Darda v. Chicago Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 03 October 1968
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 52359
• Citation: 241 N.E.2d 478,100 Ill.App.2d 94
• Parties: Velma DARDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 478

241 N.E.2d 478

100 Ill.App.2d 94

Velma DARDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 52359.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Oct. 3, 1968.

George J. Schaller, O. R. Hamlink, Jerome F. Dixon, Harry I. Parsons, Chicago, for appellant.

Cooney & Stenn, Chicago, Richard E. Neville, Chicago, of counsel, for appellee.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action for damages for personal injuries based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. The jury awarded a verdict of $3,800.00 whereupon the defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new trial. The motions were denied and judgment was entered on the verdict.

On October 31, 1960, the plaintiff boarded a bus which transported her to the Chicago Transit Authority's El station at 63rd Street and Loomis Avenue in Chicago. She gave her transfer to the ticket agent at the station and then went up to the platform. The platform was congested with the morning rush-hour commuters. The plaintiff testified that it was raining heavily and had been raining for some time. As a train approached, the plaintiff moved toward it; and, while looking through the windows into the train to see if she could find a seat, she travelled a few yards and fell to the platform. The plaintiff testified that there were 'messy looking' and 'trampled' leaves on the platform in addition to scattered puddles. When she picked herself up the plaintiff noticed a 'slimy' substance adhering to her shoes and she felt something 'slick' on her hand. The plaintiff remained on the platform for a very short time and then proceeded to board the train.

The plaintiff offered one witness who testified that she was sitting inside the train when she saw the plaintiff fall and that the platform was wet. Upon arriving at her place of employment, the plaintiff began to feel pain and was treated by her own doctor later that day. She sustained injuries to her left arm and left hip, and she remained in the hospital for five days and was thereafter treated by her family doctor for a period of ten weeks. The present appeal does not present an issue with respect to the existence or extent of the plaintiff's injuries or resultant damage.

The defendant made no attempt to refute any of the aforementioned testimony. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor which was denied. An instruction was given to the jury without objection that the defendant was under a duty of the 'highest degree of care.'

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because (1) the defendant owed only the duty of ordinary care to this plaintiff, and (2) the plaintiff offered no evidence tending to show that the defendant had either actual knowledge or constructive notice of the allegedly slippery substance on the platform. In short, the defendant argues, the plaintiff's proof presented no factual question of notice, either actual or constructive, for the jury's consideration and has thus failed to prove an essential element of her cause of action.

The case of Davis v. South Side Elevated Railroad Company, 292 Ill. 378, 127 N.E. 66, 10 A.L.R. 254, is controlling. In that case, the plaintiff had disembarked from an elevated train and had reached the first landing on the stairs when she slipped on a banana skin and fell thereby sustaining injury. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and held, firstly, that the court's instruction on the 'highest degree of care' was erroneous and that the defendant owed only ordinary and reasonable care. On pages 380--381, 127 N.E. on page 67, the court approvingly quoted the following language:

'Some of the cases seem to lose sight of the difference between the duty respecting station buildings and that respecting means and modes of conveyance, but the well-reasoned cases recognize the distinction and affirm that a railroad company that exercises ordinary care in constructing and maintaining station buildings and appurtenances in a reasonably safe condition for use is not guilty of negligence. There is really no valid reason why a railroad company should be held to a higher degree of care in maintaining its station buildings than that to which an individual owner of buildings used for ordinary business purposes is held. * * *'

The Davis court went on further to hold that a directed verdict should have been granted for the defendant:

'If it had been shown that the banana skin had been permitted to be upon the stairway for a sufficient time that notice might be implied or actual knowledge were shown, that might have justified a verdict against the company under the rule requiring the exercise of ordinary care, but such actual or implied notice was not shown on this record.' (page 386, 127 N.E. page 69.)

The principles announced in the Davis case have been consistently followed in this state. (See: Antibus v. W. T. Grant Company, 297 Ill.App. 363, 17 N.E.2d 610; Schmelzel v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Company, 342 Ill.App. 501, 96 N.E.2d 885; Wroblewski v. Hillman's, Inc., 43 Ill.App.2d 246, 193 N.E.2d 470; Olinger v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 21 Ill.2d 469, 173 N.E.2d 443.)

In light of the aforementioned authority, this court concludes that the defendant was required to exercise only ordinary care to the plaintiff in this case and that the defendant's liability is dependent upon an offering of some evidence which can allow a jury to infer constructive notice or to find actual knowledge. It is this court's opinion that the plaintiff has failed to provide the jury with any such evidence.

The record presented to us in the instant case is barren of any testimony as to how long leaves had been on the platform or as to how long this 'slimy' condition had been present. The plaintiff's fall could have been...