Daniel v. Department of Transp.
| Decision Date | 04 April 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. Q--204,Q--204 |
| Citation | 259 So.2d 771 |
| Parties | C. Welborn DANIEL, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
William H. Maness, Jacksonville, and D. Fred McMullen, of Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, McGehee & Carothers, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Russell Troutman, and Philip Tatich, of Skofield, Gilman, Cooper, Nichols & Tatich, Winter Park, for appellee.
The plaintiff in an action for an injunction to restrain the execution by the defendant of any contracts for the construction of staging areas for tandem trailer operations on the Sunshine State Parkway, has appealed from a final order entered by the Circuit Court for Leon County dismissing his complaint with prejudice.
The basic question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether that court committed reversible error in entering the said order, based upon the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.
These doctrines were invoked in the first paragraph of the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the said paragraph reading as follows:
Attached to, and made a part of the defendants' said motion, are copies of the amended complaint, answer, the court's order denying a temporary injunction, assignments of error, and final judgment appealed from in C. Welborn Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Authority.
An examination of the above-enumerated papers involved in the said previous case reveals the following:
In the amended complaint for injunction, the plaintiff, Daniel, alleges that the Florida State Turnpike Authority on a certain date adopted a resolution authorizing and permitting 'the operation of tandem-trailer combinations (commonly known as 'double bottoming') upon and over the Florida State Turnpike System and did purport to promulgate rules and regulations and conditions under which tandem-trailer combinations will be licensed and permitted to operate on and over said turnpike. . . .' The plaintiff then prays that the defendant, the authority, be enjoined from permitting the operation of such tandem-trailers or 'double-bottoms' on the Turnpike System.
The rule is firmly established in Florida that, before the doctrine of res judicata may be applied, the following conditions must exist: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made. All four of these conditions must coincide before the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.
In Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla.1953), the Supreme Court of Florida recognized the following four conditions that must concur before the doctrine of res judicata can be applied:
This court thus expressed this rule in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 117 So.2d 16 (Fla.App.1960):
'In order for the defense of res judicata to prevail, the final judgment or decree relied upon must reflect within its four corners matters from which it can be determined that the second suit is (1) upon the same cause of action, (2) between the same parties as the first, and (3) that the final judgment in the first suit upon the merits is conclusive in the second suit as to every question that was presented or might have been presented and determined in the first suit.'
In the light of the foregoing rules, we hold that in the case at bar the doctrine of res judicata is clearly not applicable.
In our opinion the only condition of res judicata that is met in the present case is, surprisingly enough, the identity of the parties. The Florida State Turnpike Authority, the defendant in the prior action, was transferred to the new Department of Transportation, the defendant in the case at bar, under the provisions of Sections 20.06 and 20.23, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., enacted by the State Legislature in 1969. These statutes merged the Florida State Turnpike Authority into the said Department of Transportation. While no Florida decision has been cited or found passing on this point, we hold on general principles that there is an identity of the parties.
Another condition of the application of the doctrine of res judicata--the identity of the causes of action--does not, in our opinion, exist between the causes of action in the two cases, and so that doctrine is not applicable here.
A fair way of determining the nature of a cause of action is to examine the main prayer of a plaintiff's complaint.
In the prior action the plaintiff's main prayer in his complaint was for the
'issuance of a temporary injunction and restraining Order, after due notice, enjoining and restraining the Defendant Authority, and each and every member, employee and agent thereof, from letting a contract, bid or otherwise incurring any expense in connection with the establishment of 'double bottoming staging areas' and/or 'marshalling areas', and/or other facilities to be used directly or indirectly by persons and corporations desiring to use or using the Florida Turnpike System for tandem-trailer operations and enjoining the further implementation of said resolution of October 2, 1967 and/or the licensing of trucks or drivers, to so operate, and that such injunction be made permanent.'
In the case at bar the plaintiff's main prayer in his complaint is for the:
'issuance of a temporary injunction and restraining order, with or without notice, enjoining and restraining the Department of Transportation, its agents, servants and employees, and the Secretary of Transportation, from letting any contract or incurring any expense for the acquisition or construction of staging areas for tandem trailer operations and enjoining and restraining the letting of any contract for the work proposed in Orange and Palm Beach counties, as described in paragraph 7 of this Complaint and that after final hearing such injunction and restraining order be made permanent.'
While, admittedly, there are some similarities between the two causes of action, we are not prepared to say that the two causes of action are Identical, which the causes of...
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White v. Miers, AD-478
...So. 323 (1935); State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So.2d 477 (1943); Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla.1953); Daniel v. Dept. of Transportation, 259 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 117 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). In the instant case, notwithstanding facts reflecting ......
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Temples v. Florida Indus. Const. Co., Inc., 74--531
...of the case constitutes reversible error, e.g. Davis v. Joyner, Fla.App.4th, 1974, 301 So.2d 803; Daniel v. Department of Transportation, Fla.App.1st, 1972, 259 So.2d 771. In view of our decision we do not, nor is it necessary, to express an opinion as to the merits of the case, or the resu......
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Swinney v. City of Tampa, 96-05187
...the first suit and where the relief sought in the second suit was not the same relief sought in the first suit. Daniel v. Department of Transp., 259 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further PARKER, C.J., and PATTERSON and FULMER, J......