Daniel v. Whitlock
| Decision Date | 26 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 23468,23468 |
| Citation | 149 S.E.2d 79,222 Ga. 192 |
| Parties | Milton DANIEL v. J. W. WHITLOCK, Warden. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court was authorized to revoke suspension of service of the three year sentence for abandonment of minor children upon finding noncompliance with the terms and conditions of such suspension, even though more than three years had elapsed since the original sentence.
2. Such sentence was not void for vagueness as to the terms and conditions regarding support payments ordered by it.
G. Hughel Harrison, Lawrenceville, for appellant.
Sanders, Mottola & Haugen, Walter D. Sanders, Willis G. Haugen, Newnan, for appellee.
His habeas corpus petition having been dismissed upon general demurrer, Milton Daniel appealed that ruling to this court. The petition, filed in the Superior Court of Coweta County, was against J. W. Whitlock, as warden of the public works camp of that county. The basis of petitioner's claim of illegal detention is an order revoking the suspension of service of his original sentence. He asserts that this revocation was ordered after the original sentence had expired.
The original sentence, for the offense of abandonment of minor children, was entered on September 18, 1961, in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County. It contained, in material part, the provisions which follow. The petitioner was sentenced to serve three years in the public works camp, but such sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation on that date for an intermediate time. He was directed to comply with nine specified conditions of probation, to defray costs of court and to pay 'as support and maintenance for his minor children the sum of $100 per month.' It further provided that 'the above sentence is hereby suspended as long as the defendant complies with the above payments,' and stated that violation of any condition of probation would subject the petitioner to arrest. Lastly, it declared that if the probation was revoked the court could order execution of the original sentence or any portion thereof.
The revocation order of November 3, 1965, recited that upon a hearing, the court found that the terms of probation had been violated by petitioner's failure to comply with the support requirement and by his absconding; and ordered that the probation provisions of the original sentence be revoked and that the petitioner be required to serve three years in the penitentiary or such other place as the Board of Corrections might direct.
The petitioner's contention, as shown by his seven enumerated errors, make two main issues. First, was the November 3, 1965, order revoking the suspension of the original September 18, 1961, three-year sentence void in that such sentence had expired? Second, was such revocation order void in that the original sentence was vague, indefinite and without measure or standard as to time in so far as the support requirement was concerned?
1. We must reject the petitioner's contentions on the first issue, whether or not revocation of the suspension of service of the original three year sentence was void because more than three years had elapsed since such sentence was entered.
The original sentence and the subsequent revocation of the suspension of its service were in conformity with a significant 1960 amendment (Ga.L.1960, p. 1148; Code Ann. § 27-2709) to Section 8 of the Statewide Probation Act (Ga.L.1956, p. 27). The amendment added after the words 'The period of probation shall not exceed the maximum sentence of confinement which could be imposed upon such defendant,' the following language: '* * * except that in a prosecution for and conviction of the offense of abandonment, the trial...
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In re Rollins
...and could order service of the entire sentence years after the sentence, by its original terms, had lapsed. See Daniel v. Whitlock, 222 Ga. 192, 194-95, 149 S.E.2d 79 (1966), citing Ga.L. 1960, p. From the foregoing, it is apparent that over the years Georgia courts and the Georgia General ......
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Strickland v. State
...appellant's sentence and in revoking and reinstating the suspension at the August 1979 and June 1982 hearings. See Daniel v. Whitlock, 222 Ga. 192, 149 S.E.2d 79 (1966). Appellant apparently bases his appeal on the use of the word "probation" and the citation of Code Ann. § 27-2713 on the p......