Daniels v. Willis

• Decision Date: 01 January 1862
• Citation: 7 Minn. 295
• Parties: JOSEPH DANIELS vs. IRA WILLIS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 295

7 Minn. 295

JOSEPH DANIELSvs.

IRA WILLIS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Error to district court, Ramsey County.

Points and authorities for plaintiff in error: —

1. The court below erred in refusing to set aside and vacate said award, and in accepting and confirming the same and rendering judgment thereon. Comp. Stat. 691, § 13. First, because said arbitrators exceeded their powers under the submission. The articles of submission did not authorize them to direct a sale of the property, but simply to determine which of the parties was entitled to possession. After the arbitrators had found that Willis was entitled to the possession of a portion of the property, they had no power to direct a sale. They were prohibited from so doing by the stipulations.

2. The arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers, that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made. First, they made no award whatever in relation to the replevin suit pending in the United States district court, or the matters involved therein. Second, they made no award whatever as to the two thousand dollar note made by Freeborn, Moss & Daniels, dated October 3d, 1856. Third, they made no sufficient, and in fact no award whatever, as between these parties, as to the promissory note and chattel mortgage made by Asa Barton, bearing date February 21st, 1860. Fourth, they made no award, as between these parties, as to the two gray colts, but say that neither are entitled to the possession thereof, which was an impossibility under the articles of submission.

3. That said award is contrary to law and the evidence given in the case.

4. That the stipulation in the said articles of submission, that the award of the said "arbitrators, or the greater part of them, shall be final in all the premises described herein, and that no appeal nor writ of error or other proceeding shall be taken to interfere with or destroy in any manner such award by either party," is wholly void. Comp. Stat. 691, § 13.

5. If the above stipulation is not void, it can only estop the parties, where the arbitrators have fully and fairly passed upon and determined all the questions submitted to them according to the terms of the articles of submission.

6. The neglect or refusal of the majority of the arbitrators to make any award upon a portion of the matters submitted to them, was a fraud upon the rights of the plaintiff in error, and fraud vitiates all things.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. By the express terms of the submission, the award of the arbitrators in this case was to be, and was, final and conclusive between the parties; and consequently no question prior to the entry of the judgment on such award can be reached by writ of error, and no error is assigned upon the judgment, hence it must be affirmed.

2. Where, by the terms of the submission, an award is to be final, the court will not disturb a judgment entered thereon, except where the proceedings have been tainted with fraud, and that must be clearly shown. Every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of an award. 1 U. S. Dig. 215, § 409, and cases there cited; id. 217, § 460; id. 216, § 433; id. 219, §§ 513-14; id. 220, § 545.

3. It is entirely competent for parties to stipulate that no appeal or writ of error shall be taken from a judgment or other proceeding; and such stipulation is binding upon the parties thereto. 1 U. S. Dig. 216-17, §§ 425-6, 444-5, 465.

W. H. Grant, and Masterson & Simons, for plaintiff in error.

D. Cooper, for defendant in error.

ATWATER, J.

A number of notes and chattel mortgages, and a suit with matters involved therein pending in the United States district court, were submitted to the arbitrators selected by the parties, for their final determination thereon. The arbitrators made and filed their award. The plaintiff in error moved to vacate and set aside the award, upon certain grounds specified in the notice of motion. The motion was overruled, and judgment was entered in the district court upon the award, and in pursuance of the terms thereof, in favor of Willis. Daniels thereupon sued out a writ of error.

Two principle grounds were alleged in the court below, upon the motion to set aside the award, viz.: First, that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. Second, that the arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers as arbitrators, that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matters submitted was not made. The arbitrators determined that Willis was entitled to the possession of certain personal property described in the chattel mortgages, which formed a part of the subject of the submission, and also awarded, that the same be sold at public auction, and the proceeds be applied toward paying the expense of keeping the same, the expenses of the arbitration, and the balance apply toward the liquidation of the amount found due from Daniels to Willis. It is claimed that the arbitrators had no authority to order such sale and appropriate the proceeds. The provision on this behalf in the submission papers, is as follows, viz.: "And it it is hereby further agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the property taken by the United States marshal, or any of his deputies or agents, or by the said plaintiff or any of his agents, either by virtue of the said writ of replevin, or in any other manner, or upon any other process, or upon any pretension whatever, shall be and remain in the hands of W. B. Gere, the said United States marshal, subject to all the rights of either party in said action, and subject to the award of said arbitrators, the same as though the rights of said parties herein were determined by said court, with the exception only, that in no case either party shall have the possession of said property, except by the award of said arbitrators." It appears from this that the property was to remain in the hands of the marshal, subject to all the rights of either party in said action, and subject to the award, the same as though the rights of said parties herein were determined by said court. If the finding of the court had been, that Willis was entitled to the possession of the property, a sale, perhaps, could not properly have been ordered. But Willis would have been the only party entitled to object to the same. It is stipulated that neither party shall have possession, except under the award. Daniels certainly was not entitled to the possession under the award, and it does not appear that he is in any manner injured by having the property sold. On the contrary, it would appear that he is actually benefited, since the proceeds of the sale were to be applied in part towards payment of the debt due from him to Willis. It may be questionable, even, whether the arbitrators, under the broad authority specified in the submission papers making this property subject to the award, have exceeded their powers, in ordering a sale of the property. But, however this may be, we think the plaintiff in error is not in a position to urge the objection. It is well settled that an award will not be set aside in equity, on account of an omission to act upon the matters submitted, unless that omission should have injured the party complaining. Davy v. Faw, 7 Cranch, 171. And courts of law are still less liberal than those of equity in regard to setting aside awards. The principle above stated is equally applicable to cases where the...