Datz v. Dosch

• Decision Date: 28 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20130364.,20130364.
• Citation: 2014 ND 102,846 N.W.2d 724
• Parties: Kurt G. DATZ, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Helen A. DOSCH, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

846 N.W.2d 724

2014 ND 102

Kurt G. DATZ, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.Helen A. DOSCH, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20130364.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 28, 2014.

Blake D. Hankey (on brief), Grand Forks, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Leslie Johnson Aldrich (argued) and Joshua Nyberg (appeared), Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee.

McEVERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Kurt G. Datz appeals from an amended judgment awarding primary residential responsibility to Helen A. Dosch; an order denying his motion to vacate, motion to strike, and demand for recusal; and a money judgment awarding attorney's fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I

[¶ 2] The underlying facts of this case are provided in Datz v. Dosch, 2013 ND 148, 836 N.W.2d 598 (“Datz I ”). Only those facts relevant to this disposition of the issues presented are reported here.

[¶ 3] This Court filed its opinion in Datz I on August 29, 2013, subject to petition for rehearing. Id. In Datz I, this Court “conclude[d] the district court's findings of fact on primary residential responsibility [were] not sufficiently specific and detailed to allow this Court to understand the basis for its decision” and “reverse[d] the judgment and remand[ed] for findings on the best interest factors as required by law.” Id. at ¶ 19. We affirmed the district court's determination of other issues because the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Id. at ¶¶ 25–28.

[¶ 4] The mandate of this Court's judgment and opinion was issued on October 1, 2013. Prior to the issuance of the mandate, on September 13, 2013, Dosch filed proposed amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment in the district court. Also prior to the mandate, on September 24, 2013, the district court entered amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, followed by an amended judgment on September26, 2013. Datz filed a motion to vacate, motion to strike, and demand for recusal on September 27, 2013. On October 1, 2013, Dosch responded opposing Datz's motions, demand for recusal, and requested attorney's fees. On October 22, 2013, the district court entered an order denying Datz's motions and demand for recusal. On November 7, 2013, the district court entered an order awarding attorney's fees of $873.62 against Datz and entered a money judgment. Datz timely appealed.

II

[¶ 5] On appeal, Datz argues: (1) the district court did not have jurisdiction to issue the amended judgment; (2) the merits of the amended judgment should not be examined because the amended judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, the district court erred in awarding Dosch primary residential responsibility; (3) the district court erred in denying his motion to vacate and demand for recusal; and (4) the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees.

A. Amended Divorce Judgment

[¶ 6] The district court entered the amended judgment prior to October 1, 2013, the date this Court issued the mandate in Datz I. Datz argues the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case until this Court's mandate was issued. Dosch argues the district court had jurisdiction because N.D.R.App.P. 41(b) does not provide an indefinite window of time for the mandate to be issued; rather, the mandate must be issued twenty-one days after the entry of judgment, which would have been September 20, 2013. Dosch also claims the district court reaffirmed its amended judgment through its order denying Datz's motion to vacate, motion to strike, and demand for recusal on October 22, 2013. Dosch alternatively argues, if this Court determines the district court did not have jurisdiction, this Court has the authority to temporarily return jurisdiction to the district court to reenter its amended findings and amended judgment.

[¶ 7] “It is well settled under North Dakota law that challenges to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo when the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute.” Schirado v. Foote, 2010 ND 136, ¶ 7, 785 N.W.2d 235. The parties do not dispute the jurisdictional facts.

[¶ 8] Once a notice of appeal is filed, a district court generally loses jurisdiction. Matter of S.E., 2012 ND 168, ¶ 9, 820 N.W.2d 389. “The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court attaches upon the filing of the appeal.... Further, an order or judgment entered by the trial court after an appeal has been filed is ordinarily void for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). It is the mandate issued by this Court that returns jurisdiction to the district court. See Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2013 ND 133, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d 527 (discussing the mandate returning jurisdiction to the district court).

