Dauzat v. Collums Furniture Mfg., Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-205-SA-DAS |
| Parties | TONI E. DAUZAT PLAINTIFF v. COLLUMS FURNITURE MFG., INC. and TROY McALISTER DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Plaintiff Toni Dauzat filed suit against Defendants Collums Furniture Manufacturing, Inc., and Troy McAlister on August 26, 2010, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of federal law, as well as state-law claims of malicious interference with employment, assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was tried in March 2012, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Specifically, jury verdict included $25,000 in damages for Plaintiff's federal sexual harassment claim; $50,000 in damages for Plaintiff's state-law assault and battery action; and $25,000 in punitive damages under federal law.1 Defendants have now filed a motion for a new trial [46], with three separate theories asserted.2 Defendants first maintain that the "weight of the evidence does not favor the verdict." Second, Defendants proffer that the Court erred in excluding evidence of Plaintiff's "sexual conduct and alcohol and drug use." The fact that there were no African Americans on the selected jury panel in this action is Defendants' third contention. Because the Courtconcludes that the jury's verdict is not contrary to the great weight of the evidence presented at trial, the grant of Plaintiff's motion in limine was not in error, and Defendants have failed to demonstrate a violation of the presumed right in civil cases to jury drawn from a "cross-section" of the community, Defendants' motion is denied.3
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a trial court to grant a new trial based on that court's appraisal of the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury's verdict. FED. R. CIV. P. 59. The rule does not specify what grounds are necessary to support such a decision, but states only that the action may be taken "after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]" FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A); see also Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in the course of the trial. See, e.g., Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 755 F.2d 416, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1985); Westbrook v. Gen. Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1985); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1982); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372-74 (5th Cir. 1981); Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1980). The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments for why a new trial should be granted in turn.
A thorough review of the complete record, transcripts, and notes taken contemporaneous therewith demonstrates that the jury's verdict in favor of Plaintiff Dauzat is neither contrary to nor against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial. "The standard at the trial level on a motion for a new trial is whether the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice." G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957 (5th Cir.1981); Dotson v. Clark Equip. Co., 805 F.2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir.1986); Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted); Pagan v. Shoney's Inc., 931 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir.1991) () (internal quotations omitted). The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Pagan, 931 F.2d at 337.4
Defendants begin by "appropriat[ing] a phrase from adverse possession law," maintaining that Plaintiff failed to corroborate her testimony and demonstrate that Defendant McAlister's alleged sexual harassment was "open, notorious, and visible." It surely goes without stating that neither phrases nor standards gathered from "adverse possession law" govern Title VII. Instead, as outlined in the Court's jury instructions, Plaintiff was required to show as follows: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the harassment affected aterm, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) respondeat superior.5 Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986). "To affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, 'sexual harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 586 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002) (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff testified that Defendant McAlister engaged in behavior such as biting her shoulder; touching her breasts; touching her rear; telling her that once she "had a black man," "that's all she'd need"; placing a rope or a piece of thread around her neck; and offering her money and drugs in exchange for sex. Plaintiff also proffered testimony from other witnesses about an incident when Defendant McAlister drove by Plaintiff's house on a weekend. While Defendants place a lot of weight on the fact that Defendant McAlister denied such allegations, it was the jury's function to weigh the evidence, decide the material facts, and judge credibility. See Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1028 () (quoting Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1979)). From the evidence and testimony presented, the jury was entitled to conclude that Plaintiff met the aforementioned standard governed by Title VII,6 and the jury's ultimate verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for a new trial on this ground shall be denied.
The next argument set forth by Defendants is that they should have been allowed "to introduce evidence concerning Dauzat's sexual precocity, multiple marriages and relationships and drug use in order to paint a picture far different from the one showing Dauzat as the victim of sexual harassment." As Plaintiff aptly notes, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine [27] prior to trial, requesting the Court to exclude the very evidence Defendants now maintain the Court erred in excluding. Defendants entirely failed to respond to Plaintiff's motion in limine. The Court's Local Uniform Civil Rules note as follows, "If a party fails to respond to any motion, other than a dispositive motion, within the time allotted, the court may grant the motion as unopposed." L. U. CIV. R. 7(b)(3)(E) (emphasis added). A motion in limine is not a dispositive motion; thus, the Court had authority under the local rules to grant the motion as unopposed. Nevertheless, the Court also engaged in areview of the merits of Plaintiff's motion in limine and set forth its ruling at trial. First, the Court found the majority of evidence irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. More importantly, however, the Court also undertook a balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Defendants were granted latitude in their cross examination of Plaintiff, and the Court finds that it did not err in granting Plaintiff's motion in limine and excluding the evidence Defendants now assert should have been admitted. As such, the new trial motion on this ground is denied.
Defendants next argue that they should be granted a new trial because there were no African Americans on the jury. Because Defendants have failed to prove a violation of any cross-section requirements that might be applicable, their new trial motion is due to be denied.7 At the outset, and before addressing the merits, the Court points out that the right to a jury in civil cases is based on the Seventh Amendment8 and, while the Sixth Amendment does require in criminal cases that the jury pool be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975), "the Supreme Court has not recognized a Constitutional mandate that jury pools in civil cases reflect a fair cross-section of the community," see Fleming v. Chicago Transit Authority, 397 F. App'x 249, 2010 WL 4140416, at *1 (7th Cir. 2010). In McCall v. Shields Associates, Inc., the court noted that Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975) "are not applicable to this case as they address the Sixth Amendment right (made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment) of criminal defendants to a jury draw from a fair cross-section of the community . . . By its terms, the Sixth Amendment has no relevance to civil proceedings but instead serves to guarantee[ ] an impartial jury trial in criminal proceedings." 617 F. Supp. 244, 246 (D.C.C. 1985) (emphasis and brackets in original, internal quotations and citations omitted).9 While the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, the court, in Timmel v. Phillips, "assume[d], without...
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