Daniel v. Hannah
| Decision Date | 26 November 1898 |
| Citation | 31 S.E. 734,106 Ga. 91 |
| Parties | DANIEL v. HANNAH. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A ground in a motion for a new trial, complaining of alleged error in admitting testimony, cannot be considered by this court when it does not appear what objection was made by the movant to the introduction of the evidence.
2. In the trial of a case involving title to personal property where both litigants claim under the same person, one as a vendee under a contract of sale, and the other as a widow claiming a year's support, the mere declarations of such person, made in his own interest, after he had parted with possession under his contract, and not in the presence of the vendee, are not admissible in evidence against the latter.
3. Where a debtor verbally agrees to sell to his creditor a definitely specified number of bales of cotton of the value of over $50, to be credited on an account due by the former to the latter at the market value of the cotton at a certain time and place, there is a complete acceptance and delivery of the property sold, within the meaning of section 2693(7) of the Civil Code, when the debtor moves the cotton to a public place designated by the creditor, and agreed upon by the parties in their contract of sale.
4. The verdict in this case was not contrary to evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Error from superior court, Talbot county; W. B. Butt, Judge.
In the matter of the appraisement of the estate of R. M. Daniel, G W. Hannah filed objections to setting apart certain property to Frances M. Daniel, his widow. Judgment in favor of the caveator, and the widow brings error. Affirmed.
Persons & Son, for plaintiff in error.
J. H McGehee and J. A. Cotten, for defendant in error.
To the return of appraisers appointed to set apart a year's support to the widow of R. M. Daniel objections were filed by Hannah that certain cotton embraced in the return of the appraisers did not belong to R. M. Daniel at the time of his death, and that it was then, and is still, the property of caveator, and not a part of the estate of R. M. Daniel. The case was, by consent, appealed from the court of ordinary to the superior court, and the trial in the latter court resulted in a verdict in favor of the caveator. The applicant for a year's support moved for a new trial, which was refused, and she excepted.
1. The first ground in the amended motion for a new trial is that the court erred in permitting the caveator to testify, over objection of applicant's counsel, that he bought the cotton in dispute from the husband of the applicant; the value of the cotton being over $50. It does not appear from the motion upon what ground this objection was based at the time the testimony was admitted. It is true, the reason for the objection is suggested in the motion by the words, "the value of the cotton being over $50," but it nowhere appears that such objection was actually made when the testimony was objected to before the court below. Without intimating that there was anything in this ground, even if the question had been properly made, we simply decide, under repeated rulings of this court, that we cannot consider it as presented by the record.
2. Another ground of alleged error in the motion is that the court erred in ruling out the testimony of certain witnesses, who were not interested in the suit, as to what R. M. Daniel, the deceased husband, said to witnesses, in the absence of Hannah, the caveator, concerning the cotton in dispute, and yet permitting the caveator to testify about his transaction with deceased in buying the cotton in dispute. There was manifestly no error in excluding this testimony, as it was merely hearsay, being the declarations of a deceased party to the contract, not even made under oath, nor in the presence of the other contracting party.
3, 4. It was further objected that the court erred in charging the jury that, if they believed from the evidence that R. M Daniel sold the cotton at Reeves' ginnery to Hannah, and in pursuance of that sale moved the cotton to a place designated by Hannah, to be credited on R. M. Daniel's account at the price it would bring on November 10, 1896, that was a sale, and title to the cotton was in Hannah. And again, because the court erred in refusing to charge, at the request of counsel for applicant, that, as no earnest money was paid, and no receipt for the cotton was given, by Hannah to Daniel at the time of the alleged sale, Hannah should have had actual possession of the cotton to have made it a legal sale of the cotton. There was testimony by one witness to the effect that he was present, and heard a conversation between Daniel and Hannah, at Hannah's store, in Thomaston, on October 10, 1896; that Daniel told Hannah that he had hauled seven bales of cotton to Mr. Reeves'; that it belonged to Dr. Hannah, and, if Hannah wished it, he would haul the cotton to Thomaston for him; that the cotton was paid to Hannah to go on Daniel's store account, and the agreement was that Hannah should allow Daniel the highest market price in Thomaston for the cotton on November 10, 1896; that is, Daniel's account with Hannah should be credited with the value of the seven bales of cotton at its highest market value at that time. There was considerable testimony introduced in behalf of the applicant for a year's support conflicting with the evidence in behalf of the caveator, and tending to establish the fact that no such contract was made as claimed by him, and no credit was upon the books of the caveator at the time of Daniel's death. The books of Hannah were introduced, showing a credit on Daniel's account of the seven bales of cotton on the day Hannah said he purchased it. Hannah testified that the credit was there on that date. Two witnesses testified that they examined Hannah's books after Daniel's death, and found no such credit on Daniel's account. The...
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Patterson v. Hightower, 16527.
...ascertained. 1 Williston on Sales 434, § 167; McConnell v. Hughes, 29 Wis. 537; Phifer v. Erwin, 100 N.C. 59, 6 S.E. 672; Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga. 91, 31 S.E. 734. The period during which property is held ordinarily terminates when title passes. 3 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation 742......
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Miller v. State
...of which some other part has already been admitted in evidence. Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Alston v. Grantham, 26 Ga. 374; Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga. 91, 31 S.E. 734; Dozier v. McWhorter, Ga. 786, 790, 45 S.E. 61. ' Mineola Mill Co. v. Griffin, 18 Ga.App. 668(2), 90 S.E. 360. See also Walker......
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Rabun v. Wynn
...that a party cannot thus make evidence in his own favor.' Dozier v. McWhorter, 117 Ga. 786, 790, 45 S.E. 61, 63. See also Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga. 91, 31 S.E. 734. In this case and over an objection that they are self-serving declarations, as interposed by counsel for the defendants, the c......
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Miller v. State, 31153.
...of which some other part has already been admitted in evidence. Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Alston v. Grantham, 26 Ga. 374; Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga. 91, 31 S.E. 734; Dozier v. Mc-Whorter, 117 Ga. 786, 790, 45 S.E. 61." Mineola Mill Co. v. Griffin, 18 Ga.App. 668(2), 90 S.E. 360. See also Wa......