[¶ 9] Rule 41, N.D.R.App.P., governs the issuance of a mandate. As explained in State v. Ebertz, 2010 ND 79, ¶ 8, 782 N.W.2d 350, “[t]he interpretation of a court rule, like the interpretation of a statute, is a question of law.” “When we interpret court rules, we apply canons of statutory construction and look at the language of the rule first to determine the meaning.” Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶ 22, 765 N.W.2d 691. We construe words to give them their “plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.” Id.; see alsoN.D.C.C. § 1–02–02. We also construe rules to harmonize related provisions to give meaning to each provision if possible. Lund v. Lund, 2011 ND 53, ¶ 9, 795 N.W.2d 318.Rule 41(b), N.D.R.App.P., provides: “The court's mandate must issue 21 days after the entry of judgment or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely petition for rehearing. The court may shorten or extend the time.” (Emphasis added.) Under Rule 41(c), N.D.R.App.P., “[t]he mandate is effective when issued.” While Rule 41(b) does indicate the mandate must be issued within certain time frames, it also provides discretion for extension of time. Because Rule 41(b) provides discretion to extend the time to issue the mandate and Rule 41(c) specifically states the mandate is only effective when issued, to harmonize and give each provision meaning requires an interpretation that the time frames under Rule 41(b) are not self-effectuating and do not result in automatic issuance of the mandate. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction until the mandate was issued on October 1, 2013.

[¶ 10] Because the district court entered its amended judgment before the issuance of this Court's mandate returning jurisdiction to the district court, the district court's amended judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. We could order a temporary remand simply for entry of the judgment. See Herzig, 2013 ND 133, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d 527. However, the issues on appeal are interrelated and will require further consideration by the district court. We, therefore, remand to the district court for sufficiently specific and detailed findings of fact consistent with our opinion in Datz I and to determine what proceedings may be necessary. We are not determining whether the district court's voided amended judgment awarding Dosch primary residential responsibility complies or does not comply with our mandate.

[¶ 11] The district court had jurisdiction over the case when it issued its order on October 1, 2013, denying Datz's motion to vacate, motion to strike, and demand for recusal and money judgment awarding attorney's fees. Therefore, we review the merits of the district court's order and money judgment.

B. Motion to Vacate, Motion to Strike, and Demand for Recusal

1. Motion to Vacate

[¶ 12] The district court denied Datz's motion to vacate the amended judgment. Datz argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to vacate because the motion correctly asserted the district court did not have jurisdiction. Dosch claims the district court's denial of Datz's motion to vacate was proper because Datz provided no argument establishing how the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate. Dosch also argues the district court, in denying the motion to vacate, affirmed its prior findings.

[¶ 13] In Vann v. Vann, 2009 ND 118, ¶ 10, 767 N.W.2d 855 (citations omitted), we explained the standard of review we apply in consideration of a district court's denial of a motion to vacate.

This Court reviews a district court's denial of a motion to vacate a judgment for an abuse of discretion. We do not determine whether the court was substantively correct in entering the judgment from which relief is sought, but determine only whether the court abused its discretion in ruling that sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment were not established. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.An abuse of discretion also occurs when a district court “misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Praus v. Praus, 2010 ND 156, ¶ 9, 786 N.W.2d 697. The district court provided no explanation for denying the motion to vacate, other than a blanket statement that “other issues raised by the Plaintiff [were] without merit.” The district court made no mention of jurisdiction nor of affirming the amended findings or judgment. Here, Datz's motion to vacate correctly asserted the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the amended judgment prior to this Court's issuance of the mandate. The district court's denial of Datz's motion to vacate constituted a misapplication of the law, therefore, constituting an abuse of discretion. We reverse the order denying the motion to vacate.

2. Motion to Strike

[¶ 14] The district court denied Datz's motion to strike. In its order denying the motion to strike, the district court explained:

The Exhibits entered ... on September 24, 2013, related to an Interim Order hearing in April of 2012. Those Exhibits were sealed, and just...