Daughenbaugh v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–0413.,10–0413. |
| Citation | 805 N.W.2d 591 |
| Parties | David Scott DAUGHENBAUGH, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John J. Wolfe, Jr., Clinton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Parrott and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney Generals, Michael L. Wolf, County Attorney, and Robin L. Strausser, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
In this case, we consider whether a person who pled guilty to criminal charges, received a deferred judgment, and had the charges dismissed after successful completion of probation has a conviction of a crime that can be challenged in a postconviction relief proceeding. The district court entertained the postconviction relief claim, but concluded that there was no basis to vacate the conviction. We agree with the result of the district court, but for different reasons as described below. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
David Daughenbaugh worked as a part-time pharmacist at the Camanche Pharmacy. Police arrested him on a warrant for theft in April 2008. As a result of an inventory search of his vehicle after his arrest, police discovered fifty-seven prescription bottles containing various prescription drugs. Daughenbaugh told the arresting officer that he was a “pharmacist tech” and intended to destroy the pills. His employer, however, told police that Daughenbaugh had no permission to take the medication from the pharmacy.
Daughenbaugh was subsequently charged with three felony counts of violating Iowa Code sections 155A.23(1)( a ) and 124.401(1)( c )(8) (2007); one aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code sections 155A.23(1)( a ) and 124.401(1)( d ); and one serious misdemeanor of unlawful possession of a prescription drug.
Daughenbaugh and the State entered into a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided that Daughenbaugh would plead guilty to the three felony counts and the aggravated misdemeanor count in exchange for the State's promise not to oppose Daughenbaugh's request for a deferred judgment. The State also agreed to drop the misdemeanor count.
The district court held a plea hearing on August 21, 2008. During the plea colloquy, Daughenbaugh admitted that he obtained the drugs—Ritalin, Vicodin, Lortab, and Lonox—by fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. He further explained that he took the drugs in order to self-medicate himself for a bad back.
The district court found a factual basis to support the guilty pleas and accepted them. During a subsequent sentencing hearing in October 2008, the court granted Daughenbaugh's request for a deferred judgment, placed him on supervised probation for two years, and imposed civil penalties. As a condition of probation, Daughenbaugh was required to undergo therapy, continue taking his prescription medication, and submit to random drug testing.
After his guilty plea and deferred judgment, Daughenbaugh received a letter from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) dated June 16, 2009. The DHS letter notified Daughenbaugh that he was excluded “from eligibility to participate in any capacity in the Medicare, Medicaid, and all Federal health care programs” as a result of his felony “convictions.” The practical impact of the letter was that Daughenbaugh was virtually unemployable as a pharmacist.
Daughenbaugh then filed an application for postconviction relief. In his postconviction relief papers, he alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Daughenbaugh claimed that there was no factual basis to support his acknowledgement at the plea colloquy that he obtained the prescription pills by “fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge.” See Iowa Code § 155A.23(1)( a ). He claimed that the trial information and minutes of testimony only supported charges of theft. Daughenbaugh filed a motion for summary judgment. The State resisted and filed its own motion for summary judgment.
The State asserted that Daughenbaugh had not been “convicted” for purposes of postconviction relief under Iowa Code chapter 822. The State relied on Galloway v. State, No. 08–0652, 2008 WL 4571556 (Iowa Ct.App. Oct. 15, 2008), an unpublished court of appeals opinion. The State also argued that there was a factual basis to support Daughenbaugh's guilty pleas. The State claimed that theft, by itself, constituted “deceit” under the applicable statutes. Further, the State argued that there was factual support on a “subterfuge” theory as Daughenbaugh knew which drugs were frequently inventoried by the pharmacy and took drugs that were not subject to such review. Finally, the State contended that untruthful statements made by Daughenbaugh after the officers discovered the prescription pills demonstrated fraud or deceit.
The district court held that Daughenbaugh was entitled to file a claim for postconviction relief. The court rejected the approach of Galloway and instead adopted the framework of Schilling v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 646 N.W.2d 69 (Iowa 2002), in determining that Daughenbaugh's guilty pleas amounted to “convictions” even though he received a deferred judgment. On the merits of his claim, however, the district court determined that there was a substantial factual basis for his guilty pleas and that, as a result, counsel was not ineffective. The district court concluded that theft involves “deceit, misrepresentation, and subterfuge.” Further, the district court found that because Daughenbaugh was an employee of the pharmacy, his theft of drugs amounted to embezzlement which was deceitful because he did not tell his employer that he was taking the drugs. The district court further found that Daughenbaugh engaged in misrepresentation because he took drugs knowing there would not be inventories over a certain time period, and therefore, he “misrepresented” the true nature of the employer's inventory.
Postconviction relief proceedings are actions at law and are generally reviewable on error. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are reviewable de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
A. The Growth of Collateral Consequences. In recent years, there has been a striking growth of what is generally termed “collateral consequences” that flow from a criminal conviction. Federal law now imposes dozens of sanctions for persons with felony drug convictions. See generally ABA Comm'n on Effective Crim. Sanctions & Pub. Defender Serv. for D.C., Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of Conviction in Federal Laws and Regulations (2009), available at http:// www. abanet. org/ cecs/ internalexile. pdf (discussing federal statutory and regulatory collateral consequences of a criminal conviction). States have also imposed an increasing number of sanctions as a result of criminal convictions. See, e.g., Kimberly R. Mossoney & Cara A. Roecker, Ohio Collateral Consequences Project: Executive Summary, 36 U. Tol. L.Rev. 611, 620 (2005) (). In Iowa, for example, a person who is convicted of sexual offenses will be subject to registration laws and other restrictions that apply to sex offenders, Iowa Code section 692A.103(1) (2011), and a deferred judgment for eluding a law enforcement vehicle may have an impact on one's driver's license, Schilling, 646 N.W.2d at 73.
The growth of collateral consequences and their potential impact on criminal defendants has gained considerable national attention. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the Uniform Collateral Consequences Conviction Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws provide for the collection and publication of information regarding collateral consequences, require that criminal defendants be advised of collateral consequences in pretrial proceedings, require individualized determinations of disqualification in certain circumstances, and provide avenues of relief from collateral consequences arising from criminal convictions. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions and
Standard 19–2.1 to .5, –3.2 (3d ed.2004); Unif. Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act §§ 4–10, 11 U.L.A. 6, 15–29 (Supp.2011).
Recent developments in the law of the right to effective counsel have recognized the need for lawyers representing criminal defendants to advise their clients of the direct collateral consequences of a plea bargain. In Padilla v. Kentucky, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486–87, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 298–99 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant pleading guilty to drug offenses received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to advise him of an important collateral consequence—deportation—that would automatically occur because of his conviction of drug offenses.
This case is a classic example of the impact collateral consequences may have on criminal proceedings. Daughenbaugh pled guilty to serious drug offenses believing he would likely receive a deferred judgment upon certain conditions. After receiving a deferred judgment, Daughenbaugh was notified by federal authorities that because his guilty pleas amounted to convictions under federal law, he could no longer participate as a pharmacist in federal drug programs, a death knell for licensed pharmacists. He now seeks to unravel the criminal proceedings to avoid the serious collateral consequences.
B. Challenge to “Conviction” in This Case. In Iowa, there are two separate avenues for challenging illegal restraint by government. The first avenue is entitled habeas corpus and is found in ...
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