Darby v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 19 June 1876
• Citation: 2 Mo.App. 486
• Parties: JOHN F. DARBY, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOHN KNAPP, Executor of DELPHY CARLIN, deceased, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

2 Mo.App. 486

JOHN F. DARBY, Plaintiff in Error,

v.JOHN KNAPP, Executor of DELPHY CARLIN, deceased, Defendant in Error.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jun. 19, 1876.

1. In an action by an attorney for services in defending a husband in a divorce and alimony suit, it is error to reject testimony offered by plaintiff to show the property and financial condition of his client. Such rejection is not justified by the fact that there was testimony tending to prove a special contract between the attorney and client.

2. Where an attorney is employed generally to guard his client's interests in a particular matter, and bestows labor in investigations which lead to the conclusion that his client has no real interest in the matter, he is entitled, nevertheless, to compensation for his services.

3. If the plaintiff prove the services on account of which he sues, but introduces no proof of their value, the jury may, from their own knowledge of the business and affairs of society, fix a reasonable value, and find a verdict in his favor accordingly.

ERROR to St. Louis Circuit Court.

Reversed and remanded.

John F. Darby, plaintiff in error, pro se.

Cline, Jamison & Day, for defendant in error.

LEWIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff presented for allowance, in the Probate Court, his account against the estate of defendant's testator for professional services as attorney at law, and for moneys paid on the testator's account during his life-time. The Probate Court refused an allowance, whereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court, where the cause was tried before a jury. Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the defendant.

The charges in the account amounted to $1,550 for professional services, and $1,727 for moneys paid--making in all $3,277. The credits, all being cash payments, amounted to $2,427, leaving a balance claimed of $850. The three following items, among those of services rendered, constitute chiefly the basis of the present controversy:

“To drawing bill for divorce against Mary Carlin, and prosecuting said suit to final judgment, and obtaining decree of divorce, throughout, etc., $500.

Drawing copy of bill of Mary Carlin against you and sending to you, and drawing your answer to the same, and defending said suit successfully for D. Carlin, and, as his counsel, having the bill dismissed, $500.

Services rendered you in the case of Mad. Huth in defending the suit, and assistance in the same, and in the Supreme Court against her claim for dower to land in Carondelet, $250.”

It appears from the testimony that the divorce suits were closely contested, and that the services rendered in them by the plaintiff were highly valued by the testator, to whom the terms of the decree, with reference to alimony, were more favorable than he had anticipated. In the course of the trial the plaintiff offered to prove the value of Mr. Carlin's estate at the time of the divorce proceedings. Upon defendant's objection this testimony was excluded, and the plaintiff excepted.

This ruling was erroneous. In every divorce suit where alimony is decreed, the value of the husband's estate becomes an essential element in estimating the amount to be decreed, against him. The ratio which the one shall bear to the other is usually a matter of controversy engaging the most earnest efforts of opposing counsel. The best service to be rendered by the attorney for the husband consists in getting the alimony fixed at the lowest possible ratio to the amount of his client's whole estate. There is no settled rule of proportion. Much will depend upon the social standing of the parties, their habits of life respectively, the productiveness of the husband's capital, and even on the respective derelictions of the parties from marital duty. These, and other elements, invite much skillful handling on either side of the contest. If the husband be worth $100,000, and the alimony be $2,000 per annum, it cannot be denied that such a decree is more favorable to him than the same would be against a man worth only $5,000. Thus the pecuniary condition of the husband furnishes a...