Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau

• Decision Date: 28 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 11232,11232
• Citation: 395 N.W.2d 576
• Parties: James E. GRACE, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 576

395 N.W.2d 576

James E. GRACE, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee.

Civ. No. 11232.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Oct. 28, 1986.

Ohnstad, Twichell, Breitling, Rosenvold, Wanner, Nelson, Neugebauer & Maring, West Fargo, for appellant; argued by Ralph R. Erickson.

Dean J. Haas, Asst. Atty. Gen., North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, Bismarck, for appellee.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

James Grace appeals from a district court judgment upholding the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau's dismissal of his claim for benefits for injuries resulting from a heart attack he suffered during the course of his employment. We affirm.

James was employed for approximately six to seven weeks as the masonry foreman for Buckley Masonry on a project at North Dakota State University. James, as masonry foreman, was required to supervise brick laying and coordinate the masonry work with the other trades that were present on the job. In addition to his foreman duties, James spent approximately 75 to 80 percent of his employment time doing masonry work. James had 38 years of experience as a mason and during that time had occasionally served as masonry foreman. His last job as masonry foreman was approximately one year prior to his duties as foreman for Andy Buckley. At the time of his heart attack James was 60 years of age.

James testified that on the date of his heart attack, August 4, 1982, and for two days prior, the temperature at the work site had been very high. James and his crew were working on the second floor of a partially built building with outside walls but without any roof. James described the work site as "being in a big, open box with the sun shining directly in...." He estimated that at the particular place where he was working the temperature was probably close to 120?. James felt uneasy because his crew was about half a day behind schedule. He felt further anxiety because a crane was moved overhead which caused a potentially dangerous working condition and further delay to his time schedule.

On August 4, the day of his heart attack, between 10:00 a.m. and noon, James began to feel very weak. He became so weak that it was difficult for him to lift up the cement blocks that he was laying. He decided to go home. After he had been home for approximately ten minutes he became very ill and was taken to the hospital. On his admission to the hospital James was diagnosed as suffering from "[a]cute inferior myocardial infarction" and "[c]hronic obstructive pulmonary disease" by Dr. Robert L. Geston. Dr. Geston, in his letter to James' attorney, described the cause of James' myocardial infarction in relevant part as follows:

"I believe that the heart attack suffered by James Grace on August 4, 1982 was caused, within reasonable medical certainty, by conditions under which he was working on the day of the event.

"In the first place, temperature conditions were extremely high. This causes a dilitation [sic] of his blood vessels in the skin which can reduce blood pressure. Excessive sweating depletes salt, potassium, and water from the circulation decreasing blood volume and sometimes disturbing electrolyte balance. He was also under extreme emotional stress due to pressures to complete a segment of construction so that other construction personnel could get underway. This stress often releases adrenalin which drives the heart and makes the heart increasingly irritable. All of these factors together would certainly lay the ground work for heart injury."

James filed a claim for Workmen's Compensation benefits on August 23, 1982. The Bureau denied him benefits finding that there was no medical substantiation that his heart attack was related to his employment with reasonable medical certainty. The Bureau also found that there was no evidence of unusual stress precipitating his heart attack.

James requested a rehearing. On January 5, 1983, the Bureau wrote to James and requested that he indicate what additional evidence he wished to present through the rehearing process. The Bureau received no response and again wrote to James, informing him that if the Bureau did not hear from him within 30 days, it would assume that he had no additional evidence to present. No response was received and the Bureau issued an order dismissing his claim on September 1, 1983.

James again requested a rehearing. A formal hearing was held on February 1, 1985. The Bureau issued an order reaffirming dismissal, based upon additional evidence introduced at the hearing and its review of the entire file, on March 28, 1985. ¹ The Bureau in its order reaffirming dismissal determined:

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"I.

"An application for workmen's compensation benefits was filed on August 23, 1982, in connection with an alleged injury on August 4, 1982.

"II.

"On the alleged date of injury the claimant was employed by Andy Buckley Masonry as a mason.

"III.

"The claimant suffered an acute inferior myocardial infarction.

"IV.

"The claimant alleges that his heart attack resulted due to working in humid, direct sunlight for several days.

"V.

"The claimant was performing the normal duties of his occupation and there is no evidence of unusual stress or strain.

"VI.

"The claimant has a history of cigarette smoking since age seven and smokes approximately one pack per day.

"VII.

"The claimant suffers from coronary artery disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

"VIII.

"There is no medical substantiation that the claimant's heart attack was in any way related to his employment with reasonable medical certainty.

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"I.

"The claimant failed to prove an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

"II.

"The claimant failed to prove that the heart attack was precipitated by unusual stress in the course of employment.

"III.

"The claimant failed to prove that the heart attack was causally related to his employment with reasonable medical certainty.

"IV.

"The claimant failed to prove that he is entitled to benefits under the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act."

James appealed from the Bureau's decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the decision of the Bureau in a Memorandum Opinion on March 10, 1986. The district court found that James' heart attack was causally related to his employment with medical certainty, but upheld the Bureau's denial determining that he failed to prove that his heart attack was precipitated by unusual stress in the course of his employment. James appealed from the district court judgment to this Court.

In an appeal from a judgment of the district court involving the decision of an administrative agency, our review is limited to an examination of the decision of the agency and not the decision of the district court. Skjefte v. Job Service North Dakota, 392 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1986); Blueshield v. Job Service North Dakota, 392 N.W.2d 70 (N.D.1986); Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979). Our review of administrative decisions is directed by Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., and requires a three step process to determine: (1) If the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) if the conclusions of law are sustained by the findings of fact; and (3) if the agency decision is supported by the conclusions of law. Skjefte, 392 N.W.2d at 817.

In Skjefte, this Court recently summarized the standards we use in reviewing administrative agency decisions, as follows:

"1. We do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined that the factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence.

"2. We exercise restraint when we review administrative agency findings.

"3. It is not the function of the judiciary to act as a super board when reviewing administrative agency determinations.

"4. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the qualified experts in the administrative agencies."

The philosophy concerning these limitations of judicial review articulated in Power Fuels and its progeny is found in Geo. E. Haggart, Inc. v. North Dakota Work. Comp. Bur., 171 N.W.2d 104, 111 (N.D.1969), (quoting 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law Sec. 612 at 453-54 (1962)):

"The general frame of the power of judicial review is to keep the administrator within the valid statute which guides him and keep him from unreasonable excesses in the exercise of his function, and to ascertain whether there is warrant in the law and the facts for what the administrative agency has done, the court being limited to questions affecting constitutional power, statutory authority, and the basic prerequisites of proof. The primary limitation upon the power of the court to review is in regard to matters calling for the exercise of expert judgment which are committed to the discretion of the administrative agency. Thus, judicial review is extremely limited in regard to findings of fact and to expert judgments of an administrative agency acting within its statutory authority. The courts must not usurp the functions of the administrative agency nor intrude upon the domain which the legislature has entrusted to the agency."

Section 65-05-05, N.D.C.C., provides for the payment of compensation and other benefits to employees who have "been injured in the course of their employment." The term "injury" as used in Section 65-05-05, has been construed by this Court to mean "compensable injury" as defined in Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C. The relevant part of the definition that controls this case reads:

"If an injury is due to heart attack or stroke, such heart attack or stroke must be causally related to the worker's employment with reasonable medical certainty, and must have been precipitated by unusual stress." Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C.

Section 65-01-02(7) was amended by the North Dakota...