Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America
Decision Date | 20 February 1957 |
Parties | DAUPHIN DEPOSIT TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of Charles William Hardt, deceased, Plaintiff, v. The COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS MUTUAL ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Anthony J. Fernicola, Utica, for plaintiff.
Hubbard, Felt & Fuller, Utica, for defendant.
This is a motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the Pennsylvania judgment upon which the case of action is based, is void and is not entitled to full faith and credit under Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States for the reason that the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which granted it, had no jurisdiction over the defendant.
The case of action alleged in the complaint is based upon a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant November 15, 1950, in the Court of Common Pleas, of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, a court of competent jurisdiction. The jdugment was for $2,200 and was entered by confession. The defendant did not appear.
The judgment was obtained upon a policy of accident insurance written by defendant May 24, 1921 upon the life of Charles W. Hardt, plaintiff's intestate, who died February 4, 1949. The plaintiff was appointed executor of decedent's estate February 24, 1949. Decedent had been a resident of Pennsylvania since the issuance of the policy by defendant in 1921.
The defendant is a domestic membership association organized in 1883. It is authorized to grant personal accident and health insurance protection to its members. Its home office is located in the city of Utica, New York and it has no office, agency, agent, bank account, real property or tangible or intangible personal property in any state other than the states of New York and Virginia. In addition it has no employee, solicitor, investigator, adjuster, or any other representative located in the state of Pennsylvania. It has not applied for or obtained a license to do business in Pennsylvania. It has never voluntarily designated any individual within nor officer or official of the State of Pennsylvania as its agent upon whom the service of process might at any time be made.
The defendant asserts by affidavit the following procedure followed by it in the transaction of its business:
Under the terms of the policy of insurance in question, the plaintiff must give notice of death to the defendant, upon which the defendant shall within 15 days furnish the necessary forms for the filing of proof of loss by the beneficiary. The proof of loss must be filed within 90 days after the date of death. The defendant then has 60 days within which to pay the loss during which 60 day period no action can be instituted on the policy. Any action on the policy must be instituted within two years from the expiration of the 90 day period for the filing of proof of loss.
The plaintiff filed the necessary proof of loss within 90 days and commenced action thereon in Pennsylvania September 14, 1949 by serving the complaint in assumpsit upon the Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Pennsylvania. It was claimed by the plaintiff that the Commissioner was the duly constituted attorney of the defendant to accept service of process by reason of the 'Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act' adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature and signed by the Governor May 20, 1949 being Public Law 1491, 40 P.S. § 1005.1 et seq. The law did not become effective until September 1, 1949.
It does not appear from the moving papers when the plaintiff filed proof of loss or when the defendant acted thereon and consequently for the purposes of this motion it cannot be said that some action was not taken by the defendant under the policy in question between September 1, 1949, the effective date of the statute, and September 14, 1949, the date upon which service of process was effected.
The portions of the Pennsylvania 'Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act' relating to the designation of the Insurance Commissioner to receive process read as follows:
'(a) Any of the following acts in this State effected by mail or otherwise by an unauthorized insurer of another state or foreign government: (1) the issuance of delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this State or to corporations authorized to do business therein; (2) the solicitation of applications for such contracts; (3) the collection of premiums membership fees, assessments, or other considerations, for such contracts; or (4) any other transaction of insurance business, is equivalent to and shall constitute an appointment by such insurer of the Insurance Commissioner and his successor or successors in office to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of an insured or beneficiary arising out of any such contract of insurance, and any such act shall be signification of its agreement that such service of process is of the same legal force and validity as personal service of process in this State upon such insurer.'
The statute is substantially identical in form to similar statutes adopted by many states to provide a means of obtaining jurisdiction over those foreign insurance companies which maintain an office and own property only in the state of their incorporation but who do business almost if not entirely by mail, upon a national basis and who generally contend in the courts that they do business exclusively in the state of their incorporation and are not amenable to the laws or courts of any other state.
In New York an almost identical statute is provided as Section 59-a of the Insurance Law.
The intention of the Legislature in passing these statutes is set forth in Section 1005.1, Volume 40 of Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated in almost identical language to that contained in section 59-a, subdivision 1 of the Insurance Law, Volume 27 of McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York. The Pennsylvania statute in this particular reads as follows:
The nature of the problem which this legislation is designed to correct is fully described and discussed by Judge Medina in Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 2 Cir., 229 F.2d 158, at page 159:
'The background is the mushroom growth of the mail order insurance business. Typically such companies maintain an office and own property only in the state where they are incorporated, but they insure risks in many states, sometimes on a nation-wide basis. They have no agents or solicitors. New business is secured through the efforts of old policyholders, or
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Wolfman v. Modern Life Ins. Co.
...it constituted the Superintendent of Insurance its agent to receive process.' Accord, Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 8 Misc.2d 210, 165 N.Y.S.2d 566 (affd. 5 App.Div.2d 960, 171 N.Y.S.2d 906). See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 ......