Darnell v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau

• Decision Date: 18 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. 890135,890135
• Citation: 450 N.W.2d 721
• Parties: Harold DARNELL, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 721

450 N.W.2d 721

Harold DARNELL, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee.

Civ. No. 890135.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Jan. 18, 1990.

Joseph F. Larson II, Jamestown, for appellant.

Dean J. Haas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

Harold Darnell appealed from a district court judgment affirming an order by the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau dismissing his claim for benefits. We affirm.

Harold began working as a guard at the North Dakota State Penitentiary in Bismarck on March 2, 1987. Harold had been treated for alcoholism at the State Hospital in Jamestown on seventeen occasions from March 1974 through October 1981, but, according to him, he had totally abstained from alcohol from October 1981 until May 29, 1987. After completing his shift at the Penitentiary at 5:00 a.m. on May 29, 1987, Harold received an appraisal from his supervisor which rated his work performance as "poor" and indicated that he:

"Needs to think out a task before attempting to complete it. Double check his work. Do not rely on memory. Makes too many repeated small mistakes. Needs to have direct contact with inmates. Ask questions when in doubt. Assign under direct supervision of another Lt. to obtain second opinion before full time employment. At this point it could go either way."

According to Harold, he became very confused and depressed because he felt the appraisal was unjust, and, while driving from Bismarck to his home in Jamestown, he began drinking from a bottle of whiskey which he kept in his trunk. After arriving in Jamestown, he drove back to Bismarck where he was admitted to a hospital that afternoon after he had drank three quarts of whiskey that day. Harold was diagnosed as suffering from pseudoseizures and depression. After he was discharged from the hospital on June 6, 1987, he continued to drink heavily. He was readmitted to the hospital in July 1987 and received alcohol rehabilitation treatment at Heartview until he was discharged in August 1987. Harold did not return to work at the Penitentiary.

Harold filed a claim for medical and disability benefits with the Bureau, contending that the "on-the-job depression and stress" coupled with the "poor" work appraisal triggered his reoccurrence of active alcoholism.

After a formal hearing, the Bureau dismissed Harold's claim, finding:

"VIII.

"The claimant was not under a dilution [sic] or in any way under any compulsion to act in any given manner as a result of receiving his performance appraisal.

"IX.

"Claimant became intoxicated following receiving the bad performance appraisal.

"X.

"Claimant's diagnosis is recurrent alcoholism. Claimant has no other psychiatric condition which necessitated medical treatment, or contributed to disability.

"XI.

"Claimant's intoxication came as a result of claimant exercising his own free will to drink.

"XII.

"Claimant's [sic] subjectively links his drinking on May 29, 1987, to the bad performance appraisal. However, an extrinsic factor such as a bad performance report is not the proximate cause of the drinking episode but is merely used as an excuse to change the blame from himself to an extrinsic factor.

"XIII.

"Dr. Kemp confirmed that the claimant was under no compulsion to drink. The physician confirms that the claimant had a free will and that he exercised this free will when he drank.

"XIV.

"Claimant has failed to prove that his employment was the proximate cause of his drinking episode and recurrent alcoholism.

* * * * * *

"I.

"Claimant failed to prove an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

"II.

"Claimant has failed to prove that his recurrent alcoholism is causally related to an employment injury."

The district court affirmed the Bureau's decision, and Harold appealed.

Our review of administrative agency decisions is governed by Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., and requires a three-step process to determine: (1) If the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of evidence; (2) if the conclusions of law are sustained by the findings of fact; and (3) if the agency decision is supported by the conclusions of law. Howes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 730 (N.D.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1126, 103 L.Ed.2d 189 (1989); Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576 (N.D.1986). In determining whether or not an administrative agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of evidence we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979). Rather, we determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined that the agency's factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence. Id.

Harold initially argues that because the Bureau found that he drank of his own free will, the thrust of the Bureau's decision is that he intentionally injured himself, and therefore, it has the burden of proof under Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C., ¹ to prove that he is not entitled to benefits. We disagree.

Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C., generally requires the claimant to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of evidence in order to participate in the fund. Howes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, supra; Moses v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 436 (N.D.1988). However, the Bureau has the burden of proof if it claims that an employee is not entitled to benefits because of the employee's willful intent to injure himself or the employee's voluntary intoxication.

That burden applies, for purposes of this case, to situations in which an "injury was caused ... by reason of the voluntary intoxication of the employee" and "the injury was due to intoxication." Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C.; see generally 1A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law p 34 et seq. (1985). That language is applicable to cases in which the employee's voluntary intoxication is the cause of the employee's injury [see 1A Larson's, supra, at pp 34.31; 34.33(a) ] and does not require the burden of proof to shift when the alleged injury is itself alcoholism. We conclude that Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C., which shifts the burden of proof to the Bureau in certain instances is not applicable to Harold's claim.

Harold also contends that the Bureau's findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Relying on a subjective causal nexus standard adopted in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978), he argues that he honestly perceived that the stress of his employment substantially contributed ² to and triggered his pre-existing, asymptomatic alcoholism.

In order to participate in the fund, a claimant must prove a compensable injury. Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C.; Moses v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, supra. As applicable to this claim, Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C., defined a "compensable injury" ³ as:

"[A]n injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment including an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment, but such term shall not include an injury caused by the employee's willful intention to injure himself or to injure another, nor any injury received because of the use of narcotics or intoxicants while in the course of the employment.... Such term, in addition to an injury by accident, includes:

"a. Any disease which can be fairly traceable to the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public outside of the employment is exposed shall not be compensable except where the disease follows as an incident to, and in its inception is caused by a hazard to which an employee is subjected in the course of his employment. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease includes impairment and effects from radiation fairly traceable to the employment. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after it is contracted, it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence." ⁴

A claimant must prove that an injury or disease occurred in the course of employment and that the resulting disability is causally connected to that employment. Howes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, supra; Satrom v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824 (N.D.1982). However, a claimant's employment need not be the sole cause of an injury; it is sufficient if employment activities are a substantial contributing factor to the injury. Satrom v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, supra. An injury which can be medically related to the repeated stress and strain of a claimant's usual work exertions is a compensable injury. Id.

Although this court has not considered the issue of mental injuries from mental stimuli in workers compensation claims, ⁵ we have held that disabilities resulting from neurosis caused by a work-related injury are compensable [Lyson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351 (N.D.1964) ], and that mental injuries resulting from the termination of employment are not compensable. Choukalos v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344 (N.D.1988).

Under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe it is necessary to analyze the various standards for assessing mental injuries caused by mental stimuli. ⁶ In this case the alleged injury is alcoholism. The imprecision and lack of agreement among the medical profession in the area of alcoholism is well recognized. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968).

In this case, both Harold and the Bureau primarily...