Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City

Decision Date30 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. WD 61294.,WD 61294.
Citation108 S.W.3d 769
PartiesEmet DANGERFIELD, Appellant, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Daniel G. Jackson, III, Charlotte Ferns, Co-Counsel, Kansas City, MO, for Respondent.

Before HOWARD, P.J., LOWENSTEIN and HARDWICK, JJ.

HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, Judge.

Emet Dangerfield appeals the granting of City of Kansas City's second motion for new trial. Six months earlier, Dangerfield had obtained a verdict, for the wrongful death of his daughter, against the respondent, City of Kansas City, based upon a dangerous condition of city property. Dangerfield contends that when it purported to grant the City's second motion, the trial court did not have jurisdiction.

Factual and Procedural History

On July 12, 1999, Emet Dangerfield's ten-year-old daughter was struck and killed by a motorist whose view, Dangerfield averred in this wrongful death suit brought pursuant to section 537.080, RSMo. (1994), against the City of Kansas City ("City"), was obstructed by the extremely long grass and weeds on its property. Appellant's daughter was riding her bicycle at the intersection of 45th and Bales in Kansas City. There were no signals or stop signs at the intersection. On August 8, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dangerfield, assessing damages at $843,333.33. The jury attributed thirty-two percent fault to the City and sixty-eight percent fault to Dangerfield's daughter. Fourteen days after the verdict, on August 22nd, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Emet Dangerfield in the sum of $269,866.67.

Nearly one month later, on September 20th, the City filed a "motion to amend judgment to conform with the limits of § 537.610(2), RSMo 1994." Section 537.610.2 limits the liability of the public entities for damages in tort actions.1 The next day, September 21st, the City moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) and, alternatively, for a new trial. One of the twelve grounds for a new trial was that a juror had visited the scene of the incident during an overnight recess and later told the other jury members that a stop sign had been placed at the intersection after the accident. A juror affidavit was submitted in support of this allegation.

On November 29th, the trial court, in a ruling captioned an "order," denied the City's motion for J.N.O.V. or in the alternative, for a new trial, but granted the motion to cap damages at $100,000 — without elaborating the basis for its decision. After a call to the division clerk or to the judge — the parties disagree as to which happened and the record is silent — the trial court, on December 10th, issued another ruling, identical to the November 29th "Order," except that it was now designated a "Judgment."

On December 20th, the City re-filed a verbatim copy of its earlier motion for new trial, including the suggestions (with the minor exception of one additional ground). Later that day, the City filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. On February 21, 2002, the trial court, now finding that there had been jury misconduct, granted the City's second motion for a new trial. On April 17, 2002, this court granted the City's motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal. See Rule 84.09. Dangerfield appeals the trial court's decision to grant a new trial. See § 512.020, RSMo. (2000). A timeline of relevant events appears within the analysis.

Analysis

On appeal, Dangerfield challenges the trial court's jurisdiction to grant the City's second motion for new trial. See § 512.020, RSMo. (2000). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Ferrier, 86 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Mo.App.2002). This court must construe these rules so as "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 41.03. Dangerfield argues that the August 22nd judgment became final on November 29th, the date the trial court ruled on all post-trial motions. On that date, he claims, the trial court lost jurisdiction to grant any future motions by the City. Thus, he claims that the order granting the new trial should be set aside and the August 22nd judgment reinstated. This case does not involve an appeal from the trial court's capping the judgment to comply with Section 537.610, RSMo. (1994). Thus, this court assumes that Dangerfield does not contest reinstating the $100,000 judgment if the order for a new trial is ruled a nullity.

In this case, there are various motions that were filed and rules that apply to effect the finality of the judgment. In order to determine when the judgment was final and the trial court lost jurisdiction, it is important to consider what occurred in this case, the time frame in which it occurred, and the rules associated with finality of a judgment. Five rules that are applicable in this case are Rules 74.01, 74.06, 75.01, 81.05 and 78.07. The difficulty in applying these various rules is that they often apply at a distinct point in the process and their interplay is somewhat unexplained by the rules.

