Daniels v. State

• Decision Date: 09 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2D21-702
• Parties: ELLIOTT DAVID DANIELS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

ELLIOTT DAVID DANIELS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 2D21-702

Florida Court of Appeals, Second District

September 9, 2022

Appeal from the County Court for Sarasota County; Erika N Quartermaine, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Daniel Muller, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laurie Benoit-Knox Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Elliott David Daniels appeals a final judgment and sentences for a misdemeanor count of DUI pursuant to section 316.193, Florida Statutes (2019), and a misdemeanor count of refusal to submit to testing pursuant to section 316.1939(1). We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the law enforcement officers who initially interacted with Daniels had reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation and, therefore, that the trial court properly denied Daniels' motion to suppress. However, while we affirm Daniels' judgment and sentences, we write to explain our reasoning due to the unique facts in this case.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on April 13, 2020, a citizen informant (CI) contacted 911 to report finding Daniels asleep in his truck with the lights on. A video, which was admitted by stipulation, reflects that the truck was parked in a business parking lot but was situated within the entrance/exit and facing outwards as if Daniels was preparing to pull out onto the adjacent road.

Initially at least two deputies with the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office responded to the scene. Those deputies called for an ambulance to have EMS conduct a welfare check, a point that Daniels does not dispute. However, Deputy Dustin Bell-the State's lone witness at the suppression hearing-testified that at some point, the deputies at the scene called for him to come to the scene "for a possible DUI."

Deputy Bell testified that he arrived within ten minutes of the first deputies but by that time, the EMS technicians had already arrived, determined that Daniels was not having any medical issues, and left the scene. Deputy Bell first spoke with the CI who had called 911. Deputy Bell testified that the CI suggested that Daniels might be intoxicated. And indeed, the video reflects that the CI told Deputy Bell that when he first encountered Daniels, Daniels was slumped over in his seat with his seatbelt on; the CI believed that Daniels had either had a medical incident or that he was drunk. The video also reflects that the CI told Deputy Bell that once he saw Daniels' fingers move, he [the CI] believed that Daniels was likely intoxicated.

Deputy Bell then made contact with Daniels who was already awake and outside of his vehicle, having already been checked and cleared by the initial EMS technicians. Deputy Bell told Daniels that he was with the sheriff's office, that he worked with the DUI unit, and that he was there "to make sure that there is not an instance of DUI occurring." Deputy Bell noticed that Daniels appeared lethargic and had bloodshot, watery eyes. Daniels explained that he had been working in the sun all day and was extremely tired, which resulted in him pulling into the parking lot to sleep. Daniels also told Deputy Bell that he was diabetic, prompting Deputy Bell to call for EMS to return to conduct a blood sugar check. Once EMS returned, the technicians conducted the blood sugar check and determined that it was normal. Based on the fact that Daniels had been medically cleared, Deputy Bell suspected that Daniels was intoxicated. Deputy Bell obtained consent from Daniels to conduct field sobriety tests, which Daniels failed. Daniels was then arrested.

Daniels filed a motion to suppress arguing that he should have been released once the first EMS technicians medically cleared him. He contended that nothing at that time provided reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. At the suppression hearing, Daniels further argued that merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle could not provide reasonable suspicion. He noted that he had not committed a traffic violation and that Deputy Bell admitted he had not smelled any alcohol or drugs during the incident.

Ultimately, the trial court entered an order denying Daniels' motion, concluding that "during the course of a welfare check[,] law enforcement developed reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation," citing Dermio v. State, 112 So.3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Daniels subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the dispositive suppression motion. The trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to twelve months' probation on both charges with various DUI conditions, a $500 fine, revocation of his driver's license for six months, fifty hours of community service, and court costs.

ANALYSIS

We employ a mixed standard of review for orders denying suppression motions. We give deference to a trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent substantial evidence, Dermio, 112 So.3d at 555, but we review the legal conclusions de novo, State v. Teamer, 151 So.3d 421, 425 (Fla. 2014).

Daniels does not dispute that based on the condition in which the CI found him, the first law enforcement officers that arrived were justified in conducting a welfare check. Case law clearly provides that law enforcement may conduct such checks when necessary and that they do not rise to the level of an unconstitutional stop or seizure. Dermio, 112 So.3d at 555 ("It is well recognized that police officers may conduct welfare checks and that such checks are considered consensual encounters that do not involve constitutional implications." (citing Greider v. State, 977 So.2d 789, 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008))); Taylor v. State, 326 So.3d 115, 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (noting that welfare checks fall under the "community caretaking doctrine" and explaining that they can be deemed lawful as long as they are "totally [divorced] from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute" (quoting Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973))), disagreed with on other grounds by State v. Fernandez, 335 So.3d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); cf. State v. Baez, 894 So.2d 115, 116 (Fla. 2004) (involving issue of continued detention after appellant voluntarily provided his driver's license but classifying initial encounter which began with a welfare check as "consensual" in nature).

However, once a police officer's concern for the welfare of the person has been satisfied, a continued detention is not permissible unless the police officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing a crime. See Greider, 977 So.2d at 792-93 (explaining that an investigatory stop must be based on a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity that is based on more than a mere hunch and further concluding that where the officer's concern for the appellant's safety had been dispelled and where the officer admitted that he did not think any criminal activity had occurred, the officer lacked authority to detain the appellant further); Bozeman v. State, 603 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that where the appellant had been slumped over his steering wheel and woke up mumbling but where he passed sobriety tests and the law enforcement officer determined that he was fit to drive, "his continued detention and warrantless search were illegal"); Taylor, 326 So.3d at 118 ("Without any reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is or was afoot, the welfare check should end when the need for it ends."); cf. Baez, 894 So.2d at 117 (concluding that where the appellant was found in a "suspicious condition" slumped over the steering wheel in his van near a dimly lit, normally abandoned warehouse area, which was not an area he should have normally been in, the law enforcement officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to further detain the appellant and run a computer check of his license, which the appellant had voluntarily provided).

Here, Daniel argues that once the concern for his health had been dispelled by the first EMS technicians, he should have been released. He asserts that his continued detention for purposes of a DUI investigation was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred prior to Deputy Bell's arrival. He further argues that any reasonable suspicion that developed after Deputy Bell physically observed him could not justify the initial detention.

Had Daniels been discovered by the CI parked in a regular parking spot, asleep, with the headlights on, we would have been constrained to reverse absent additional factors that could lead to reasonable suspicion. This is so even if the engine had been running. Cf. Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (concluding that where the appellant was parked in a legal parking spot, with the headlights on and his engine running but where the law enforcement officer observed no traffic infraction, had no reason to believe there was any mechanical problem with the vehicle, and did not testify that he was concerned for the appellant's personal health, the investigative stop was not based on reasonable suspicion); Delorenzo v. State, 921 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (concluding that where the law enforcement officer observed the appellant sleeping in his legally parked vehicle in a public parking lot with the engine running but where the...