Daniels v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1939
• Docket Number: 280-1938
• Citation: 135 Pa.Super. 450,5 A.2d 608
• Parties: Daniels, Appellant, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

5 A.2d 608

135 Pa.Super. 450

Daniels, Appellant, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

No. 280-1938

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 21, 1939

Argued October 20, 1938.

Appeal from judgment of M. C. Phila. Co., Aug. T., 1937, No. 453, in case of Ida M. Daniels v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Assumpsit. Before Bonniwell, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was judgment n. o. v.

Judgment reversed.

Abraham T. Needleman, with him Irving J. Katz, for appellant.

Owen B Rhoads, with him John Bishop, Dechert, Smith & Clark, and Harry Cole Bates, for appellee.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker and Rhodes, JJ.

OPINION

Rhodes, J.

Appellant was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by appellee company upon the life of appellant's father Dread Daniels. He died on December 10, 1932, when she was seventeen years of age. This policy contained a provision as follows: "When the beneficiary is a minor and the right to change the beneficiary has not been reserved, the insured cannot dispose of the policy during the beneficiary's minority.

"When the death of the insured occurs during the minority of the beneficiary, a guardian must be appointed to collect the insurance for the minor."

Appellant's father left a will by which he made the following provision for the guardianship of appellant and her brother:

"Whereas it is my desire that my said sister, Mrs. Daisy Roberts shall act as guardian of my said two children, and whereas my said sister is willing to so act as guardian, 'loco parentis' to my said two children,

"Therefore, in consummation of my said desire, I do hereby constitute and appoint my said sister, Mrs. Daisy Roberts, in the event of my death, to have full charge and control of my said two children until they have reached such maturity that they can safely take care of themselves. It is also my desire that my said sister shall have charge and possession of any assets which my children now have, or may become possessed of at my decease.

"It is also my desire that whatever monies my said two children may collect from any insurance policies that shall accrue to my said two children at my death, provided the by-laws of the company are not to the contrary, shall be paid over to my said sister, to be applied toward the maintenance and support of my said two children, Henry and Ida Daniels."

On February 3, 1933, appellant and her brother, in a petition to the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, consented to by their aunt, Daisy Roberts, asked the appointment of their uncle, Alexander Daniels, as guardian of their persons, and a decree of such appointment was made by Stearne, J.

On February 28, 1933, appellee issued to the order of "Alexander Daniels Guardian of the Person of Ida M. Daniels Minor," its draft in the sum of $ 1,026.01, the entire proceeds of the policy in question.

Appellant, upon coming of age, made demand upon appellee for the value of the policy, with interest, and upon refusal of her claim instituted this action in assumpsit on August 17, 1937. Appellee had issued a writ of scire facias directed to Alexander Daniels to add him as a party defendant. At the trial appellant made out a prima facie case by offering in evidence the life insurance policy, and such portions of the statement of claim as were admitted or not denied by the affidavit of defense. For the defense the guardian of the person testified substantially that with the money which he had received from appellee he paid the expenses of deceased's funeral and last illness, and applied the balance to the use and benefit of his ward, the appellant. He admitted that he had made affidavit in the guardianship proceedings that he was in a position to provide for the maintenance and support of his wards; that he had not stated in those proceedings any facts respecting collection of proceeds of an insurance policy, or filed any bond in the orphans' court, or deposited the proceeds of the draft in his name as guardian, but to his own individual credit. It was also conceded that his expenditures on appellant's account were without benefit of an orphans' court order.

There was other testimony concerning admissions on appellant's behalf by her counsel of receipt of some of the payments testified to by Alexander Daniels. The court submitted this testimony to the jury as bearing upon the question of fact whether appellant had received the full proceeds of the policy with instructions that she could recover only the balance unaccounted for, and also left it to the jury to say whether the guardian had received the fund under color of right, as affecting appellant's claim to interest on the fund. Points for binding instructions submitted by both sides were declined, and the jury found for the defendant. Appellant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial were refused.

We have before us seventeen assignments of error, only the first of which, that of refusal of appellant's motion for judgment n.o.v., requires our attention.

Appellee takes the position (1) that when payment was made to Alexander Daniels, guardian of the person, its obligations, under the language of the contract entered into between itself and Dread Daniels, the insured, were completely fulfilled; and (2) that even though Alexander Daniels had no authority to receive the proceeds of the insurance policy, nevertheless appellee is entitled to credit for all the moneys which were actually expended therefrom for the benefit of appellant, since it was proper for Alexander Daniels, as guardian of the person of appellant, to credit himself with the amounts so expended, the same credits being allowable to appellee in this action.

The burden at the trial was on appellee to prove that Alexander Daniels, guardian of appellant's person, was legally authorized to receive payment of the proceeds of the insurance policy, and so to discharge appellee. It is a recognized principle of law that one who pleads payment to a person other than his creditor must prove the authority of such person to receive payment (see Wayne Tank & Pump Co v. Thomas Petroleum Products Co., 83 Pa.Super. 158; Rodgers v. Fleming, 325 Pa. 228, 234, 188 A. 861), and payment without such authority is no defense (48 Corpus Juris pp. 589, 590, § 4). In this connection appellee contends that under the terms of the contract, which provides that during the minority of the designated beneficiary payment must be made to a guardian, the obligations of appellee thereunder could be discharged by payment either to a guardian of the person or a guardian of the estate appointed either by the orphans' court or by the register of wills. In support of this contention appellee cites section 59 (h) (j) 1 of the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, 20 PS §§ 1041, 1043, as imposing upon "every guardian" the duty of filing an inventory of, and accounting periodically for, the property of his ward, and argues that the failure of these sections of the act to distinguish between guardians of the person and guardians of the estate is a legal justification for the payment to the guardian of appellant's person. An answer to a part of this argument is found by reference to section 59 (a, b, d, e, and f) 20 PS §§ 1021, 1022, 1024, 1025, 1026, of the same act, as amended, which clearly differentiates between the two classes of guardians. Nor does it help appellee to point to section 101, art. 8, of the Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, 46 PS § 601, otherwise known as the Statutory Construction Act, as containing this definition, "(47) 'Guardian,' a fiduciary who legally has the care and management of the person, or the estate, or both, of another under legal disability," since the definition recognizes both types of guardian as included within the general category. Two classes of guardians have long been recognized. See Senseman's Appeal, 21 Pa. 331. As stated in Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 127 A. 840, natural guardianship confers no right to intermeddle with the property of the infant, but is a mere personal right in the father or other ancestor to the custody of the person of his heir apparent or presumptive until attaining 21 years of age, and that a natural guardian or a guardian by nature has no authority whatever to exercise any control over the estate of the minor. See Lewis's Blackstone, vol. 1, § 461, note 4. Guardian by nature is the father, and on his death the mother; and the authority of a guardian of the person is derived out of that of the parent, such guardian being only a temporary parent, that is, for so long a time as the ward is an infant, or under age, ^[1] who performs the office of tutor of the Roman law (Senseman's Appeal, supra, p. 333). A person having control of the property of a minor without that of his person was known in the civil law by the name of curator, who had care of the minor's fortune or was the committee of his estate. ^[1] Guardian of the person is invested with the care of the person of the minor; while guardian of the estate is entrusted with the control of the property of the minor. Of...