Davis v. South Side Elevated R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1920
• Docket Number: No. 13201.,13201.
• Citation: 127 N.E. 66,292 Ill. 378
• Parties: DAVIS v. SOUTH SIDE ELEVATED RAILROAD CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

292 Ill. 378

127 N.E. 66

DAVIS

v.SOUTH SIDE ELEVATED RAILROAD CO.

No. 13201.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1920.

Action by Louise Davis against the South Side Elevated Railroad Company. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from First Branch Appellate Court, First District; on appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; Sheridan E. Fry, Judge.

William A. Morrow and Carroll H. Jones, both of Chicago (Addison L. Gardner, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

CARTER, J.

Appellee filed a statement of claim of the first class in the municipal court of Chicago against appellant for damages alleged to have been sustained through an accident from falling on the stairway leading from an elevated railway station in Chicago after leaving the train the evening of July 12, 1916. On the trial in the municipal court a judgment for damages of $100 and costs was rendered. On appeal to the Appellate Court this judgment was affirmed. That court granted a certificate of importance, and the case has been brought here by appeal.

The testimony in the record shows that appellee and her husband were returning from a visit to his mother's home in another part of the city on appellant's elevated railroad, and had left the cars and passed through the Thirty-Fifth street station and reached the first landing on the stairs going to the street when she slipped on a banana skin and fell, striking her head and back. She had to be assisted in getting up and to her home and was confined to her bed for a time. There is considerable testimony in the record as to the nature and extent of the injury which we do not think it necessary to refer to at length, in view of the conclusion that we have reached as to the legal questions involved.

[1] The principal contention here is as to the correctness of an instruction given by the trial court in defining the care required of appellant in the maintenance and supervision of its stairway and landing. The instruction in question stated that--

‘In the management and operation of elevated trains and the management and maintenance of the platforms and steps and landings leading to and from said trains for the use of passengers, it is the duty of common carriers to exercise the highest degree of care, skill, and diligence for the safety of their passengers consistent with the mode of conveyance adopted and its practical operation.’

We have not been favored with a brief and argument on behalf of appellee.

Counsel for appellant content that as to station grounds, platforms, and stairways leading to and from the stations only ordinary care is required on the part of appellant, and that the evidence in this case is insufficient, under proper rules of law, to sustain the verdict. Counsel for appellant concede that in the operation of its trains and the immediate incidents of passenger transportation the highest degree of care is required, but contend that the same degree is not required as to its station platforms and the approaches to and from said stations; that the only degree of care required as to these latter places is the degree of care that would be required, under the law, from the owner of an ordinary business house or concern with reference to its building and premises.

This precise question does not seem to have been definitely decided by this court. It has, however, been frequently discussed by testwriters and decided definitely in other jurisdictions. The decisions are not all in harmony, though the weight of authority seems to be that as to station buildings and other appurtenances only ordinary or reasonable care is required. In Knight v. Portland, S. & P. R. Co., 56 Me. 234, 96 Am. Dec. 449, Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Hagblad, 72 Neb. 773, 101 N. W. 1033,106 N. W. 1041,4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254,9 Ann. Cas. 1096, and Brackett v. Southern Railway Co., 88 S. C. 447, 70 S. E. 1026, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1212, the courts stated that the highest degree of care is required on the part of a railroad company as to its station grounds; while Kelly v. Manhattan Railway Co., 112 N. Y. 443, 20 N. E. 383,3 L. R. A. 74;Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 104 Ind. 239, 3 N. E. 874;Moreland v. Boston & Providence Railroad Co., 141 Mass. 31, 6 N. E. 225;Christie v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 61 Minn. 161, 63 N. W. 482;Falls v. San Francisco & Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 97 Cal. 114, 31 Pac. 901;McCormick v. D., G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 141 Mich. 17,104 N. E. 390;Hiatt v. D. M., N. & W. Ry. Co., 96 Iowa, 169,64 N. W. 766, and Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Owens, 118 Ark. 467, 177 S. W. 8, all hold that as to stations and other appurtemances only ordinary or reasonable care is required on the part of the owners.

‘The duty respecting the construction and maintenance of station buildings is not so rigorous as that imposed upon railroad carriers in relation to roadbeds, tracks, cars, appliances, and the like. Some of the cases seem to lose sight of the difference between the duty respecting station buildingsand that respecting means and modes of conveyance, but the well-reasoned cases recognize the distinction, and affirm that a railroad company that exercises ordinary care in constructing and maintaining station buildings and appurtenances in a reasonably safe condition for use is not guilty of negligence. There is really no valid reason why a railroad company should be held to a higher degree of care in maintaining its station buildings than that to which an individual owner of buildings used for ordinary business purposes is held. The reasoning of the cases which laid the foundation for the strict American doctrine as to the degree of care required of carriers using steam as a motive power cannot, it is obvious, have any application to buildings and structures prepared for the use of travelers.’ 4 Elliott on Railroads (2d Ed.) sec. 1590. See to the same effect, 3 Thompson on Negligence (Ed. of 1902) sec. 2748; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed.) sec. 941; 6 Cyc. 605; 10 Corpus Juris, sec. 1341. and cases there cited. The rule is frequently laid down that the degree of care owed to the passenger is justly lessened to the extent of the lessening of the danger involved; that the care required should be commensurate with the danger involved. Taylor v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (C. C.) 59 Fed. 755. A lengthy review of the authorities is found in a note to St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Woods (Ark.) 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855, and Johns v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. (S. C.) 20 L. R. A. 520. ‘The degree of care is not fixed solely by the relation of carriers and passengers; it is measured by the consequences which may follow the want of care. A railroad company is held to the highest degree of care in respect to the condition and management of its engines and cars, because negligence in that respect involves extreme peril to passengers, against which they cannot protect themselves. It would not act reasonably if it did not exercise greater care in equipping and running its trains than in regard to the condition of its station grounds.’ Moreland v. Boston & Providence Railroad Co., supra, 141 Mass. 33,6 N. E. 226.

This court has had occasion several times to rule on kindred questions. In Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Co. v. Grush, 67 Ill. 262, 264,16 Am. Rep. 618, the court had under consideration a case where a passenger had been injured by a defect in the floor in the platform of the company which had existed for nearly two years before the accident, and the court said:

‘The obligation of care on the part of a railroad company extends to all the accessories of its business, among which are stations or depots. These must be constructed and arranged with care, properly lighted when dark, and otherwise made safe and convenient for persons lawfully entering therein for the transaction of business. But in these as in other matters the company is only bound to use ordinary care, except in favor of passengers. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 447.’

This statement of the court in that case, which was based on the rule as laid down by Shearman & Redfield on Negligence in the edition of that work then published, it is urged, justified the conclusion that the court held that more than ordinary care was required in such cases in favor of passengers. Expressions may be found in New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 Ill. 40, 43 N. E. 809;Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N. E. 713;Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Jennings, 190 Ill. 478, 60 N. E. 818,54 L. R. A. 827, and Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co. v....