Daniels v. Shell Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 17341,17341
• Parties: Alice Elizabeth DANIELS et al., Appellants, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 948

485 S.W.2d 948

Alice Elizabeth DANIELS et al., Appellants, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 17341.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

Oct. 13, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 3, 1972.

Garrett, Settle & Callaway, and Bill Waltrip, Fort Worth, for appellants.

Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Cravens & Munn, and Howard G. Barker, Fort Worth, for appellee.

OPINION

BREWSTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Alice Elizabeth Daniels et al. (who were the surviving wife, child, and parents of David Lee Daniels, deceased) from a summary judgment rendered in favor of defendant, Shell Oil Company, to the effect that plaintiffs take nothing by their suit. The suit was for damages for the alleged wrongful death of David Lee Daniels. It was based on the theory that the death of David Lee Daniels was proximately caused by the negligence of Shell Oil Company.

The undisputed facts were as follows: Shell Oil Company owned the land on which was located the filling station premises that are involved in this suit; on August 11, 1969, Shell Oil Company entered into a written lease agreement by the terms of which it leased the entire filling station premises involved to Employers Overload Company, a corporation, from day to day with the agreement that the lease could be terminated by either party, by giving ten days' notice; under this lease arrangement Employers Overload Company had possession of the entire premises and ran the filling station in question from August 11, 1969 to February 11, 1970; one of the terms of the original written lease was that the filling station would be operated 24-hours a day, but two or three days before David Lee Daniels was killed Shell agreed that Employers Overload Company would no longer be required to operate the station as a 24-hour operation; the purpose of this lease was to keep a going filling station business on the premises while Shell searched for a dealer whom they would later train and turn the station over to; the deceased, David Lee Daniels, was an employee of Employers Overload Company and was not an employee of defendant, Shell Oil Company at the time in question and he had, at the time of his death, been so employed for around six months; Daniels had worked at this particular filling station as an employee of Employers Overload Company since about August 11, 1969; and on November 7, 1969, while he was on duty alone at this filling station as an attendant after midnight Daniels was stabbed while being robbed by several men and he died from the stab wounds; the lease agreement provided that the tenant was obligated to keep the premises in good repair and expressly provided that Shell would not have any right to direct or control the management or the operation of the business and that the lessee had control of those things; and although the agreement of the parties only authorized Employers Overload Company to incur the expense of a certain number of man-hours per week for attendants at the filling station, it was Employers Overload Company that had the right to determine how many attendants would be on duty to run the station at any given time of the day.

The negligent acts alleged to have been committed by defendant were:

A. In requiring the station to remain open during the early morning hours, or for a 24-hour period each day;

B. In requiring the station to have only one attendant during such late hours;

C. In failing to provide Daniels with adequate safeguards for his safety;

D. In failing to instruct Daniels as to proper safeguards for his safety during the late hours when he was alone;

E. In operating the station during the late hours with just one attendant;

F. In failing to warn Daniels of the dangers of working alone at night.

The sole point of error urged by appellants is to the effect that the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment.

A number of cases condemn points of error in this form and hold that points of error so worded are so general that they do not meet the requirements of the rules relating to briefing. See Rule 418 in Vol. 4, Vernon's Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases listed under Note 25 under that Rule.

However, in view of the liberal rules relating to briefing, we will consider and discuss the grounds of the appeal, as we understand them, that are contained in the argument and authorities set out under appellants' point. Covington v. City of Denison, Tex.Civ.App., 369 S.W.2d 824 (Dallas Civ.App., 1963, no writ hist.), and Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Adams, Tex.Civ.App., 377 S.W.2d 123 (Dallas Civ.App., 1964, no writ hist.).

This is not a suit by the heirs of an employee against his employer for damages for the employee's death.

We hold that the evidence offered at the summary judgment hearing established as a matter of law that the legal relationship that existed at the time in question between Shell Oil Company and Employers Overload Company was that of landlord and tenant and...