Dardick v. Dardick

• Decision Date: 15 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 70455,70455
• Parties: Eileen H. DARDICK, Appellant, v. Leon M. DARDICK, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 268

948 S.W.2d 268

Eileen H. DARDICK, Appellant, v. Leon M. DARDICK, Respondent.

No. 70455.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Two.

July 15, 1997.

Michael C. Walther, Craig G. Kallen, The Walther Law Firm, St. Louis, for appellant.

Louis J. Basso, Louis H. Basso, P.C., St. Louis, for respondent.

GERALD M. SMITH, Judge.

Wife, Eileen Dardick, appeals from a decree of dissolution. She questions the validity of an antenuptial agreement, the disposition of property and the failure of the court to award her maintenance. We affirm.

Husband and wife met in 1978, when husband was still married to his first wife. ¹ Husband and Eileen were married in 1982 in California. Prior to their wedding the parties executed an antenuptial agreement. It provided that it was to be construed and governed by California law. It was wife's testimony that the agreement was entered into to protect wife's assets from a possible alienation of affections action by husband's first wife. The court found the agreement valid under both California and Missouri law. It found that wife executed it after consultation with her legal counsel, that she had full knowledge and understanding of the agreement, and that she had carefully read the document. Those findings were fully supported by evidence before the court.

Wife attacks the validity of the agreement on three bases. She bears the burden of establishing invalidity. In re Marriage of Iverson, 11 Cal.App.4th 1495, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 70 (1992). First she contends that husband did not disclose all of his assets. Specifically, she contends that his employer had promised to pay him $500,000 at some time in the future if he was still employed by the company at the time the company merged or was acquired by some other company. In 1984 husband received from the owner of his employer stock having approximately that value when the owner's company was acquired by another company. Wife contends this was part of husband's employment contract; husband contends the stock was a gift from the owner of the company to him. The court characterized the stock as compensation for services rendered, which was conditioned on continued employment with the company. We find it makes no difference. It is clear that the award, whatever its characterization, was contingent upon two conditions--husband's continued employment with his employer and acquisition of the employer by another entity. It was not an asset of the husband at the time of the execution of the antenuptial agreement and if one or both of the conditions did not occur would never become an asset. The occurrence of the conditions was mostly out of the control of husband. We are unable to conclude that husband's failure to advise wife of such a speculative possibility amounts to non-disclosure.

Secondly, wife contends that the agreement was unconscionable. Under California law, if the party voluntarily executed the agreement then to establish unenforceability, she must establish unconscionability and non-disclosure. California Family Code Section 1615(1994). Wife having failed to establish non-disclosure did not establish unenforceability. In addition, in California unconscionability is defined as "whether, in light of the general background and needs of the particular case, the provisions involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract is made." Legislative Committee Comment to California Family Code Section 1670.5 (1985). Unconscionability is a question of law. California Family Code Section 1615(b)(1994). The circumstances at the time of making the contract were: (1) wife had an attorney of her own choosing who actually drafted the agreement, (2) wife had worked as a legal secretary and was not ignorant of the law, (3) wife knew husband was contesting the distribution of property in his first divorce and reasonably would be trying to protect himself in a second marriage, (4) while husband had more assets than wife, wife did have substantial separate property and the training and education to make an adequate living. The agreement provided:

2. Eileen agrees that any and all property which Lee may hereafter acquire, including property resulting from his personal services, skills, and efforts, shall be and remain the sole and separate property of Lee. Eileen acknowledges that she voluntarily relinquishes all interest in such property and understands that property which in the absence of the Agreement, may be community property or other property in which she has an interest shall be and remain the sole and separate property of Lee and property in which she has no interest.

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