Daniels v. State
| Decision Date | 19 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 40255,40255 |
| Parties | Bobby L. DANIELS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Derek H. Jones, Atlanta, for Bobby L. Daniels.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Atlanta, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Bobby L. Daniels was convicted by a jury in Fulton County for the malice murder of Herbert Gene Taylor. After being sentenced to life imprisonment, he appeals. We affirm.
The evidence presented at trial shows that during the morning of July 18, 1982, Herbert Taylor asked at least two persons, including his former employer, to lend him money because he "really needed the money" and that he "was in a financial strain." Later that evening, the deceased went to the Santabella Lounge located on Simpson Road in Atlanta and talked with other patrons at the bar. He then went out front of the lounge and continued conversing just outside the entrance. Several witnesses testified that suddenly, appellant walked up to the deceased and stated "you're going to pay me." Appellant pulled a .38 caliber pistol and shot Herbert Taylor. Taylor threw up his arms and then attempted to crawl back into the lounge. Additional shots were fired by appellant after which he immediately fled the scene. Taylor died as a result of the gunshot wounds. The witnesses testified that appellant was wearing a blue work uniform including a bibbed cap, weighed between 160 and 170 pounds and was medium height. Appellant was arrested approximately six weeks later when identified by an eyewitness at the Tasty Dog restaurant located next to the Santabella Lounge.
Appellant testified at trial and denied knowing Herbert Taylor. Appellant said that on July 18, 1982 he went to the Rib Shack restaurant on Auburn Avenue, a cafe on Boulevard, and returned to his apartment on Simpson Road. He stated he did not go to the Santabella Lounge until after the shooting had occurred. The owner of the Rib Shack restaurant on Auburn Avenue testified her restaurant was closed on Sunday, July 18, 1982.
1. In his first enumeration of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in not suppressing the eyewitness testimony of Eleazar Buckins. Mr. Buckins, the owner of the Santabella Lounge, testified he saw the appellant and the victim sitting together just before the shooting. After Mr. Buckins heard shots fired, he saw the appellant running away from the lounge. When he arrived at trial, Mr. Buckins observed appellant sitting with eight other prisoners in the jury box. He then identified appellant as the man with the victim and brought this information to the district attorney's attention.
Appellant argues that the witness' viewing him in the jury box as he awaited trial impermissibly tainted the witness' in-court identification of the appellant. We disagree. There is no evidence that the police or prosecutor conducted an identification procedure by placing the defendant and others in the jury box. The chance viewing of a defendant in the company of several other prisoners by a witness immediately prior to trial is not unduly suggestive. McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108(2), 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980); Robinson v. State, 164 Ga.App. 379(3), 296 S.E.2d 225 (1982). We find no merit in this enumeration of error.
2. In his second enumeration, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Ben Thomas that the victim had asked to borrow money from him on the day he was killed. Appellant argues this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The State counters that the testimony contained facts to ascertain the motive of the killing. OCGA § 24-3-2 (Code Ann. § 38-302). Pretermitting the question of whether this testimony was inadmissible hearsay or admissible to show motive, there is no merit in this ground, for the reason that substantially the same testimony from another witness was admitted without objection. Hicks v. Hicks, 196 Ga. 541, 27 S.E.2d 7 (1943). Another State's witness, Jimmy Hunter, testified the victim told him he was in a financial strain and needed money. This testimony was not objected to.
3. In his third enumeration, appellant contends the evidence did not support the verdict and the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. A review of the record in this case in the light most favorable to the verdict shows that a rational finder of fact could have found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
4. In his fourth enumeration of error appellant contends the trial court erred in not striking the testimony of Pam Wilson. The essence of her testimony was that on the day of the killing, about 4:30 in the afternoon, appellant left the house where he was living accompanied by Pam Wilson's mother and a woman named "Cookie", and that appellant sometimes wore a burgundy bibbed cap embroidered with a Playboy symbol.
Appellant contends this testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible. We hold that testimony was relevant as part of the identification evidence and to place the appellant in the general vicinity of the crime at a time not far removed from the time of the murder. We find no merit in this contention. The evidence admitted made the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. McCormick on Evidence, § 185, p. 437 (1972).
5. In his next enumeration, appellant contends the trial court erred in ruling that appellant had waived the attorney-client privilege by presenting the attorney who represented him at the preliminary hearing as a witness at trial. On direct examination, the attorney testified that State's witness Leo Morgan had told her investigator that appellant was not the gunman, contrary to his trial testimony. On cross-examination, the attorney testified that appellant told her he did not commit the crime and that he was on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mize v. State
...defendant's character or reputation into evidence.'" Boutwell v. State, 256 Ga. 63(2), 344 S.E.2d 222 (1986), quoting Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30(6), 310 S.E.2d 904 (1984); Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494(1), 422 S.E.2d 188 (1992) (evidence of defendant's involvement in satanic cult admissib......
-
Krause v. State, S09A1453
...not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally puts a defendant's character or reputation into evidence." Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30, 32, 310 S.E.2d 904 (1984). In light of the overwhelming evidence of his involvement in Carver's murder, Chesser's strategy at trial was to minimize......
-
Terry v. State
...by the State to Maddox prior to Maddox' independently recognizing him. Compare Frye, supra. There was no error. Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30, 31(1), 310 S.E.2d 904 (1984); Anderson v. State, 206 Ga.App. 354(1), 426 S.E.2d 6 (1992); Wilson v. State, 181 Ga.App. 435(1), 352 S.E.2d 618 4. In h......
-
Earnest v. State
...because it incidentally puts a defendant's character or reputation into evidence." Boutwell, supra at 65 (quoting Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30, 32, 310 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1984)). Appellant further argues that the prosecutor made several improper arguments to the jury during summation. The pro......