State v. Daniels

• Citation: 209 Conn. 225,550 A.2d 885
• Decision Date: 22 November 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 12948,12963,s. 12948
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jerry D. DANIELS.

Page 885

550 A.2d 885

209 Conn. 225

STATE of Connecticut v. Jerry D. DANIELS.

Nos. 12948, 12963.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 4, 1988.

Decided Nov. 22, 1988.

C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., with whom were John M. Massameno and Steven Sellers, Asst. State's Attys., for appellant-appellee (State).

Joseph G. Bruckmann, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellee-appellant (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in these appeals, after a remand for articulation, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the penalty phase of a death penalty proceeding pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-46a, ¹ and in imposing a life sentence, after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the existence of a mitigating factor. In State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 394-96, 542 A.2d 306 (1988) (Daniels I ), this court determined that such disagreement authorized the trial court to declare a mistrial. Because we were, however, unclear about the reasoning underlying the trial court's action, we requested an articulation. We now affirm the trial court's decision and, after considering one other issue relating to sentencing that remained undecided in Daniels I, find no error.

For the purposes of the present appeals, we need only reiterate the following facts, which are more fully reported in Daniels I, supra, at 378-81, 542 A.2d 306. After a trial to a three judge court, the defendant, Jerry D. Daniels, was convicted of one count of murder in the death of Christine Whipple pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-54a, ² one count of capital felony in the deaths of Christine Whipple and her daughter Amy Russell pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-54b(8), ³ and one count of second degree sexual assault concerning Christine Whipple pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-71. ⁴ The prosecution sought the death penalty for the capital felony conviction and the defendant elected a trial by jury at the penalty stage. The jury found the existence of an aggravating factor, but despite extensive deliberations and receiving a "Chip Smith" charge, could not reach a unanimous decision on the existence of a mitigating factor. The trial court then dismissed the jury and sentenced the defendant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, one each for the murder and capital felony convictions, and to a consecutive term of ten years imprisonment for the sexual assault conviction. ⁵

On the prior appeal, in which both the state and the defendant took issue with various trial court rulings, we determined that the trial court had correctly construed the death penalty statute to impose upon the state the burden of proving one of the statutorily defined aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and thereafter to impose upon the defendant the burden of proving a statutorily defined mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. Daniels I, supra, at 383-86, 542 A.2d 306. We concluded, furthermore, that neither of these burdens can be met without a unanimous finding by the trier of fact. Id., at 386-94, 542 A.2d 306. Finally, we held that, if the jury cannot agree on the existence of a mitigating factor, the trial court has discretion to declare a mistrial. Id., at 394-96, 542 A.2d 306. In such circumstances, we determined that the trial court may pursue one of three courses of action: it may declare a mistrial; it may make factual findings "acquitting" the defendant of the death penalty; or it may exercise its discretion, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56, ⁶ to dismiss the death penalty proceeding. Id., at 396-97, 542 A.2d 306. We were, however, unsure whether the trial court was aware of its authority to declare a mistrial and, if it were aware, what underlay its decision of fact and law leading to its imposition of a life sentence on the defendant for the capital felony conviction. ⁷ Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court for a further articulation of its reasons for dismissing the death penalty phase of the proceeding and imposing the life sentence. Id., 207 Conn. at 400-403, 542 A.2d 306.

The trial court responded with an articulation on June 13, 1988, which made it clear that the court understood that it had the authority to declare a mistrial, but had elected not to do so. The court then went on to describe why it had decided to dismiss the death penalty proceeding and to impose a life sentence upon the defendant. It stated that it "was determined to resolve the case with finality."

On this record, there are two issues before us. On the state's appeal, the question is whether a death penalty proceeding must be reinstated because the trial court either lacked the discretion to impose a life sentence or abused its discretion in its exercise. The defendant maintains, to the contrary that principles of double jeopardy preclude appellate review of the trial court's decision. On the defendant's appeal, the question is one we did not reach in Daniels I: whether the trial court violated the principles of double jeopardy in imposing two life sentences upon the defendant, one for the murder of Christine Whipple and the other for the capital felony of killing Christine Whipple and Amy Russell. We find no error. ⁸

I

Turning to the state's appeal, we must address two issues in order to ascertain whether the trial court erroneously imposed a life sentence. First, is the court's decision, as the defendant maintains, barred from appellate review by applicable principles of double jeopardy? Second, did the court, as the state maintains, have authority or justification for its exercise of discretion to impose a life sentence?

The defendant's double jeopardy argument comes to us in two versions. The defendant maintains that, if the trial court exercised discretion in imposing a life sentence, its action is not further reviewable after the beginning of the execution of his life sentence. He further maintains that, if the trial court's action amounted to a fact-based "acquittal," then, as we held in Daniels I, supra, at 397-99, 542 A.2d 306, such an "acquittal" bars a second capital sentencing hearing. We find neither of these arguments persuasive.

In Daniels I, we considered and rejected the defendant's argument that the beginning of the execution of his life sentence foreclosed any proceedings to impose a penalty that would be more severe. Id., at 387, 542 A.2d 306. We noted that double jeopardy does not preclude the correction of a sentence that is illegal. Id. The defendant now renews this claim, arguing that any sentence that the trial court has discretion to impose is not illegal. While that argument might have force under other circumstances, such as when a trial court is selecting one among a range of permissible statutory sanctions, it is inappropriate in this case where the consequence of the trial court's decision is the dismissal of the penalty phase of a capital felony proceeding. Were such an exercise of discretion improper, the court would have acted illegally in imposing a life sentence. "Correction of this illegality, were it to be shown, would not violate double jeopardy. United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C.Cir.1987); State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 116, 445 A.2d 304 (1982); State v. Pina, 185 Conn. 473, 479, 440 A.2d 962 (1981); see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980)." Daniels I, supra, at 387, 542 A.2d 306.

The defendant's alternative double jeopardy argument rests on the proposition that the trial court's articulation amounted to an "acquittal on the merits" of the death penalty. We posited in Daniels I, supra, at 397, 542 A.2d 306, that, if the trial court were to reach such a fact-bound determination, double jeopardy would bar further review because another capital sentencing hearing would be foreclosed. We held that the test was " 'whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, [1355], 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)." Daniels I, supra, at 399, 542 A.2d 306. Applying that test to the trial court's original oral memorandum and its subsequent articulation, we conclude that the trial court was not exercising the power conferred upon it, by Practice Book § 883, ⁹ to find as a matter of fact that "the evidence would not reasonably permit a finding of guilty."

Examination of the court's remarks at trial and in its articulation ¹⁰ discloses nothing that either expressly or impliedly can be construed as the equivalent of a factual finding that the evidence produced at the hearing on mitigating factors reasonably required a finding that the existence of a mitigating factor had been proven. The statements that come closest to such a finding were the following. At the trial, the court remarked that " 'I feel that the State had its best shot at this trial; and, with all of that, there was a division of six and six. I see no further reason to prolong the Daniels sentencing phase of the trial any further.' " Daniels I, supra, at 400, 542 A.2d 306. In its articulation, the court merely reiterated that a jury could reasonably have found the existence of a mitigating factor: "In the context of the statutory definition of mitigating factors, there was sufficient evidence for jurors to come to a reasonable conclusion that there were one or more mitigating factors. In fact, six jurors did." Indeed the court expressly articulated its intent to exercise its discretion, and emphasized its concern for the futility and expense of another trial, and its adverse impact upon the defendant, the victims' family, and society. We...