Danser v. Stansberry

• Decision Date: 03 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1828.,13–1828.
• Citation: 772 F.3d 340
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
• Parties: David Karl DANSER, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Warden Patricia R. STANSBERRY; Lieutenant Bobby Roy; Officer Theron Boyd, Defendants–Appellants, and Lieutenant Dodson; Officer Diaz, Defendants.

772 F.3d 340

David Karl DANSER, Plaintiff–Appellee

v. Warden Patricia R. STANSBERRY; Lieutenant Bobby Roy; Officer Theron Boyd, Defendants–AppellantsandLieutenant Dodson; Officer Diaz, Defendants.

No. 13–1828.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 13, 2014.

Decided: July 3, 2014.

Amended: Sept. 12, 2014.

ARGUED:Michael Gordon James, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Elizabeth Guild Simpson, North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants.

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge KEENAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge DIAZ joined.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erred in holding that certain prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for injuries inflicted by an inmate on David K. Danser, a federal prisoner serving a sentence for convictions involving the sexual abuse of a minor. The incident occurred after prison officials left an enclosed recreation space unsupervised for several minutes, during which period Danser was attacked by an inmate who was a member of a violent prison gang. Danser filed a complaint against the prison officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (Bivens ), alleging that the officials' actions showed a deliberate indifference to his safety, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The prison officials filed a motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity, which the district court denied.

On appeal from the district court's summary judgment determination, the prison officials argue that they did not violate Danser's constitutional rights because the record lacks any evidence that they had the “culpable state of mind” necessary to establish a deliberate indifference claim.See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). In response, Danser argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and, alternatively, maintains that the district court correctly concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.

Upon our review, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to decide this issue of law, and that the district court erred in denying the prison officials' motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order and remand the matter with instructions that the court enter judgment in favor of the prison officials.

I.

Danser is a federal inmate serving a 370–month sentence for convictions of sexual exploitation of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), sexual abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). At the time of the incident at issue in this civil action, Danser was housed in the “low” security facility at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina (FCI–Butner).

On August 21, 2005, Danser was assigned to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) within FCI–Butner, after he engaged in a verbal altercation with another inmate. The SHU is a secure, closely supervised facility within FCI–Butner that houses inmates whom prison officials have determined need separation from the general inmate population, either because the inmate violated prison rules or because the inmate requires protective custody. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.21 –541.23. Inmates in the SHU are allowed only five hours of outdoor recreation per week. About 100 inmates were housed in the SHU when Danser was assigned to that unit.

Theron Boyd is a correctional officer employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons who worked in the SHU at FCI–Butner. On August 22, 2005, Boyd reported to the SHU and was assigned to a post that placed him in charge of the SHU's recreation area. The recreation area consists of eight fenced-in “recreation cages,” which each are about ten feet long and ten feet wide and hold up to five inmates per cage. Among other responsibilities, Boyd was required to ask each SHU inmate if he wanted outdoor recreation, determine which inmates would be placed together in the recreation cages, and help transport inmates from their cells to the cages.

On the day of the incident, Danser informed Boyd that he wanted to participate in outdoor recreation. Boyd did not recall Danser expressing concerns to him about being placed in a recreation cage with any other inmate, and there is no evidence in the record showing that Boyd was aware that Danser was a sex offender.

Boyd made assignments to the recreation cages based on the inmates' custody level, the location of the inmates' cells within the facility, and information contained in a computer-generated “SHU Report.” As a general matter, the SHU Report includes each inmate's name, his prison identification number, and whether any inmate should be “kept separate” from any other inmate in the SHU (“separation orders”).¹

The SHU Report is compiled from information entered into the SHU computer by the “Officer–in–Charge” of the SHU. Danser did not name this officer as a defendant in this lawsuit, and it is undisputed that Boyd had no role in compiling or entering the information in the SHU Report.

The parties dispute the content of the information contained in the SHU Report that Boyd used in making the recreation cage assignments, including whether separation orders were included in the report.² However, it is undisputed that the SHU Report did not contain information concerning Danser's status as a sex offender or the gang affiliation of Danser's assailant. Instead, that information was entered into the “Sentry” and “Central Information Monitoring” (CIM) systems, which are separate databases maintained by the Bureau of Prisons. As an officer in the SHU, Boyd had access to these databases but there is no evidence in the record that he was required to examine the two databases, or actually consulted either of them, in making the recreation cage assignments.

Boyd assigned Danser to a recreation cage with three other inmates, including Scott Gustin, a convicted drug dealer who is a member of the violent prison gang “La Nuestra Familia.”³ It is undisputed that Danser and Gustin had never met before being placed in the same recreation cage, and that there were no “separation orders” requiring that Danser and Gustin be kept apart from each other.

After placing the inmates in their recreation cages, Boyd left the recreation area. By leaving the area unsupervised, Boyd violated a duty specified in the orders for his post, which required that inmates in the recreation area remain supervised at all times.

While Boyd was away from the recreation area,⁴ Gustin knocked Danser to the ground and repeatedly kicked and stomped his face, head, and body. Danser stated that Gustin uttered obscenities and commented on Danser's sex-offender status during the attack. After prison officials responded to the assault, Danser was transported to a local hospital where he received treatment for a ruptured spleen, a punctured lung, some broken ribs, and numerous bruises and abrasions. Boyd was not disciplined or reprimanded by his supervisors for his actions in connection with the incident.

Danser filed a complaint pursuant to Bivens against Patricia Stansberry, the Warden of FCI–Butner at the time of the incident,⁵ in which he sought damages for his injuries.⁶ Danser later filed an amended complaint (the complaint) naming Boyd and his direct supervisor, Bobby Joe Roy, the Special Housing Lieutenant in charge of the SHU at the time of the attack, as additional defendants. Danser alleged in the complaint that Boyd, Stansberry, and Roy (collectively, the defendants) were deliberately indifferent to Danser's safety, and that his injuries resulting from the defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (the deliberate indifference claim).

Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion seeking summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, holding that there were material disputed facts concerning whether the defendants violated Danser's constitutional rights. The defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

A.

We first address Danser's argument that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, because our review of the district court's decision would require that we review whether the court's factual findings are supported by the record. We disagree with Danser's position.

Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings to the extent that the court's decision turned on an issue of law. Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir.2013) ; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (holding that a district court's denial of qualified immunity, “to the extent that [the decision] turns on an issue of law,” is an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ). We lack jurisdiction, however, if the decision was based on questions of evidentiary sufficiency properly resolved at trial. Cooper, 735 F.3d at 157 ; Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 221–22 (4th Cir.2012) (en banc); see also Gray–Hopkins v. Prince George's Cnty., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir.2002) (courts of appeal lack jurisdiction to determine in an immediate appeal of denial of qualified immunity whether the evidence is sufficient to support the facts as set forth by the district court).

In this matter, contrary to Danser's suggestion, our review of...