Darden v. Board of Trustees of Public School Retirement System of School Dist. of Kansas City, WD

• Decision Date: 06 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Parties: 21 Ed. Law Rep. 1056 Lillie Belle DARDEN, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the PUBLIC SCHOOL RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, and Geraldine Darden, Respondents. 35539.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 755

680 S.W.2d 755

21 Ed. Law Rep. 1056

Lillie Belle DARDEN, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the PUBLIC SCHOOL RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri and Geraldine Darden, Respondents.

No. WD 35539.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Nov. 6, 1984.

Byron Neal Fox, Kansas City, for appellant.

Shirley W. Keeler of Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, for the Retirement System.

Clifford Spottsville, Kansas City, for Geraldine Darden.

Before TURNAGE, C.J., and SHANGLER and MANFORD, JJ.

MANFORD, Judge.

This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the circuit court which, the entry thereof, affirmed an administrative decision determining the beneficiary of certain retirement and death benefits. The judgment is affirmed.

A sole point is presented, which in summary charges that the trial court erred in entering a judgment to the favor of respondents because the administrative decision was erroneous, unreasonable, and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and therefore said decision was not supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record.

The facts as summarized are as follows, and they are undisputed between the parties.

Appellant, Lillie Belle Darden (hereinafter Lillie) was the former wife of Lawrence Darden (hereinafter Lawrence). Lillie and Lawrence were husband and wife until their marriage was dissolved on February 14, 1979. On May 26, 1979, Lawrence married respondent Geraldine (hereinafter Geraldine). Lawrence was employed as a teacher for and within the Kansas City, Missouri School District. He commenced that employment status on February 18, 1970. On February 18, 1970, Lawrence executed a "beneficiary card" advising the Retirement System of the Kansas City School District that his designated beneficiary was Lillie. This card remained on file until Lawrence's death on January 9, 1980.

On October 1, 1979, Lawrence wrote to the Retirement System, requesting a retirement blank. On October 24, 1979, the System received an application from Lawrence for service retirement. This application requested that Geraldine be appointed beneficiary for retirement purposes. On November 7, 1979, the System approved Lawrence Darden's application for disability retirement. Subsequently, Lawrence requested that his disability retirement not become effective until he had used his accumulated sick leave. This request was granted. He was paid by the school district up until the time of his death, because his accumulated sick leave had not been exhausted. Thus, at the time of his death, he had not begun to receive any monthly disability retirement allowance.

Following Lawrence's death, Lillie and Geraldine made claims to the retirement benefits accumulated to the credit of the deceased, Lawrence Darden. Geraldine's claim was based upon her status as the widow of Lawrence Darden. She presented her claim, supported by the application filed by Lawrence Darden some 2 1/2 months prior to his death. This form designated Geraldine as his wife and as his beneficiary. Lillie's claim was based upon the original beneficiary card completed on September 18, 1970 which designated Lillie as the beneficiary of Lawrence Darden. This card, like the one supporting Geraldine's claim, was on file with the school district's personnel office.

Upon the advice of counsel, the Retirement System filed a declaratory judgment action and evidence was submitted in that action. The court's jurisdiction to entertain such a declaratory judgment action was questioned by Lillie because § 169.291, RSMo 1978 vests original jurisdiction of such matters in the Retirement Board of the Retirement System. The declaratory judgment action was dismissed.

At the time these events were taking place, there were no statutory provisions for a hearing before the Board of Trustees to resolve conflicting claims to benefits. The Retirement System, in the attempt to resolve the matter, appointed a hearing officer to gather the facts and to submit a recommendation regarding the appropriate beneficiary. A record was compiled. Both parties were afforded opportunity to submit anything additional, but both parties declined the offer. This record was submitted to the Board of Trustees, along with suggested findings prepared by the hearing officer. There has never been any challenge to this procedure by any of the parties. The Board of Trustees entered its decision designating Geraldine as the beneficiary of benefits of the late Lawrence Darden. Lillie filed a petition for review. The circuit court entered judgment against Lillie and this appeal followed.

Before addressing the specifics of the issue presented on this appeal, it is thought advisable to point out certain basic principles applicable to appellate review of such proceedings.

There is no statutory requisite (concerning the determination of beneficiaries to retirement benefits) that a hearing be held, thus pursuant to Chapter 536, RSMo 1978, the decision of the Board of Trustees is a final decision of that agency and is denominated an uncontested case. State ex rel. Wilson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867 (Mo.1960). Due to this particular status, the circuit court was authorized to take additional evidence and consider the matter de novo. Phipps v. School District of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91 (Mo.App.1982), Long v. Bates County Memorial Hospital, 667 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.App.1983). The parties herein agreed that no additional evidence was necessary and the circuit court secured no additional evidence.

As to the standard of review to be applied and followed by this court in the review of such agency proceedings and decisions, this court is to uphold the agency decision unless that decision is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, or is not authorized by law. This court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the agency relative to matters of discretion vested in the agency. Ross v. Robb, 662 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. banc 1983), Mead Products v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 656 S.W.2d 805 (Mo.App.1983), Fleming Foods of Missouri, Inc. v. Runyan, 634 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. banc 1982). It is to be noted that appellate review in contested versus non-contested agency matters differs, see Long, supra, and the net effect herein is the same due to the disposition by the circuit court.

Lillie's argument asserts that at the time of his death, Lawrence was an "active employee". Lillie reaches that conclusion because Lawrence had not, by the date of his death, exhausted all of his sick leave. From this, Lillie then concludes further that the beneficiary card executed by Lawrence on September 18, 1970 controls and hence she (Lillie) is the beneficiary entitled to the claimed benefits.

In support of her assertion, Lillie directs this court's attention to § 169.322, RSMo 1978, and from that statutory reference, Lillie concludes that "since he (Lawrence Darden) was receiving compensation from the School District, he could not receive retirement benefits." What § 169.322 specifically says on this question is, "The first monthly payment of such ordinary disability retirement allowance...