Daniel v. Daniel

• Citation: 106 Wash. 659,181 P. 215
• Decision Date: 12 May 1919
• Docket Number: 14951.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: DANIEL v. DANIEL et ux.

181 P. 215

106 Wash. 659

DANIEL v. DANIEL et ux.

No. 14951.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 12, 1919

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Bruce Blake, Judge.

Action by Hazel Daniel against J. I. Daniel and wife. From decree rendered, all parties appeal. Affirmed.

Cyrus Happy and O. C. Moore, both of Spokane, for appellants.

George W. Belt and Fred M. Williams, both of Spokane, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

This action was instituted by Hazel Daniel, as plaintiff, against the defendants, John I. Daniel and Ella Mona Daniel, his wife, to have established and set aside to her an interest in certain described real property, situated in part in the state of Washington and in part in the state of Arizona. The plaintiff claims as heir of her deceased mother, formerly the wife of the defendant John I. Daniel, who is her father. The other defendant is the present wife of John I. Daniel. In the complaint it is alleged that certain of the property in the state of Washington, namely, lot 2 of block 10, resurvey and addition to the city of Spokane, was the property of the community consisting of the defendant John I. Daniel and the plaintiff's mother, owned and held by them at the time of the mother's death, and that the other property in this state was acquired by the defendant subsequent to the mother's death from the rents, issues and profits of the community property. The property in Arizona was in part entered as a homestead under the laws of the United States during the lifetime of the mother, and commuted subsequent to the mother's death. The remainder of the property in that state was subsequently purchased by the defendant John I. Daniel with the proceeds, it is alleged, of the community property mentioned. The answer of the defendants put in issue the allegations of the complaint concerning the manner and time of the acquisition of the property, and affirmatively averred that the property was acquired subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's mother, and that it was the separate property of the defendant John I Daniel. In the answer the statute of limitations was also pleaded. To the answer a reply was filed, putting in issue its affirmative allegations.

With the issues thus framed and before a trial was entered upon, the plaintiff and defendants purported to settle the differences between them. The written evidences of the purported settlement consisted of some five separate instruments: (1) A writing signed by the plaintiff, entitled after the manner of the pleadings, in which, after reciting that since the commencement of her action she had become convinced that it was without merit and that she had been misled in starting the same, she consented to its dismissal, further agreeing that the dismissal should 'be res adjudicata' of any further cause of action, and that she would not thereafter directly or indirectly prosecute any further suit for the recovery of the property, and that the writing should be sufficient authority for the court to make an order dismissing the action; (2) a quitclaim deed signed and acknowledged by the plaintiff purporting to convey to the defendant her interest in all of the property described in the complaint situated in the state of Washington; (3) a quitclaim deed signed and acknowledged by the plaintiff purporting to convey to the defendant all her interests in the property described in the complaint situated in the state of Arizona; (4) a writing on a printed blank form for a quitclaim deed, signed by the defendants, but otherwise defectively executed, purporting to convey to the plaintiff 40 acres of the homestead property situated in the state of Arizona; and (5) an agreement signed by the defendant John I. Daniel in which he agreed to pay the plaintiff's schooling, board, laundry, room rent, buy her clothing, give her $10 per month spending money, for a term of 'one year, but not more than two,' while she was in attendance upon some school not named. The writing authorizing the dismissal of the action was filed in the cause on November 16, 1916, some three months after the filing of the reply.

The action was not dismissed on the agreement, and later on the respondent obtained leave of court and filed a supplemental complaint. In this complaint she charged the defendants with fraud in procuring the writing authorizing a dismissal, setting forth in detail the facts upon which the charge was founded, and asking that the agreement to dismiss and the quitclaim deeds executed by her be set aside and held for naught. To this complaint the defendants demurred, and, on their demurrer being overruled, answered, putting in issue its allegations. The cause was then tried upon the issues made by the supplemental complaint and the denials thereto, at the conclusion of which the trial court announced that the allegations of the complaint had been sustained, and that he would in the final judgment, should the allegations of the principal complaint be sustained, set aside and hold for naught the agreement to dismiss and the quitclaim deeds issued contemporaneously therewith. To these conclusions the defendants excepted, and moved that the court's findings be reduced to writing, and that a judgment be then entered embodying the court's holding, that an appeal therefrom might be taken and perfected. This motion the court denied, whereupon the trial proceeded upon the issues made by the original complaint, the answer thereto, and the reply to the answer. At the conclusion of the trial the court entered a decree setting aside the written agreement for a dismissal of the action, the quitclaim deed from the plaintiff to the defendant John I. Daniel for the property in the state of Washington, decreeing the plaintiff to be the owner of an undivided one-twelfth interest in the lot hereinbefore specifically described, and directing that an accounting be taken for a one-twelfth interest in the rents and profits of the property received by the defendant John I. Daniel since the death of the plaintiff's mother. It was further decreed that the plaintiff had no interest in the other property described in the complaint situated in the state of Washington. While the decree made no specific reference to the Arizona lands, the court early in the trial held that it was without jurisdiction over them, and admitted evidence only as tending to elucidate the respective contentions of the parties. Both parties appeal.

Taking up the appeal of the defendants, the first question to be noticed arises on the ruling of the court permitting the appellant to file the supplemental complaint. It is claimed that this was error because the matter set forth therein was not in aid of the cause of action pleaded in the original complaint; that is, it did not bring before the court new matter pertaining to the cause of action originally set forth arising subsequent thereto, but was a matter independent of the original cause of action, tending to defeat it, and hence must be itself the subject of an original cause of action. But, conceding the effect of the matter set forth in the complaint to be as the defendants contend, we think nevertheless, there was no error in permitting it to be filed in and tried out as a part of the original action. It a controversy had arisen between the parties over the ownership of the land and a purported settlement had been agreed upon between them before action was begun thereon in which the defendants had overreached and defrauded the plaintiff, manifestly the plaintiff could in a single suit in equity set aside the purported settlement and establish her interest in the property. She would not have been compelled to institute two suits for that purpose. Equity, having jurisdiction over the controversy, could in one proceeding afford complete relief. The fact that the purported settlement was had in the instant case after suit begun does not change the situation in this respect. The plaintiff must, of course, set aside the settlement before she can proceed with the main action, but she would have had to do this in the case supposed. Since, therefore, the original action in the case before us was not actually dismissed, and since the settlement was made subsequent to the commencement of the original action, no reason exists why it cannot be brought before the court in a supplemental complaint. More than this, the statute (Rem. Code, § 308) expressly provides that the court may, on motion, allow supplemental pleadings showing facts which occurred after the former pleadings were filed, and we think one of the purposes of the pleadings therein provided for is to permit questions such as are here presented to be tried out in the original action. True, this court, in common with other courts, has held that a premature action cannot be ripened into an existing cause of action by a supplemental complaint showing facts arising after the commencement of the action. Keeler v. Parks, 72 Wash. 255, 130 P. 111. But this is not the condition presented here. The complaint in this instance stated a valid cause of action. By an agreement made afterwards the action was apparently destroyed. Clearly it violates no principle of the case cited to show by a supplemental complaint that the agreement was procured by fraud.

Another contention under this head is that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to show the entire transaction with reference to the purported settlement, the oral agreement leading up to the writings, as well as the entirety of the writings; the contention being that the testimony should have been confined to the single instrument authorizing the dismissal of the action. But this is not the rule. The charge was fraud in procuring the agreement. To establish this the...