiff (the United States) appropriated the flowage easement in question' and sought new viewers to determine the award as claimed by petitioners or in the alternative that the Court enter judgment for the sum claimed with appropriate terms to create the flowage easement in the United States.

Upon this exception a hearing was had and findings and judgment...

To continue reading

Request your trial
269 cases
  • Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland Cnty.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • August 12, 2015
    ...occurs only where a claimant shows an actual increase in the frequency or severity of flooding. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939) (rejecting the argument that the passage of legislation in and of itself constitutes a taking and noting that a......
  • Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • March 7, 1984
    ...are "incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 [60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240] (1939). See Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (CA 8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 [1......
  • State ex rel. Morrison v. Helm
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arizona
    • October 21, 1959
    ...purchase that which would be detrimental instead of beneficial to the public interests.' In the case of Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240, the United States Supreme Court 'Unless a taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a statutory prov......
  • Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. C. B. Lauch Const. Co., 8414
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • January 10, 1957
    ...F.2d 884; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 176, note 20, p. 1056. Commenting on the Brown case in Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, at page 236, 84 L.Ed. 240, at pages 246-247, Mr. Justice Reed 'In Brown v. United States this Court had occasion to consider whether interest ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT