Davenport v. Sebring

Decision Date02 December 1879
Citation3 N.W. 403,52 Iowa 364
PartiesJOHN DAVENPORT AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS, v. J. J. SEBRING AND OTHERS, APPELLEES.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Boone district court.

Action to recover the possession of land situated in Boone county. The answer of the defendants denies generally all the allegations of the petition, and pleads the bar of the statute of limitations, alleging that defendants and their grantors had been for more than ten years in the actual, notorious and adverse possession of the land, under claim of title and right. A verdict and judgment were had for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.Webb & Dyer and Wright, Gatch & Wright, for appellants.

O'Connell & Springer and Hindman & Hall, for appellees.

No brief or argument for appellees was filed.

BECK, C. J.

1. The evidence shows that the land in question is a part of the “Des Moines River Grant,” and that the title thereto is in the plaintiffs. The testimony tends to establish the following facts: The property was originally claimed by the Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad Company, under the act of congress of May 15, 1856, granting lands to the state to aid in building certain railroads. This corporation sold the land by written contract, executed December 29, 1865, to James Stinson, who thereupon entered upon the land and made improvements thereon. He assigned the contract to defendants November 2, 1868, who went into possession of the land under their purchase and made other improvements.

The land is one of many tracts claimed under the “Des Moines River Grant.” A conflict as to these lands arose between this grant and the railroad grant, which was finally determined in favor of the former by the decision of the United States supreme court in Williams v. Baker, 17 Wal. 144, and other cases therein referred to. This decision, it was conceded on all hands, settled the title of the lands in dispute under the two grants, and determined that they were covered by the “Des Moines River Grant;” and the conrt below held, and so instructed the jury, that the evidence shows the title to be in plaintiffs.

After the decision in Williams v. Baker, supra, the defendants herein brought an action against the Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad Company, upon the contract for the sale of the land in controversy, and in 1873 the company repaid to defendants the full amount paid for the purchase of the land by them and their assignor, Stinson. The railroad company abandoned all claim to the lands in dispute under the grant. Defendants, in their action against the railroad company, claimed that it could convey to them no title, and the company, conceding their claim, made the repayment as stated. The defendants admitted, after the decision in Williams v. Baker, that they held no title to the land, and made no claim thereto, except for the value of the improvements. They had negotiations with plaintiffs for the purchase of the land.

The court gave to the jury instructions in general terms upon the subject of the adverse possession necessary to constitute a bar to the action under the statute of limitations. These, as well as other instructions, are probably correct in the announcement of abstract rules of law, but the court failed to give directions which would enable the jury to apply them to the peculiar facts of the case.

An important inquiry for the jury was this: Did defendants hold the land adversely? The jury was informed that if the defendants so held the land the action was barred by the statute of limitations. It is a question of law whether the possession of defendants, as shown in the testimony, was adverse to the title of plaintiffs. The instructions given by the court were not directed to the inquiry, and, therefore, could have given the jury no aid in determining it. The plaintiffs asked the court to give the jury the following instructions applicable to this branch of the...

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4 cases
  • Hoffine v. Ewings
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1900
    ... ... to the owner." To the same effect are Headrick v ... Fritts, 93 Tenn. 270, 24 S.W. 11; Allen v ... Allen, 58 Wis. 202, 16 N.W. 610; Davenport v ... Sebring, 52 Iowa 364, 3 N.W. 403; Pease v ... Lawson, 33 Mo. 35. We therefore conclude that the use of ... the word in the instruction ... ...
  • Hoffine v. Ewing
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1900
    ...* * *” To the same effect are Headrick v. Fritts, 93 Tenn. 270, 24 S. W. 11;Allen v. Allen, 58 Wis. 202, 16 N. W. 610;Davenport v. Sebring, 52 Iowa, 364, 3 N. W. 403;Pease v. Lawson, 33 Mo. 35. We therefore conclude that the use of the word in the instruction quoted does not constitute prej......
  • City of St. Joseph v. Seel
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1899
    ... ... Wall. 328, 17 L.Ed. 871; Allen v. Allen, 58 ... Wis. 202-209, 16 N.W. 610; Perkins v. Nugent, 45 ... Mich. 156, 7 N.W. 757; Davenport v. Sebring, 52 ... Iowa, 364, 3 N.W. 403; Pease v. Lawson, 33 Mo. 35; ... Smith v. Stevens, 82 Ill. 554. In the present case ... there was no ... ...
  • Davenport v. Sebring
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1879

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