Daniels v. Balcones Woods Club, Inc., No. 03-03-00310-CV (TX 2/2/2006)
| Decision Date | 02 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-03-00310-CV.,03-03-00310-CV. |
| Parties | GREGORY DANIELS, Appellant, v. BALCONES WOODS CLUB, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Travis County, 201st Judicial District, No. GN200811, Honorable Margaret A. Cooper, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices B. A. SMITH and PURYEAR.
In this case, the district court granted a permanent injunction in favor of neighborhood association Balcones Woods Club, Inc., requiring appellant Gregory Daniels to remove a car parked on his front lawn in violation of neighborhood association restrictive covenants. Daniels argues that the district court was not fair and impartial, and challenges, among other things, findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the issuance of the injunction. We will affirm.
Balcones Woods Club, Inc. is a neighborhood association in northwest Austin. It is governed by a board of directors who set neighborhood policy, ensure that the budget is spent properly, and enforce covenants, deed restrictions, and dues collections. Property in the Balcones Woods neighborhood is subject to certain covenants, conditions, and restrictions that were filed and recorded with the Travis County clerk in January 1974.
Two restrictions are at issue in this case. Section eleven of article five, entitled "Nuisances," states that Section twelve, entitled "Unsightly Objects," provides, in part, that "No boat, motor boat, camper, truck, trailer, motor home, recreational vehicle, travel trailer or unsightly vehicles or objects shall be parked or stored between the curb and building line of any lot or on any street adjoining any lot."1
Daniels is the owner of a home on Flagstaff Street in the Balcones Woods neighborhood.2 In the summer of 2001, Daniels began parking a late model Mazda 626 on his front lawn, next to the driveway and under an oak tree.3 In the late summer of 2001, Brooks Colson, the chairperson of the covenants enforcement committee, informed the Board that the car was parked on Daniels's front lawn. In a letter dated October 5, the Balcones Woods Operating Committee notified Daniels that it believed that parking a vehicle in his yard was a violation of the neighborhood covenants, conditions and restrictions.4 The letter also stated that if Daniels disagreed with the allegation, he could contact the committee and explain his position. The committee requested compliance within ten days, but gave Daniels the option of requesting an extension. It notified him that if the violation was not corrected, the matter would be turned over to legal counsel for action.
On January 31, 2002, the Board sent Daniels another letter notifying him that it was prepared to file suit for the "ongoing violation of Article V, Sections 11 and 12 of the restrictive covenants governing [Daniels's] property" regarding a vehicle parked in the front yard, and that he may be required to pay attorney's fees and costs if he did not comply with the covenants. The letter also stated that Daniels could request a hearing before the Board within thirty days in an effort to resolve the matter. Daniels never responded to the Board's letters, sought a hearing, or otherwise attempted to resolve the dispute.
On March 8, 2002, Balcones Woods filed suit, alleging that Daniels was in violation of sections eleven and twelve of the restrictive covenants and seeking a temporary and permanent injunction in addition to attorney's fees and costs. After a bench trial, the district court granted a permanent injunction and assessed attorney's fees and costs against Daniels. Daniels requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were timely filed. This appeal followed.
Daniels complains that the district court was not fair and impartial, as allegedly evidenced by the manner in which it ruled, interjected objections, and prevented cross-examination of witnesses. He also challenges several findings of fact and conclusions of law and attacks the issuance of the injunction.
Standard of review
Generally, the necessary elements of an injunction are: (1) a wrongful act, (2) the existence of imminent harm, (3) the existence of irreparable injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Democracy Coalition v. City of Austin, 141 S.W.3d 282, 295-96 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.); see Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 853 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.). However, when an injunction is sought to enforce a restrictive covenant, the movant is not required to show proof of irreparable injury.Marcus v. Whispering Springs Homeowners Ass'n, 153 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.);see Bankler v. Vale, 75 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Instead, the movant need show only that the defendant intends to do an act that would breach the covenant. Marcus, 153 S.W.3d at 707; Vale, 75 S.W.3d at 39; Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d at 849.
We review a district court's issuance of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & S.E. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998). The test for an abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the district court's action but "whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles." Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985)).
Whether the district court was fair and impartial
Daniels cites several examples of what he contends is evidence that the district court was not fair and impartial because the court "made it obvious" that it favored Balcones Woods and "effectively eliminated any possibility of discovering the complete truth behind this matter."5
Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, and judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Furthermore, " " Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56). In short, a district court has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases "with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Id. (quoting Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). Moreover, the district court has great discretion over the conduct of a trial. Id. (citingSchroeder v. Brandon, 172 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. 1943); see Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). It may properly intervene to maintain control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it considers to be a waste of time. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241; see Tex. R. Evid. 611(a) ().
We have reviewed the transcript of the circumstances surrounding Daniels's complaints. First, he complains that the court would not allow him to question a witness regarding what the witness believed was "unsightly"—using Daniels's necktie as an example—in an apparent attempt to prove that the meaning of the term is subjective. However, the court accurately informed Daniels that the interpretation of a term in the restrictive covenant is a question of law which is not an appropriate subject for a fact witness.See Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. 2001) (); see also Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998) ().
Next, Daniels argues that the "same problem occurred" when he "tried to focus on the issue of waiver or speculative real estate values or to simply test an expert witness's knowledge of critical provisions." In these examples, the district court was avoiding needless consumption of time, see Tex. R. Evid. 611(a), because Daniels was asking questions about what the witness did not consider to be a violation of the covenants, whether the witness had protested the value assigned to his own property for property tax purposes, and whether individuals may enforce deed restrictions. These lines of questioning were either irrelevant to the legal question of whether Daniels had violated the applicable deed restrictions or improperly called for a legal conclusion.6 See Tex. R. Evid. 402, 701. It is true that the district court played a somewhat active role in the questioning of witnesses. However, this was a bench trial where ...
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