Generally, under Rule 75.01, a trial court retains jurisdiction for thirty days, during which it may vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment. See also In re Marriage of Jeffrey, 53 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Mo.App.2001). The court's jurisdiction may be extended, however, under Rule 81.05. This rule provides that the judgment becomes final at the expiration of thirty days, unless an authorized after-trial motion is filed which serves to extend the jurisdiction up to ninety days or on the date the trial court rules on the last motion. Third, Rule 78.07(c) provides that the trial court may amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 75.01 or upon motion by the party. Unless otherwise specified, this amended judgment becomes a new judgment. In addition to these three rules, for a judgment to be final under Rule 74.01, there must be a ruling that is denominated "judgment" or "decree." City of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Mo. banc 1997).

Timeline of Events

1. August 8, 2001 — Jury returns verdict, assessing damages at $843,333.33 and fault apportioned at 32% to the City and 68% to Dangerfield's daughter.

2. August 22, 2001Trial court enters judgment in accordance with the

jury verdict, for $269,866.67 (under Rule 75.01, the trial court retains jurisdiction for 30 days).

3. September 20, 2001 — City files "Motion to Amend Judgment to Conform with the Limits of § 537.610(2)" filed (if authorized after-trial motion under Rule 81.05, extends jurisdiction of the court up to 90 days). Dangerfield does not contest this motion.

4. September 21, 2001 — City files Motion for JNOV or New Trial (authorized after-trial motion, extends jurisdiction of the court up to 90 days).

5. November 29, 2001Trial court issues "Order" granting "motion to amend" and denying motion for new trial (Judgment final under Rule 81.05 or, as City alleges, did not comply with Rule 74.01(a)).

6. December 10, 2001Trial court issues ruling identical to November 29th Order but designated "Judgment" (nullity because court lost jurisdiction or as City alleges a judgment effectively amending August 22 judgment, thus a "new" judgment that extends jurisdiction of the court for 30 days).

7. December 20, 2001 — City files in almost the same language as the September 21st motion a second motion for JNOV or New Trial (as City alleges, extends jurisdiction up to 90 days).

8. December 20, 2001 — City files Notice of Appeal.

9. February 21, 2002Trial court grants second motion for new trial.

10. April 17, 2002This court granted City's motion to dismiss its appeal.

A. When Did the Judgment Become Final?

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the City's second motion for new trial depends on when the August 22nd judgment became final under Rule 81.05. Once a judgment becomes final under Rule 81.05, the trial court loses jurisdiction to entertain any further motions, unless another Rule provides otherwise. In re Marriage of Jeffrey, 53 S.W.3d at 175. Under Rule 81.05(a)(2), "[i]f a party timely files an authorized after-trial motion, the judgment becomes final at the earlier of the following:"

(A) Ninety days from the date the last timely motion was filed, on which date all motions not ruled shall be deemed overruled; or

(B) If all motions have been ruled, then the date of ruling of the last motion to be ruled or thirty days after entry of judgment, whichever is later.

Were the City's first motion for new trial and motion to reduce the damages in the August 22nd judgment authorized post-trial motions? The Supreme Court has recognized six post-trial motions expressly authorized by the rules:

(1) "a motion to dismiss without prejudice after the introduction of evidence is commenced under Rule 67.01;

(2) "a motion for directed verdict under Rule 72.01(a);

(3) "a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 72.01(b);

(4) "a motion to amend the judgment [under then-] Rule 73.01(a)(3)," now Rule 78.04; (5) "a motion for relief from judgment or order under Rule 74.06(a) and (b), but see, Rule 74.06(c);" and

(6) "a motion for a new trial under [then-] Rule 78," now Rule 78.04 Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 41 S.W.3d 504, 511-12 (Mo.App.2000) (quoting Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 854 S.W.2d 390, 392 n. 1 (Mo. banc 1993)). Thus, the City's September 21st motion for new trial was a valid post-trial motion. This court will assume, merely for the sake of argument and solely for purposes of Rule 81.05, that the City's September 29th motion to reduce damages to $100,000 was also authorized. (More on this later.)

Ninety days after the City's last timely motion (the September 21st motion for new trial) was December 21st. Both of the City's post-trial motions were decided on November 29th. November 29th comes before December 21st, so ...

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