Darling v. Ill
| Docket Number | 4D2022-2433 |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Parties | DEBRA DARLING f/k/a DEBRA DARLING-ILL, Appellant, v. CHARLES L. ILL, III, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County; Karen M. Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No 502019DR006615XXXX.
Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., West Palm Beach for appellant.
Adam M. Zborowski and Matthew S. Nugent of Nugent Zborowski, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant Debra Darling ("Former Wife") appeals the trial court's denial of her renewed motion to enforce a prenuptial agreement (the "Agreement") in favor of appellee Charles L. Ill. III ("Former Husband"). After the trial court dissolved the parties' marriage Former Wife moved to enforce the Agreement, which she claimed entitled her to two lump sum payments totaling $1,465,000.00 after a final dissolution judgment was entered. Former Husband argued the motion was premature because arbitration had not been completed, and the trial court denied the motion.
After arbitration, Former Wife renewed her motion to enforce. However, the trial court found that its previous denial was a final order and that Former Wife's second motion to enforce was barred by res judicata. As we conclude that the trial court's res judicata finding was erroneous, we reverse and remand for the trial court to adjudicate the merits of Former Wife's renewed motion to enforce the Agreement and specifically, her entitlement to the lump sum payments under the Agreement.
Before the parties were married, they entered into a prenuptial agreement. The Agreement did two things relevant to the instant case. First, it required Former Husband to pay Former Wife two lump sum payments: $465,000 within 45 days of a final dissolution judgment and $1,000,000 within 60 days of a final dissolution judgment. Second, it required the parties to arbitrate any disputes concerning the Agreement's interpretation, and allocated arbitration costs and fees. Former Husband would pay costs and fees upfront, but he could deduct half the arbitration costs and all Former Wife's attorney's fees from any amounts due under the Agreement.
Eventually, Former Wife filed a petition for dissolution, asking the court to determine a variety of issues, none of which involved the two lump sum payments. Shortly after this petition was filed, the trial court confirmed the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. Former Wife then moved to bifurcate the issues appropriate for arbitration and the dissolution of the parties' marriage. Former Wife's position was that a final judgment would entitle her to the two lump sum payments, regardless of whether the judgment was entered before or after arbitration. The trial court granted Former Wife's motion to bifurcate, explaining, in pertinent part:
The terms of the Prenuptial Agreement require the Husband to pay the Wife certain moneys, the timing of which is triggered by the entry of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Given the findings of this Court and the absence of any traditional family law issues, the Court finds the Wife is entitled to the immediate entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.
The trial court then entered its final dissolution order, and Former Wife sought the lump sum payments from Former Husband. After Former Husband failed to pay, Former Wife filed a motion to enforce, arguing the trial court's final dissolution judgment entitled her to the payments.
At the hearing on Former Wife's motion, Former Husband admitted he had not paid Former Wife the payments, arguing that he did not owe Former Wife the payments "at this time":
(Emphasis added).
The trial court then denied Former Wife's motion to enforce, without explanation. Former Wife moved for rehearing, arguing that the trial court's failure to state whether the denial was with or without prejudice meant that she could be barred from ever enforcing the Agreement. Her motion for rehearing was also denied without explanation.
Relying on Former Husband's argument that arbitration needed to be finalized before she could receive the lump sum payments, Former Wife did not appeal the trial court's denial. Instead, she waited until after arbitration had concluded and then filed a renewed motion to enforce.
The trial court denied Former Wife's renewed motion on the basis that it was barred by res judicata. Specifically, the trial court found that its first denial was a final order because the order's failure to specify the grounds for denying the motion made it a final adjudication on the merits. The trial court also pointed out that because Former Wife's motion for rehearing acknowledged the denial could have been with prejudice, Former Wife's failure to appeal that decision meant res judicata applied. This timely appeal followed.
We review whether res judicata applies de novo. Aronowitz v Home Diagnostics, Inc., 174 So.3d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action and is conclusive of all issues which were raised or could have been raised in the action." Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Res judicata has the same preclusive effect regardless of whether the claim was asserted in the same or a different proceeding. See Pelphrey-Weigand v. Weigand, 283 So.3d 822, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
"The party claiming the benefit of the former adjudication has the burden of establishing . . . that the matter was formerly adjudicated." Wisconsin ex rel. North v. Martorella, 670 So.2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Res judicata applies if there is a prior adjudication that has: "1) identity in the thing sued for; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of persons and parties of the action; and 4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made." Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Cowie v. Orlowski, 184 So.3d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting W &W Lumber of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Town &Country Builders, Inc., 35 So.3d 79, 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).
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