Danvir v. Morse
| Decision Date | 13 May 1885 |
| Citation | 139 Mass. 323,1 N.E. 123 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | William Danvir v. Benjamin W. Morse & another |
Exceptions overruled.
F Dodge, for the defendants.
W. E Russell, (C. T. Russell, Jr., with him,) for the plaintiff.
Devens J.
The first count in the plaintiff's declaration alleged a liability of the defendants for injuries received by the plaintiff, while in the service of their vessel; and, upon this count, a verdict was directed for the defendants. The case went to the jury upon the second count, which alleged that the plaintiff, having broken his leg in the service of the vessel, and requiring immediate medical care and treatment, the defendants had negligently failed to provide it, had kept him on board without it, and did not give him proper care and attention on board the vessel, "by reason whereof, and of said detention and delay, the plaintiff suffered extremely, and was obliged to be in a hospital and under medical and surgical treatment for eighteen months, and is crippled for life." The acts done or omitted to be done were those of the master, but it was not contended at the trial, nor at the hearing in this court, that the defendants would not be liable therefor, if a failure of duty on his part was shown.
While the plaintiff contended that it was the duty of the master, immediately after the accident, to sail to the nearest port where surgical aid could be given him, and there to land him, this instruction was refused, and the jury were instructed, that such was not the law, and that other circumstances were to be regarded "besides the mere comfort and well-being of this one person on board the ship;" that there was no absolute duty upon the master to seek the nearest port; "that his duty was to be ascertained upon consideration of the circumstances bearing on the case, and he is to decide that matter, in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion, taking into account all the circumstances which are to govern his actions;" and "that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the master's decision was not reasonable and proper at the time and under the circumstances," which must be shown by evidence. With great clearness, the instructions pointed out, in several forms, that all for which the plaintiff was entitled to recover, in the position in which the case was before the jury, was for the aggravation to his original injury, if any, which proceeded from the negligence of the defendants; that the jury must observe that the question was not, "as it would be in any ordinary case of personal injury, whether it was the result generally of the accident, but whether it was the result of any failure of duty of the defendants towards" the plaintiff; and that, as the plaintiff could only recover damages for the aggravation of the original injury and the consequences flowing therefrom, it was for the plaintiff to separate and distinguish these from the original injury. The presiding judge illustrated this proposition by mentioning various aggravations of the original injury claimed by the plaintiff to have resulted from the negligence of the defendants, such as the failure of the bones of his broken leg to unite, and an abscess and a fever which followed; and he instructed the jury that they must be satisfied, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, before allowing damages therefor, "that these features of his case were due, not to his injury, nor to any general cause, but to the specific cause which he alleges in his declaration, namely, the failure of the defendants to perform their duty toward him."
These instructions, while they do not adopt the language of the defendants' requests, are, so far as they afford the general rules which are to govern the trial of the case substantially in accordance therewith. So much of them as requested the court to rule that, if the master believed, though there would be delay in carrying the plaintiff to the port of destination, it would not be a serious delay, nor involve any serious result, then the master was not in fault for deciding as he did, was properly refused. This would have left the...
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