Daugherty v. State

• Decision Date: 10 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-14., No. 01-13
• Citation: 2002 WY 52,44 P.3d 28
• Parties: Ty Charles DAUGHERTY, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Ty Charles Daugherty, Appellant (Defendant), v. The State of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

44 P.3d 28

2002 WY 52

Ty Charles DAUGHERTY, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Ty Charles Daugherty, Appellant (Defendant), v. The State of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Nos. 01-13, 01-14.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 10, 2002.

G. Mark Garrison of Garrison & Bronnenberg, P.C., Cody, WYO, Representing Appellant.

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, WYO, Representing Appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] Ty Charles Daugherty (appellant) was convicted of two burglaries. He was given a split sentence on the first burglary and sentencing was continued on the second burglary. After his probation was revoked, he was given a four-to-five year sentence on each crime, with the sentences to run concurrently. In these appeals, the appellant attacks the first sentence as violating the split sentencing statute and he attacks the second sentence as violating his right to speedy sentencing. [¶ 2] We affirm the sentence for the first burglary, but vacate the sentence for the second burglary. We further hold that, in the future, district courts utilizing the split sentencing statute must first impose a minimum and maximum sentence as required by statute and court rule, and we overrule previous holdings to the contrary.

ISSUES

1. Whether the sentence imposed by the district court in Case No. [01-13] was illegal?

2. Whether the district court violated [the appellant's] constitutional right to speedy sentencing [in Case No. 01-14]?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On June 3, 1996, a felony information was filed charging the appellant with burglary. This case, to which we will refer as the "first burglary," is the basis of Case No. 01-13. On November 22, 1996, a felony information was filed charging the appellant with another burglary. This case, to which we will refer as the "second burglary," is the basis of Case No. 01-14. On February 12, 1997, a combined hearing was held in the two cases, at which hearing the appellant entered guilty pleas to both burglaries. He was adjudicated guilty of both crimes and a presentence investigation was ordered.

[¶ 4] A sentencing hearing was held on June 20, 1997. The district court heard the testimony of witnesses and the arguments of counsel. The presentence investigation report and its recommendations were reviewed. Sentencing options, including incarceration and probation, were discussed. At the end of the hearing, the district court indicated that it had not yet reached a decision and that the matter would be continued. The hearing was then continued until June 26, 1997.

[¶ 5] At the continued hearing, the district court went to considerable length to detail its intentions as to sentencing on both burglaries and to explain to the appellant what those intentions were. Because the district court's intentions included delaying sentencing on the second burglary, the district court explained to the appellant his right to speedy sentencing:

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Daugherty, the Court is proposing to defer a portion of the sentencing [on the second burglary]; specifically, the portion that would pertain to any prison sentence and fine in that case. You have a right, legally, to a speedy sentencing, and I cannot defer that portion of the sentence unless you are willing to give up that right.

So my question to you and [defense counsel] at this time is whether you are willing now, on the record in open court, and yet today to sign a written waiver of speedy sentencing. [Defense counsel]?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I did speak with my client about that matter earlier, and I explained to him that he does have a right to proceed to sentencing immediately if he wishes to do so. However, after having that explained to him, it is his wish to waive a speedy sentencing, insofar as the term of incarceration and fine go, indefinitely until the Court resets the matter. And he will do that in writing.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Daugherty, do you concur with what [defense counsel] said?

MR. DAUGHERTY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Then you may remain standing. And I am going to go ahead and impose the [judgment] and sentence of the Court, except for that portion which is being deferred.

First let me say for the record that the Court has given full and extensive consideration to the sentence being proposed in this case. The Court has considered and rejected the possibility of a straight probation order at this time and—well, for many reasons has rejected that possibility.

The Court will, at this time, [on the first burglary] . . . impose a split sentence pursuant to the Wyoming statute authorizing split sentencing.

And it is specifically the intention of the Court to use a probationary split sentence, as has been recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court in recent case law. Accordingly, the Court is requiring that you serve one year in the Park County Jail with credit for time served which is a total of 218 days.

And upon the completion of your term of one year in the Park County Jail, you will then be on probation for a period of five years. There will be a number of conditions with respect to that probation, and I will give those to you in a moment.

* * *

And I will find that the total amount of your joint and several liability for restitution is $11,559.33.¹ The Court will further order that you are to pay the sum of $1,000 to the Wyoming Crime Victims' Compensation Fund. That amount may be paid in monthly payments when you're released to be on probation, at the rate of $50 per month, beginning with the second full month after your release.

* * *

The Court will not impose a fine [for the first burglary], but certainly reserves the authority to do that [for the second burglary].

[¶ 6] The district court's intention as to sentencing was further clarified in the written Sentence & Probation Order:

THE COURT HEREBY defers sentencing [for the second burglary] with respect only to any potential fine and period of incarceration, as the Defendant agreed on the record to waive any rights he may have with regard to a speedy disposition in [that case].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case [No. 01-13] and Case [No. 01-14], the Defendant shall pay a surcharge to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund in the total amount of $1,000.00.

* * *

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [for the first burglary] the Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Park County Detention Center for a period of one (1) year, pursuant to the probationary split sentence statute under Wyoming Statute § 7-13-107(c), with credit for 218 days served. The Defendant shall be granted a furlough to Youth Services International, Inc. at the Defendant's expense upon the following furlough conditions:

* * *

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the Defendant's successful completion of the one year program at the Youth Services International, Inc. treatment program [for the first burglary] the Defendant shall, at that time be placed on five (5) years supervised probation under the direction of the Wyoming Department of Corrections, Probation and Parole, upon the following terms and conditions with which the Defendant shall comply[.]

[¶ 7] After the sentencing hearing, the appellant was returned to the Park County Jail to continue serving his one-year sentence while awaiting transportation to the Youth Services International facility in Tarkio, Missouri (YSI). His sentence was modified on August 21, 1997, to allow his parents to transport him to that facility. The appellant successfully completed the YSI program and his sentence was modified again on August 6, 1998, this time to allow him to be released from that facility upon graduation, even though he had been there a few weeks short of a full year. His release was conditioned upon the probationary terms and conditions contained in the earlier Sentence & Probation Order.

[¶ 8] The next significant document in the record is the State's Petition to Revoke Probation, filed September 1, 2000. The appellant was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant and brought back before the district court. He denied the allegations of the petition.² His attorney also filed a Motion to Dismiss Probation Revocation in Part; Motion to Dismiss [the Second Burglary] in Whole and Objections to Imposition of Prison Sentencing in Either [Case]. The motion raised two issues: (1) whether the district court, having failed at the outset to impose a prison sentence on the first burglary, could do so now; and (2) whether, despite the appellant's waiver of speedy sentencing for the second burglary, imposing sentence more than three years later violated the appellant's constitutional right to due process.

[¶ 9] A hearing on the appellant's motion was held on September 25, 2000. The transcript of that hearing details the confusion shared by all involved as to the exact nature of the original sentences in the two cases and the appellant's probationary status, particularly in regard to the second burglary. The appellant took the position that, for the first burglary, he could not now receive a prison sentence, or that, at most, he could only be sentenced to a maximum of five years—the length of his probation—with credit for time served. His second argument was that his right to speedy sentencing now prohibited sentencing for the second burglary. To the contrary, the State took the position that the appellant could be sentenced to any amount of time up to the full statutory ten years for each crime.

[¶ 10] The district court ruled that, since the appellant had never been sentenced or placed on probation for the second burglary, the petition to revoke probation should be dismissed as to that crime. On the other hand, the district court held that sentencing on the second burglary was delayed as an accommodation to the appellant,...