Darius A., In re, 259
| Decision Date | 13 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 259,259 |
| Citation | 47 Md.App. 232,422 A.2d 71 |
| Parties | In re DARIUS A., Persephone A. and Germaine A. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Alan M. Wright, Asst. County Atty. for Montgomery County, with whom were Paul A. McGuckian, County Atty. for Montgomery County and Richard E. Frederick, Deputy County Atty. for Montgomery County, on brief, for appellant.
Richard T. Colaresi, Cheverly, for appellee.
Argued before MOYLAN, MELVIN and MASON, JJ.
It is unfortunate but not uncommon to see a child involved in a tug-of-war between two competing parents. It is extremely rare, however, to see children involved in a tug-of-war between two competing courts. That, in a nutshell, is the issue before us on this appeal.
Without unnecessarily belaboring the details, Darius, Persephone and Germaine are three siblings, all of whom are still under five years of age, who were found to be Children in Need of Assistance. In January, 1978 (January, 1979, in the case of the youngest, Germaine), all three children were committed to the custody and care of the Montgomery County Department of Social Services and, by that Department, were placed in foster care. On January 24, 1980, a hearing was held in the juvenile court of Montgomery County for purposes of reviewing the status of the subject children. Following the hearing, the juvenile court judge determined that it would be in the best interests of the children to remain in foster care, to remain under the general jurisdiction of the court and to remain under the continuing commitment to the Montgomery County Department of Social Services. The parents, on the other hand, because of evidence of significant progress in resolving their problems of emotional and marital instability, were to be allowed enlarged visitation rights under a specific schedule set out in the court order. Thus far, nothing that was determined is controversial.
At the same hearing, the Department of Social Services expressed its intention to file in the circuit court a Petition for Guardianship with the Right to Consent to Adoption. The final provision of the court order of January 24, 1980, was intended to enjoin such action by the Department of Social Services:
"ORDERED that under Article 3-827 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings, it being determined by the Court that any one to file any action to relieve the parents of their parental rights may defeat the disposition of the Court; and said filing of any action be and hereby is PROHIBITED; And It Is Further; ...."
The Department of Social Services takes umbrage at this final order, arguing 1) that it violates the notion of the proper separation of powers for one coordinate branch of government (the judicial) to presume to tell another coordinate branch of the government (the executive) how to behave, and 2) that it represents an invasion of the province of the circuit court on the part of the juvenile court.
The provision under which the juvenile court asserted its authority to act is Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-827, which provides, in pertinent part:
"Pursuant to the procedure provided in the Maryland Rules, the court may make an appropriate order directing, restraining, or otherwise controlling the conduct of a person who is properly before the court, if:
(i) The court finds that the conduct:
(a) Is or may be detrimental or harmful to a child over whom the court has jurisdiction; or
(b) Will tend to defeat the execution of an order or disposition made or to be made; ...."
The power of the juvenile court to utilize such orders to accomplish its appropriate mission must be viewed in the context of what is that mission and what are the limits upon it. We find guidance in § 3-802(a), which declares that the very purpose for the establishment of the juvenile court is, inter alia:
"(1) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child's best...
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In re Jayden G.
...to finalize this plan.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 106, 642 A.2d 201, 205 (1994) (citing In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235, 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980)). “[U]nless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is required to petition the circuit co......
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In re Blessen H., 71, September Term, 2005.
...and that adoption is in the child's best interests, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to finalize this plan. In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235, 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980); see also F.L. § 1-201. Instead, unless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is require......
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In re Julianna B.
...of a juvenile offender. The same principle distinguishes In re David K., 48 Md.App. 714, 429 A.2d 313 (1981), and In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 422 A.2d 71 (1980), cited by appellant; both cases preceded Demetrius J. In each case, we held that the juvenile court had overstepped its bound......
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In re Yve S.
...and that adoption is in the child's best interests, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to finalize this plan. In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235, 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980); see also F.L. § 1-201. Instead, unless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is require......