Danner v. Bartel
| Decision Date | 28 August 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 5770-I,5770-I |
| Citation | 21 Wn.App. 213,584 P.2d 463 |
| Parties | Anton R. DANNER and Ethel Danner, his wife, Appellants, v. Fred BARTEL and Jane Doe Bartel, his wife, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Bell, Ingram & Rice, Douglas L. Bell, Everett, for appellants.
Benjamin Westmoreland, Everett, for respondents.
The marital community of Anton R. Danner appeals and the marital community of Fred Bartel cross-
appeals from a judgment quieting title to real property located in Snohomish County in the Danners.
In 1941 and 1942, Carl Bartleheimer and his wife received title to property located in Snohomish County. The property was later sold by the Bartleheimers to the Danners in 1967. In the spring or early summer of 1947, following a violent argument between Carl Bartleheimer and his brother, Fred Bartel, who owned adjacent property, Bartleheimer erected a fence in the northern area of the boundary between the properties, using a survey of his property as a reference. Bartleheimer claimed to the east of the fence. At the time the fence was built, Bartel insisted that it was located on his property rather than on the true boundary line dividing the properties. Although Bartel never accepted the fence as being located on the true boundary, he respected the fence as a de facto boundary, and throughout the years he entered onto the disputed property to keep clear a drainage ditch located on said property to prevent surface waters from flowing onto his land. The ditch was maintained openly.
This boundary situation continued until 1973 when Bartel had the property resurveyed and found that the survey line was 13 to 16 feet east of the Bartleheimer fence. Bartel thereafter ordered the fence removed, and when the Danners, who were the subsequent purchasers of the Bartleheimer property, failed to do so, Bartel removed the northerly portion of the fence and replaced it with his own.
The Danners brought suit to quiet title to the property. The court entered judgment quieting title in the Danners and entered the following conclusion of law:
That each of the (Bartels) together or either of them be and they hereby are forever barred from having or asserting any right, title, estate, lien or interest in said disputed lands and premises or any part thereof adverse to the (Danners), except the right to maintain a water course on said property to prevent surface waters from The Danners appeal from that portion of the judgment granting the Bartels a continuous right to maintain the drainage ditch. The Bartels cross-appeal from the judgment quieting title in the Danners by adverse possession. We affirm.
coming onto the northeastern corner of the (Bartels') property. (Conclusion of law No. 3.)
ISSUES
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in finding that the Danners and their predecessor established claims to the property by adverse possession?
ISSUE 2: Do the findings of fact support the court's conclusion of law which reserved the right of the Bartels to maintain a water course on the property?
ISSUE 1.
The first issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Danners and their predecessor had adversely possessed a strip of real property which bordered on the Danners' and Bartels' property.
In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the possession must be actual, uninterrupted, open, notorious, hostile and exclusive for the statutory period. RCW 4.16.020; Frolund v. Frankland, 71 Wash.2d 812, 431 P.2d 188 (1967); Hunt v. Matthews, 8 Wash.App. 233, 505 P.2d 819 (1973); Rognrust v. Seto, 2 Wash.App. 215, 467 P.2d 204 (1970). See generally W. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 Wash.L.Rev. 53 (1960). Whether a party has acquired title to property by adverse possession is a question of fact. Reymore v. Tharp, 16 Wash.App. 150, 553 P.2d 456 (1976); Jackson v. Pennington, 11 Wash.App. 638, 525 P.2d 822 (1974). The trial court's findings will be sustained on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Reymore v. Tharp, supra; Diel v. Beekman, 7 Wash.App. 139, 499 P.2d 37 (1972).
The Bartels claim that the record does not support the trial court's finding that the Danners and their predecessor introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate their actual possession of the disputed property. We disagree. For purposes of establishing title through adverse possession, a person need only exercise that degree of dominion and control consistent with an owner in general. See Butler v. Anderson, 71 Wash.2d 60, 426 P.2d 467 (1967); Hunt v. Matthews, supra; Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash.App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970). In the written memorandum decision, the trial court explained its finding concerning actual possession:
It is apparent from the facts that Carl Bartleheimer, and his successors in interest, have been in actual and uninterrupted possession of the property for some 25 years. While it is true that the nature of the possession by Carl Bartleheimer and the (Danners) was not intensive, the possession was consistent with the property owned by them immediately to the east of the disputed strip, and the erection and continuance of the barbed wire fence was a clear assertion of possession and dominion. It is not, of course, necessary for one claiming adverse possession to have possession of property in any particular manner. It is sufficient if the character of possession was consistent with the nature of the land and the use of adjacent land. In the instant case, although Carl Bartleheimer made virtually no use of the land, nonetheless, the fence was his standard in his field, and it effectively prevented the (Bartels) from challenging his possession.
The record supports the trial court's findings concerning the necessary elements of adverse possession, and even "(i)f we were of the opinion that the trial court...
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