Daniels v. State, 48502
| Decision Date | 19 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 48502,48502 |
| Citation | 312 So.2d 706 |
| Parties | Vernell DANIELS v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Henry E. Pope, Columbia, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Wayne Snuggs, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before PATTERSON, SMITH and BROOM, JJ.
Vernell Daniels was convicted in the Circuit Court of Marion County upon a charge of manslaughter arising from an automobile collision in which James McKlemury lost his life. Daniels was sentenced to a term of fifteen years in the state penitentiary and from his conviction and sentence now appeals.
He assigns as error:
1. The state failed to meet its burden of proof;
2. The introduction of an oral statement of the appellant was erroneously permitted into evidence;
3. Instruction No. 3 for the state was improperly granted; and
4. The evidence failed to support the verdict of the jury.
On October 7, 1973, a two-car collision occurred on Highway 98 just west of the village of Kokomo in Marion County. One of the vehicles was driven by Vernell Daniels and the other by Mrs. Geneva McKlemury. The McKlemury vehicle at the time was occupied by the driver, her husband, who was killed, and her grandchildren. The appellant was the sole occupant of his vehicle.
Just prior to the collision Carl Voss and his wife were driving in a westerly direction along Highway 98 when he overtook the McKlemury vehicle and passed it. Immediately after passing, Voss observed the appellant's automobile approaching from an easterly direction near the center of the paved road. As the vehicle approached more closely, it crossed, according to Voss, into his lane of traffic, forcing him completely off the highway. Before he could get his vehicle back on to the roadway, he heard a crash behind him and observed that there had been an accident on his side of the road.
Leaving his family at a nearby store with instructions to call the authorities, Voss returned to the crash site. He helped five people from the McKlemury vehicle and then discovered the appellant lying unconscious off the highway. He further testified that he did not observe anyone behind the steering wheel of the car which had forced him off the road and thought it was a 'runaway.'
Thereafter, a highway patrolman arrived to investigate the accident. He testified that in assisting the appellant to a stretcher he smelled alcohol on his breath. An ambulance attendant and another witness also detected the odor of alcohol on the appellant prior to his being removed from the crash site. Several weeks later the appellant admitted to the patrolman that he had consumed two or three beers several hours before the collision.
Mrs. McKlemury testified that she observed the Voss vehicle leave the road after it had passed her and immediately thereafter saw the appellant's vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed in her lane of traffic. She testified there was no way she could avoid the collision and 'it looked like an empty car to me.'
The appellant's version of the collision was that the McKlemury car crossed the center line into his lane of traffic and that he tried to move his vehicle to the left to avoid the accident, but was unable to do so. He admitted that he had two beers sometime before the accident, but testified this did not affect his driving ability. He further stated that he was driving in a normal manner and was not slumped over the wheel of his vehicle and that he could have been observed by other motorists.
All of the testimony, as well as the photographic exhibits, indicate that the collision occurred during daylight hours, with visibility unobscured by either the weather or by curvature of the road.
In considering the first contention, we note there was an eyewitness (Voss) to the facts immediately prior to the crash and an eyewitness (Mrs. McKlemury) to the crash itself. Their testimony was sufficient to establish an issue of culpable negligence for consideration by a jury. In Cochran v. State, 278 So.2d 451 (Miss.1973), we stated:
The rule in regard to a peremptory instruction is the same in criminal and civil cases, the rule being that when all the evidence on behalf of the State is taken as true, together with all sound or reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, if there is enough to support a verdict of conviction, the peremptory instruction must be denied. Stringer v. State, 279 So.2d 156 (Miss.) (decision rendered May 28, 1973), McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So.2d 821 (1939). 278 So.2d at 453.
Moreover, the defendant by the introduction of testimony in his behalf is precluded from raising on appeal the motion for a directed verdict. The question of whether or not the defendant was entitled to the requested peremptory...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Warn v. State, 49852
...a verdict of conviction, the peremptory instruction must be denied. See Newton v. State, 321 So.2d 298 (Miss.1975); Daniels v. State, 312 So.2d 706 (Miss.1975); Norman v. State, 302 So.2d 254 (Miss.1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 1956, 44 L.Ed.2d 453 (1975); Fields v. State, 293 So......
-
Thomas v. State
...349 So.2d 1063 (Miss.1977); Varnado v. State, 338 So.2d 1239 (Miss.1976); Barrett v. State, 329 So.2d 67 (Miss.1976); Daniels v. State, 312 So.2d 706 (Miss.1975); and Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d 589 We find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C......
- Edmond v. State, 2012–CP–00768–COA.
-
Price v. State
...deficient. Of course, peremptory instructions are properly refused if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Daniels v. State, 312 So.2d 706 (Miss.1975). It is also familiar law that when two or more persons act in concert, with a common design, in committing a crime of violen......