Daniels v. State

Decision Date09 April 1970
Docket NumberNo. 25693,25693
Citation226 Ga. 269,174 S.E.2d 422
PartiesJulius Marshall DANIELS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

In the trial of a sixteen-year-old juvenile on an indictment for murder the court erred in not suppressing evidence showing a written incriminating statement made by the appellant-defendant and erred in admitting the statement in evidence on the trial for the reasons that: 1. The appellant was under virtual restraint and illegal arrest at the time when the interrogation by police officers led to an oral statement that he killed some person and wanted to tell about it. 2. At the time of the earlier questioning, appellant had not been advised of his rights to have present his mother, or father, or a lawyer, etc. 3. At the time of a lie detector test, he was advised as to his rights except that he had a right to have a parent present to advise him, and no parent was present and neither knew anything of the lie-detector test, and the result of this test played a part in later questioning, which led to the appellant's first oral incriminating statement. 4. The appellant was not under legal arrest when the oral or written incriminating statement was made nor had he been carried before juvenile court authorities as required under Georgia law. 5. Appellant's mother was noticeably under the influence of intoxicants or drugs at the questioning when the appellant was being advised of his rights before the final questioning which resulted in the signed incriminating statement.

This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment of guilty and sentence to life imprisonment filed by the defendant Julius Marshall Daniels, a sixteen-year-old juvenile who was convicted of the murder of Barbara Ann House on October 3, 1969.

At about 11:30 p.m. on Monday, July 14, 1969, Barbara Ann House was stabbed to death while on the front porch of her apartment at 396 Peeples Street, S.W., in Atlanta, Georgia. Two young boys, James and Ricky Sanders, were stabbed at the same time. The two boys said that the murder and assault were committed by colored boys. There were no other clues to the identity of these colored boys and the Atlanta police began interviewing several hundred Negro youths around the clock, seeking a lead. Appellant, Julius Marshall Daniels, a 16-year-old Negro boy, lived on Abbott Street, a few blocks from where the stabbings took place. He was first questioned by Atlanta police on Friday, July 18, 1969, four days after the stabbing. On that Friday afternoon, Daniels was picked up, questioned at the Atlanta police station and released, but advised to return on Sunday in order that his statement might be reduced to writing. Appellant did as he was told and returned to the Atlanta police station on Sunday, July 20, 1969. Accompanied by his sister, he talked with a police lieutenant and gave a written statement in which he accounted for his whereabouts the night of the murder and disclaimed any knowledge of or participation in the stabbings. Thereafter, he was again allowed to leave the police station. As of July 21, 1969, no arrests had been made. On that date city detectives Sidney Dorsey and P. F. Johnson went to the residence of appellant, told him that they were to take him downtown for questioning, put him in a police car, and took him to a location on Cain Street in Atlanta, where he was delivered to detective Lewis Graham of the Atlanta Police Department and administered a polygraph, or lie detector test, which he was advised, showed that he had lied. Appellant was then taken to the third floor of the Atlanta police station by these detectives, where he was again questioned. There are several versions of just what happened there. Appellant testified that he was threatened and physically abused. The detectives called the questioning friendly and similar to a 'bull session'-until appellant stated that 'he did it' and wanted to tell them about it. Appellant was called a liar during the questioning and was asked the same questions repeatedly. At each session of questioning of appellant, including the next to the last one, he was not advised as to his constitutional rights to have a parent or a lawyer present, and his rights as to his answering questions or not answering them, etc. After appellant told the detectives that 'he did it' the questioning was discontinued until his mother was sent for. Detective Graham testified that he advised appellant of his right for the first time just prior to the administration of the lie detector test, which advice was in the absence of a lawyer or appellant's parents. When questioning was continued, appellant's mother was at the police station in an intoxicated condition, but not drunk. The detectives testified that the mother was present during the rest of the questioning, but the mother swore that she was not, but was in a separate room. There is no evidence that a warrant was sworn out before the resumption of questioning after appellant's mother came to be with him (whether she actually was, or not) and no one seems to question the fact that the appellant was in the actual restraining custody of the police. After the final session of questioning, appellant gave a statement which was transcribed and which he signed and his mother witnessed. Detective Graham testified that the matter of the arrest and charge in the case was not reported to Juvenile Court Judge Langford until after he had received a statement from appellant containing his incriminating statements which appellant repudiated under oath at his trial, when he explained that he and a friend had made up the lies (in the statement) to prevent repeated abuse by the detectives in the last questioning period. It appears without contradiction...

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14 cases
  • Theriault v. State
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1974
    ...also relies on Matter of D. (1968), 30 A.D.2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935, from an intermediate New York Appeals Court, and Daniels v. State (1970), 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422.Matter of D. held that a fifteen-year-old minor could not even be questioned until the minor and his parents were notifi......
  • K. W. B., In Interest of, KCD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 1, 1973
    ...v. Indiana, 288 N.E.2d 138, 442(6) (Ind.1972); Matter of William L., 29 A.D.2d 182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221 (1968); Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1970). Such a rule proceeds on the premise that (In the Interest of Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (1966), Weintraub, ......
  • State ex rel. J. M. v. Taylor
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 10, 1981
    ...C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), reh. denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed.2d 121; Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 In its Standards Relating to Adjudication, the Juvenile Justice Standards ......
  • Marshall v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1981
    ...proceedings under the Juvenile Code. See, e. g., Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 325(1), 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977); Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 273, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970). There is no provision in the Juvenile Code requiring that one or both parents be present during the questioning. This co......
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