Daniels v. Bronson
| Decision Date | 23 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. B-89-241 (TFGD). |
| Citation | 736 F. Supp. 1215 |
| Parties | Jerry D. DANIELS, Petitioner, v. George BRONSON, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Joseph Bruckmann, New Haven, Conn., for petitioner.
Carolyn Longstreth, Wallingford, Conn., for respondent.
RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT HABEAS CORPUS
Jerry Daniels petitions this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. He is presently incarcerated at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, Connecticut. Petitioner claims that his separate convictions and sentences for both multiple murder capital felony and for murder of one of the victims of the capital felony offense violate the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause. After unsuccessfully asserting his double jeopardy claim in the trial proceedings, petitioner was granted certification to appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which rejected his double jeopardy claim. State v. Daniels, 209 Conn. 225, 550 A.2d 885 (1988) ("Daniels II"). Accordingly, petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. See, e.g., Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 302-03, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 1810-11, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c).
The respondent has answered the petition and responded to the Court's order to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted. Additionally, the respondent filed and the Court has reviewed the pertinent portions of the transcript of the trial court proceedings. Finally, oral argument having been heard on the petition, this matter is now ripe for decision.
The following excerpt from the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 378-79, 542 A.2d 306 (1988) ("Daniels I") describes the actions for which the petitioner stands convicted:
On June 16, 1984, the day of the murders, the victim, Christine Whipple, shared a two-bedroom apartment with Mary ... in Norwich. Christine and her three year old daughter, Amy Russell, normally slept in one bedroom, while Mary slept in the other. During May and early June, Mary had dated and had sexual relations with the defendant, but approximately one week before the day of the murders she had broken up with him.... At approximately 1 a.m., the defendant, looking for Mary, arrived at the apartment. Having been admitted by Christine, the defendant refused to comply with her request that he leave. An argument and then a physical struggle ensued. Christine broke away and ran into her bedroom, where the defendant followed her. He pulled out a knife, which he had concealed in his sock, and stabbed her several times in the chest. She fell on the bed while he continued to stab her. Amy awoke screaming, "Mommy, Mommy." The defendant grabbed the child by the neck in an attempt to strangle her and then slit her throat. Upon hearing gurgling noises from Christine, he removed her panties and had sexual intercourse with her, stabbing her again afterwards.
The facts pertaining to this petition are, with one significant exception, essentially undisputed. After trial before a three-judge panel in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of New London, the petitioner was convicted of the murder of Christine Whipple, in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-54a1, and of capital felony for the murders of both Whipple and her three-year old daughter, Amy Russell, in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-54b(8).2 Petitioner was also convicted of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-71. The prosecution sought the death penalty on the capital felony conviction pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a. During the penalty phase, the jury deadlocked on whether the petitioner had proven the existence of a mitigating factor, an issue critical to the determination of whether the death penalty could be imposed. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a(f). The trial judge then dismissed the jury, reassembled the three-judge panel, and on March 27, 1986 imposed two consecutive life sentences for the capital felony and murder convictions and a consecutive ten-year sentence on the sexual assault conviction.
Both the petitioner and the State appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The State raised issues relating to the construction and application of Connecticut's death penalty statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a. Seeking to have his murder conviction set aside, the petitioner claimed that his capital felony and murder convictions and punishments violated the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause. The Connecticut Supreme Court, sitting en banc, remanded the case to the trial court for an articulation of its reasons for dismissing the death penalty proceeding and imposing sentence. Daniels I, 207 Conn. at 400-03, 542 A.2d 306. The court expressly declined to reach petitioner's double jeopardy argument until after the trial court issued its articulation. Id. at 402, 542 A.2d 306.
After the trial court ruled, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's double jeopardy claim. Daniels II, 209 Conn. at 238-50, 550 A.2d 885. The Supreme Court implicitly found that the trial court, also without explicitly so stating, reduced the capital felony conviction to one for the lesser included offense of the murder of Amy Russell and permissibly sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment for that offense. Id. at 239-40, 550 A.2d 885 (). It also held that "for punishment purposes, it was not unconstitutionally duplicitous to join this conviction with the petitioner's separate conviction for the murder of Christine Whipple." Id.
Subsequently, on March 7, 1989, the United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. Daniels v. Connecticut, ___ U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 1349, 103 L.Ed.2d 817 (1989).
A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is being held in the custody of respondent in violation of a federal right. Engel v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1567, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Petitioner argues that the convictions and sentences for multiple murder capital felony and murder violated the double jeopardy clause's proscription that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. More specifically, he claims that the conviction and sentenced imposed on the Christine Whipple murder are barred by the double jeopardy clause's protection against "multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
Respondent argues that the court need not reach the merits of petitioner's claim because it was waived during the course of the trial court sentencing proceeding. A careful review of the trial court record shows that this argument is wholly without merit.
Both before and during the trial, petitioner, through counsel, moved to dismiss the murder count on double jeopardy grounds. T. at 36-27 (10/21/85). During the sentencing phase, petitioner reiterated and renewed this argument on several occasions. On each occasion, the trial court denied the relief sought.
The trial court initially sentenced petitioner to consecutive terms of imprisonment "for the rest of his natural life" on the capital felony conviction and "for the remainder of his natural life" on the murder conviction. T. at 66 (3/27/86). Petitioner then immediately requested that his double jeopardy exception be noted and objected to this sentence, arguing for its amendment on the ground that the statute in effect at the time of the offense permitted only a sentence of "life imprisonment" for the crime of capital felony.3Id. at 67. The State did not object to the defense motion to amend and further requested that the trial court indicate that the sentence on the capital felony count was for the intentional murder of Amy Russell to alleviate any multiple punishment concerns. Id. at 67-68. Petitioner objected to this request arguing that judgment should be imposed on the crimes charged in the information. Id. at 68.
After listening to the State renew its request one final time, the trial court then resentenced petitioner to consecutive terms of "life imprisonment" on the capital felony and Christine Whipple murder convictions. Id. After imposing the life imprisonment sentence on the capital felony charge, the trial court asked defense counsel, "Is that the way ... you want it?" Id. Defense counsel responded affirmatively. Id. This response, the respondent contends, constituted a waiver of petitioner's double jeopardy claim.
The Court disagrees. The record demonstrates that the court inquired of defense counsel to see if the resentencing resolved the issue raised by his motion to amend. The defense responded, not by waiving the double jeopardy argument which had previously been rejected and to which exception had been taken and noted, but rather by affirmatively indicating that the wording of the new sentence conformed to the statutory penalty applicable to the charge of capital felony. Waiver, therefore, is not an issue in this case.4
At the heart of this dispute is the Connecticut Supreme Court's finding that the trial court implicitly reduced the multiple murder capital felony conviction to the lesser included offense of the Amy Russell murder and sentenced accordingly. Daniels II, 209 Conn. at 239-40, 550 A.2d 885. If this factual finding was correct, then the petitioner was not subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense and...
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