Daniels v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 27 September 2018
• Docket Number: 16-cv-9080 (AJN)
• Parties: Kevin Daniels, Plaintiff, v. City of New York et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Kevin Daniels, Plaintiff, v. City of New York et al., Defendants.

16-cv-9080 (AJN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 27, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

In this civil rights action, Plaintiff Kevin Daniels argues that he was injured during a collision with a police vehicle and that he suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights, as well as violations of his state rights, as a result. Currently before the Court is the Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

On July 14, 2016 at approximately 7:45 p.m., Plaintiff Kevin Daniels was driving a motorbike southbound on East 56th Street toward Linden Boulevard in Brooklyn, New York. D. Statements of Undisputed Facts ("D. 56.1"), Dkt. No. 60, ¶¶ 1-2; Pl. Counter-Statements and Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Pl. 56.1"), Dkt. No. 75, Responses 1-2. At the same time, Defendant Officer Saul Delacruz was driving a police vehicle eastbound on Linden Boulevard toward East 56th Street. D. 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl. 56.1 Response 10. Another police officer, Jesus Munet, was riding in the passenger seat of the police vehicle. See D. 56.1. ¶ 10; Pl. 56.1 Response 10. At the intersection of Linden Boulevard and East 56th Street, "an incident occurred"¹ involving the Plaintiff's motorbike and the police vehicle that resulted in the Plaintiff sustaining injuries. D. 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl. 56.1 Response 1.

At some point either immediately before or after the "incident," Officer Delacruz determined that the motorbike driven by the Plaintiff was not street legal based on his observations that the motorbike had no mirrors, no headlights, and tires that were not legal for street driving. D. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 11; Pl. 56.1 Response 6; see also Pl. 56.1 Response 11 (denying that Officer Delacruz determined after the incident that the Plaintiff's motorbike was not street legal because "[f]rom the lack of a headlight De La Cruz should have and was able to easily tell this was an off road bike before he struck the plaintiff"). Following the incident, the Plaintiff "got up from off the ground and . . . walked over towards the police car and . . . asked why did they hit me." Pl. 56.1 Response 13; Daniels Deposition Tr., Dkt. No. 98-1, 116:4-5; see also D. 56.1 ¶ 13. Officer Delacruz testified that he perceived the Plaintiff as moving to leave the scene of the accident, D. 56.1 ¶ 12; Delacruz Deposition Tr., Dkt. No. 98-2, at 25:14-18 ("I put handcuffs on him because, after the accident took place, he got back . . . up from the floor, told me some bad words and went to grab the bike."), although the Plaintiff disputes that his motions were consistent with such a motive, Pl. 56.1 Response 12; Oliviere Deposition Tr., Dkt. No. 73-6, at 97:25-98:5 (stating that he did not see the Plaintiff pick up the bike because the Plaintiff "couldn't even move. . . . [H]is leg was hurt"). The Defendants then placed the Plaintiff in handcuffs and into the police vehicle. D. 56.1 ¶ 16; Daniels Deposition Tr. at 117:20-22; Delacruz Deposition Tr. at 25:10-18. At that time, they also searched the Plaintiff and found marijuana in his pocket. D. 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18; Pl. 56.1 Responses 17-18.

Defendant Delacruz placed the Plaintiff in the back of his police vehicle, which was not air conditioned. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 2; D. Responses to Pl. 56.1 ("D. Responses"), Dkt. No. 79, ¶ 2. July 14 was a hot and humid day. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1; Oliviere Deposition Tr. 98:8-16; D. Responses ¶ 1. The parties dispute how long Daniels remained in the back of the police vehicle until an ambulance was called, as well as the time at which the ambulance arrived. Compare Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3-5 (stating that an ambulance was not called until 8:15 p.m. and did not arrive until 8:40 p.m.), and Delacruz Deposition Tr. 103:4-13 (estimating Delacruz waited 10 to 15 minutes to call an ambulance), with D. Responses ¶¶ 3-5 (stating that the ambulance was called at 8:01 p.m., arrived at 8:05 p.m., and left for the hospital at 8:47 p.m.), and FDNY Prehospital Care Report, Dkt. No. 80-1 (stating that the ambulance was called at 8:01 p.m., arrived at 8:05 p.m., first made contact with the Plaintiff at 8:27 p.m., and left for the hospital at 8:47 p.m.). While waiting for the ambulance, the Plaintiff complained repeatedly that he was in severe pain from his foot or leg. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 7-8; Oliviere Deposition Tr. 69:19-24, 73:1-12; D. Responses ¶¶ 7-8. In addition, he complained that it was hot in the back of the vehicle through the cracked window. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-11; Oliviere Deposition Tr. 73: 3-4; D. Responses ¶¶ 9-11.

After the "incident," the Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to the Kings County Hospital Center. D. 56.1 ¶ 19; Pl. 56.1 Response 19. His injuries included abrasions and a fracture of the second and third metatarsal bones in his left foot. D. 56.1 ¶ 20; Pl. 56.1 Response 20. As a result of the "incident," Plaintiff received four summonses: a criminal summons for unlawful possession of marijuana, and traffic summonses for operating a motorbike without a license, disobeying a steady red light, and having an unregistered motorbike. D. 56.1 ¶¶ 21-25; Pl. 56.1 Responses 21-25. Plaintiff did not appear in court to contest his summons for failure to obey a steady red light. D. 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27; Pl. 56.1 Responses 26-27.

On November 23, 2016, the Plaintiff initiated this action in the Southern District of New York by filing a claim against Defendants City of New York, Officer Delacruz, and Officer Munet. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. Following the completion of discovery, the Defendants moved for partial summary judgment. Mot. for SJ, Dkt. No. 59. That motion is the subject of this Memorandum and Order.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the parties' submissions in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is genuinely in dispute if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In seeking summary judgment, the initial "burden is upon the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue respecting any material fact exists." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). Where the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant "demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact" to survive summary judgment. Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). "The non-moving party may not rely on mere conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence showing thatits version of the events is not wholly fanciful." D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's unreasonable seizure claim and his negligence claim. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's unreasonable seizure claim but that summary judgment should not be granted as to Plaintiff's negligence claim.

A. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff's Unreasonable Seizure Claim

The Plaintiff's fourth cause of action is a claim that he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment based on the conditions in which he was detained. Because it was not clearly established by binding precedent that it was unconstitutional for the Defendant officers to confine the Plaintiff in the conditions he describes, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5-6 (2013) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). It "gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). "In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, '[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer's conduct violated a [federal]right[.]' . . . The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was 'clearly established' at the time of the violation." Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865-66 (2014) (first, second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

For a right to be clearly established, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate" such that "every 'reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). "The dispositive question" when determining whether a right is clearly established "is 'whether the violative...