Dartt v. Sonnesyn
| Decision Date | 25 April 1902 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 12,891-(42).,s. 12,891-(42). |
| Citation | 86 Minn. 55 |
| Parties | GEORGE B. DARTT v. JOHN K. SONNESYN.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Savage & Purdy, for appellant.
W. S. Hammond, for respondent.
Action to recover for services by a real-estate broker in effecting an exchange of lands for a stock of merchandise. The case was tried to a court and jury. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, upon defendant's motion, it was dismissed. This appeal is from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff was a real-estate broker at Minneapolis. He had advertised lands for sale. Defendant was doing business under the firm name of Sonnesyn & Co., and owned a stock of goods at St. James, which he desired to exchange for lands. He wrote plaintiff a letter, stating that he had been informed that plaintiff had lands to exchange for merchandise, and that he would "give some man a good deal." Further correspondence was conducted between the broker and defendant. Later on plaintiff informed defendant that he had "parties with good wild lands and cash for good merchandise;" that their lands were in North Dakota and Michigan. From this on followed communications between the parties by letter and over the telephone. A third party (one Kearny) was presented to the defendant by plaintiff as the owner of the lands to be exchanged, and a trade between Kearny and defendant was agreed to at St. James, which was not, however, carried out; but we shall assume, for the purposes of this review, that a contract between these parties was consummated, so as to entitle plaintiff to recover for services if they were legally due from defendant instead of from Kearny, which is the real question at issue, and decisive of this appeal.
When defendant and Kearny met at St. James the negotiations were conducted between them without interference or suggestion from plaintiff, but at their inception there is no doubt that plaintiff was the agent of Kearny for the purposes stated, and there is nothing in the subsequent dealings between the parties to indicate that this relationship had ceased or had been changed. Plaintiff's contention is that from the beneficial character of the services he rendered defendant in the trade a promise by the latter was implied to pay for the same.
Generally stated, the rule is as expressed by Justice BROWN in Johanke v. Schmidt, 79 Minn. 261, 82 N. W. 582, viz.:
"Where one person performs labor for another, the law, in the absence of proof of a contract, and in the absence of a showing that the same was performed gratuitously, implies or presumes a request to perform the work and a promise to pay therefor."
Many authorities are cited to establish this elementary proposition, which may be conceded, but to maintain the claim of plaintiff it is essential that the supposed promise follows as an implication which tends to show a request to perform the work upon grounds of equity and right. Therefore, while the request itself ordinarily may be implied from the nature of the services, yet if the situation of the parties in law is such as to repel or prohibit such request, it cannot be presumed.
Clearly, it could not be claimed, if defendant had acted directly with the plaintiff in trading for the lands, that a broker's commission could be deducted from the purchase price or collected from the vendee, and what the plaintiff in such case could not demand for himself, he could not demand while acting as the agent of the vendor. If a broker, inviting trades of the character referred to, could not hold out inducements to third persons to make...
To continue reading
Request your trial