Daniel v. State
| Decision Date | 23 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. E2002-02838-CCA-R3-PC.,E2002-02838-CCA-R3-PC. |
| Parties | ALDEN JOE DANIEL, JR. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Cynthia Fort, Nashville, Tennessee, and Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., pro se, Wartburg, Tennessee for the appellant, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Braden H. Boucek, Assistant Attorney General, Jerry N. Estes, District Attorney General, and Joseph Hoffer, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR. and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.
Petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his initial brief filed with the assistance of retained counsel, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary and knowing and in finding that Petitioner's trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel during the interval between Petitioner's first and second trial and during plea negotiations. After the filing of his initial brief, this Court granted Petitioner's counsel leave to withdraw as counsel and denied Petitioner's motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider post-judgment facts pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and a pro se supplemental brief. In his brief, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court based its findings on erroneous facts. Petitioner requests that this Court remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to factual matters not presented at Petitioner's post-conviction proceeding. For the reasons discussed herein, we deny Petitioner's motion to consider post-judgment facts and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.
Petitioner was indicted on thirteen counts of statutory rape, sexual battery and rape stemming from allegations by various members of the girls' basketball team that Petitioner coached during the summer. After he was indicted, Petitioner fled the state and was apprehended approximately six months later. Following his return to Tennessee to stand trial, Petitioner was convicted of flight to avoid prosecution, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to the sexual offense charges. A second trial commenced later that summer. During the selection of the jury, a recess was called to explore the possibility of a plea settlement. After negotiations, Petitioner pled guilty to five counts of statutory rape, two counts of sexual battery and one count of rape with an effective sentence of nine years. This sentence was substantially less than the potential sentence Petitioner faced if he proceeded to trial and less than the twelve-year effective sentence initially offered by the State. In addition, the State agreed not to prosecute Petitioner's father, mother, former wife and daughter for perjury and/or for aiding Petitioner while he was a fugitive.
Petitioner initially filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among numerous other issues, (1) that his guilty plea was not entered into voluntarily or knowingly but was instead a product of duress and coercion prompted by the State's threat to prosecute his family if he did not plead guilty; (2) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the interval between the first and second trial and during the plea negotiations; and (3) that the prosecution failed to turn over exculpatory evidence during the period between the first trial and the second trial.
In support of his petition, Petitioner testified that he only talked with his counsel one time between the conclusion of his first trial and the commencement of the second trial. When he arrived at the courthouse, Petitioner said that he had every expectation that the trial would begin. In the middle of jury selection, a recess was called, and Petitioner, along with his father, mother and former wife, met with Petitioner's counsel in a separate room. On the table were several documents which appeared to be warrants containing the names of Petitioner's family members. Although Petitioner was aware during his first trial that his family was vulnerable to prosecution for their assistance to him while he was absent from the state, the State had not pursued the filing of charges. Petitioner said that his counsel assured him that the family had not done anything wrong, so Petitioner was surprised to find out that arrest warrants had actually been prepared.
Petitioner said that the plea negotiations lasted only about fifteen minutes and included an agreement by the State not to press charges against his family. Petitioner testified that during the plea negotiations, his only concern was his family's potential arrests, although he admitted that the family members told Petitioner not to base his decision on what might or might not happen to them. Petitioner denied that trial counsel had discussed the additional incriminating evidence the State had gathered against him between the first and second trials. Specifically, Petitioner denied that his counsel told him that James McDonald, the friend who sheltered Petitioner during part of the time he was a fugitive, was prepared to testify for the State that Petitioner had acquired a tattoo below the waist for the sole purpose of confusing the victims on identification. Petitioner also denied that his counsel told him that Mr. McDonald had informed the State that Petitioner had engaged in sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl while staying at Mr. McDonald's house.
At Petitioner's first trial, his former wife and daughter both testified that Petitioner was working at Charleston Hosiery Mill at the time one of the incidents allegedly occurred. Petitioner denied that his counsel told him that the State subsequently obtained the company's sign-in logs for that time period, and that the records did not support Petitioner's contention that he was working at Charleston Hosiery Mill at that time. Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that he was working as an independent contractor and was not required to use the employee sign-in sheets. Petitioner said he was paid in cash and admitted that he did not pay federal income tax on this income. Petitioner also denied that counsel told him he had spoken to Detective Tony Alvarez who provided a summary of the evidence the State had to prosecute both Petitioner's former wife, Darlene Ledford, and his daughter, Brandy Daniel, for perjury pertaining to their testimony at the first trial.
Plaintiff, however, admitted that he was aware that the State had obtained the services of an expert witness to testify at Petitioner's second trial that the handwriting on correspondence to one of the victims was Petitioner's. Petitioner also knew that the State had discovered that a friend of one of the victim's had arranged Petitioner's rape by three or four men and that the State was in possession of Petitioner's medical records resulting from that incident. Petitioner was also aware that the secretary for Coach Pat Head Summit was prepared to testify at the second trial that a resume submitted by Petitioner to the University of Tennessee's women's basketball program contained a number of fraudulent statements. Petitioner, however, denied that he ever sent a resume to Coach Summit.
Petitioner testified that he received a copy of criminal injuries compensation reports submitted by two of the victims after he was in prison. One of the reports was filed five months before trial and indicated that at least one of the victims intended to file a civil suit against Petitioner and had contacted an attorney to act on her behalf. Petitioner said that the State should have provided his counsel with a copy of the report. One of the victim's mothers had testified at the first trial that she had not filed a lawsuit against Petitioner, and Petitioner argued that the compensation report could have been used to impeach the witness. In addition, Petitioner testified that he would not have pled guilty if he had known about the potential for a civil lawsuit.
Finally, Petitioner testified that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because of a conflict of interest between Petitioner and another client of counsel's, Dr. Cecil Knight. Although not exactly clear from Petitioner's testimony, it appears that Petitioner and Dr. Cecil Knight were on opposite sides of a lawsuit totally unrelated to Petitioner's criminal trial. Petitioner admitted that it was the district attorney who initially raised the issue of a conflict of interest. Petitioner and his counsel resisted the State's motion to disqualify Petitioner's trial counsel and, after a hearing, the trial court concluded that no conflict of interest existed. During the hearing, Petitioner waived any conflict that might exist and expressed his desire to retain trial counsel to assist him at trial.
Robert Owenby, a former employee of Charleston Hosiery Mill, testified that he knew Petitioner was a security guard at the facility some time in 1997 but could not recall the exact time period that Petitioner worked there. Mr. Owenby also said he thought Petitioner was hired as an independent contractor rather than an employee but did not know how Petitioner was paid.
Christal Ward, a member of Petitioner's basketball team, said that she was prepared to testify at trial that one of the victim's mothers had approached her about joining a potential civil lawsuit against Petitione...
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