Daniels v. Bernard

• Citation: 240 S.E.2d 518,270 S.C. 51
• Decision Date: 09 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 20575,20575
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: Eva McCrea DANIELS, Appellant, v. George William BERNARD, Respondent.

Page 518

240 S.E.2d 518

270 S.C. 51

Eva McCrea DANIELS, Appellant, v. George William BERNARD, Respondent.

No. 20575.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 9, 1978.

R. Dean Welch and Dalton B. Floyd, Jr., Lake City, for appellant.

James M. Connor, of Connor & Connor, Kingstree, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court granting a new trial.

The appellant, Eva McCrea Daniels (Daniels), brought this action against the respondent, George William Bernard (Bernard), to recover actual and punitive damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an automobile collision.

The complaint of Daniels alleges that she was traveling in a northerly direction on Highway 52, a four-lane road in Lake City, when an automobile driven by Bernard violently collided with the rear end of her automobile, causing her to suffer painful and permanent personal injuries. The complaint further alleged that the collision was proximately caused by the negligence, recklessness, carelessness, willfulness and wantonness of Bernard in the operation of his automobile in the following particulars:

(a) in operating his automobile at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances, in violation of the laws of South Carolina;

(b) in failing to keep his automobile at a reasonable and proper distance from Daniels' automobile;

(c) in failing to take proper cognizance of traffic conditions on the highway ahead of him;

(f) in failing to take the necessary measures to avoid the collision when he knew or should have known that the collision was imminent;

(g) in failing to keep his automobile under proper control; and

(h) in operating his automobile in violation of the laws of South Carolina and being otherwise negligent, careless and reckless.

In his answer, Bernard denied any wrongful driving conduct on his part which proximately caused the injuries to Daniels, and alleged that the collision was caused solely by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness, willfulness and wantonness of Daniels in the operation of her automobile in the following particulars:

(a) in unlawfully changing lanes;

(b) in failing to yield the right-of-way to Bernard's vehicle; and

(c) in failing to keep a proper lookout

The answer further alleged that even if he was negligent, which he denied, Daniels' claim was barred by her own contributory negligence.

The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict for Daniels in the amount of $7,000.00 actual and $8,000.00 punitive damages. Bernard moved for a judgment non obstante veredicto, and alternatively for a new trial, based on alleged trial errors. The judge granted the motion for a new trial on the following grounds:

(1) That he erred in charging the law as to punitive damages since there was "no evidence of any statutory violation . . ." and "no evidence of recklessness on the part of the defendant."

(2) That he erred in charging that a verdict for actual damages ". . . should include such future or prospective damages, if any, as the evidence renders it reasonably certain will of necessity result in the future from the alleged wrongful conduct."

(3) That he erred in allowing a licensed chiropractor to testify "about medical matters he is not qualified to diagnose or treat."

Daniels appeals.

Our first inquiry is limited to the question of whether there was any evidence from which the jury might reasonably have inferred (1) that Bernard was reckless, and (2) that Daniels would suffer future damages. We are of the opinion that there was evidence from which the jury could have made both findings. We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in granting the motion for a new trial on these grounds.

In regard to the question of recklessness, Ringo Wallace, an eyewitness to the collision, testified that he saw both vehicles traveling north on Highway 52; that they were both traveling in the right-hand lane; that Bernard's automobile was trailing Daniels and that it was gaining on the Daniels' vehicle; and that the Bernard automobile rammed into the rear of Daniels' vehicle.

Daniels testified that she first observed the Bernard automobile in her rear-view mirror, that it was coming up behind her, and she thought it would go around her; and that it struck her vehicle in the rear.

We think that the jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony that Bernard was following too closely and was failing to maintain a proper lookout. Following too closely constitutes a violation of § 56-5-1930, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). We have held that the violation of a statute is negligence per se and is evidence of recklessness and willfulness, requiring the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Jarvis v. Green, 257 S.C. 558, 186 S.E.2d 765 (1972); Still v. Blake, 255 S.C. 95, 177 S.E.2d 469 (1970).

We conclude that the trial judge erred in holding that there was no evidence of recklessness to sustain an award for punitive damages.

Concerning the question of future damages, the trial judge ruled that there was no evidence to support such an award. We disagree.

In making this ruling, the trial judge strongly relied on the statement of Dr. D. M. Evans, a medical doctor who had examined and treated Daniels. Dr. Evans stated that he did not believe that Daniels would suffer any permanent damage or disability, but that she may need further treatment in the future.

The trial judge apparently equated disability with future damages in concluding that since there was no evidence of permanent or future disability, there could be no future damages. In the recent case of Fishburne v. Short, S.C., 235 S.E.2d 118, we...