David P. Hunter v. the Childern's Medical Center
| Decision Date | 18 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | 98-LW-5657,C.A. 17103 |
| Parties | DAVID P. HUNTER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. THE CHILDERN'S MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee C.A. CASE NO. 17103 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
BROOKS A. COMPTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0014767, 1812 Kettering Tower Dayton, Ohio 45423, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
ROBERT N. SNYDER, Atty. Reg. No. 0030556, One Dayton Centre, Suite 1800, 1 South Main Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
David P. and Deborah L. Hunter appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on their medical malpractice claim against Children's Medical Center ("CMC").
The facts and procedural history are as follows.
On July 13, 1990, the Hunters took their eleven month old son, Brandon, to the emergency room of CMC complaining that he had been suffering from diarrhea, up to twelve times a day, for the past three weeks. Brandon was admitted to CMC and administered fluids through an intravenous ("IV") tube. The diagnostic tests on his condition did not reveal its cause. At approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 15, 1990, Laurie Rom, R.N., was performing routine nursing care on Brandon, and the Hunters were getting ready "to take a break and join [some friends] for dinner in the hospital." Brandon became upset that they were leaving, and Nurse Rom picked him up and calmed him down. Nurse Rom put Brandon back in his bed, changed his diaper, checked his vital signs, patted him, and left his room approximately ten to fifteen minutes later. When she returned at about 7:30 p.m., she found Brandon suspended above the mattress in a sitting position with the IV tube wrapped tightly around his neck three times. Nurse Rom observed that Brandon was not breathing and was bright red and limp. Nurse Rom was unable to unwrap the IV tube, but when she released the pressure of the tube, Brandon started breathing. The Hunters returned to Brandon's room to find several medical personnel treating him. Brandon was released from the hospital on July 20, 1990, and the Hunters brought him back within twenty-four hours, again reporting that he was experiencing diarrhea even though he had been eating well and had not been having diarrhea when he was discharged the previous day.
The Hunters originally filed a complaint against CMC in January 1992, alleging negligent nursing care with respect to the July 15, 1996 incident. They filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) in October 1993. On October 5, 1994, the Hunters refiled the action, alleging medical malpractice that had caused "serious injuries, including but not limited to an organic brain injury which has adversely affected both his emotional and cognitive skills." The Hunters claimed that CMC's employees and agents had "failed to properly care, control and supervise" Brandon and had "failed to properly maintain and care for the medical equipment" used in treating him. CMC filed an answer denying the allegations of negligence. On January 16, 1998, CMC filed a motion for summary judgment with attached excerpts from the deposition testimony of Nurse Rom and Earl L. Staddon, D.O., one of the Hunters' potential expert witnesses. The Hunters filed a response on January 30, 1998 with an attached affidavit sworn by both of them, and CMC replied to their memorandum. On February 13, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment, and the Hunters filed a notice of appeal on March 12, 1998, raising two assignments of error.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE WHEN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR, CMC'S NEGLIGENCE IS OF A TYPE WHICH IS READILY APPARENT TO LAYPERSONS.
The Hunters insist that summary judgment was not appropriate because, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a jury could have inferred negligence from the circumstances surrounding the strangulation of Brandon despite the absence of expert testimony suggesting negligence.
We review the trial court's decision granting summary judgment de novo. Chapman v. Adia Services, Inc. (1997), 116 Ohio App.3d 534, 540. Summary judgment is appropriate when:
(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.
Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. See, also, Civ.R. 56(C). The movant bears the initial burden of showing that "there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning an essential element of the opponent's case." Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292. "In deciding whether there exists a genuine issue of fact, the evidence must be viewed in the nonmovant's favor." Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 482, 485. When the movant satisfies its burden, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Civ.R. 56(E).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence permitting, but not requiring, the factfinder to "draw an inference of negligence when the logical premises for the inference are demonstrated." Jennings Buick, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 167, 169-170. Invoking the doctrine is "merely a method of proving the defendant's negligence through the use of circumstantial evidence." Id. at 169-170. In Hake v. Wiedemann Brewing Co. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, the supreme court explained:
To warrant application of the rule a plaintiff must adduce evidence in support of two conclusions: (1) That the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury, or at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury, under the exclusive management and control of the defendant; and (2) that the injury occurred under such circumstances that in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed.
Generally, in medical malpractice cases, "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not obviate the requirement that the plaintiffs provide expert medical testimony on the standard of care that is ordinarily observed in these circumstances." Johnson v. Hammond (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 125, 128. Rather, unless the negligence is apparent to laypersons, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony "that in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed." Anderson v. Motta (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 1, 3.
CMC supported its motion for summary judgment with excerpts from the deposition testimony of Dr. Staddon and Nurse Rom. Dr. Staddon undercut the Hunters' claim of res ipsa loquitur by testifying that, although he was not an expert on "appropriate nursing standards for maintaining an IV in a pediatric hospital," he nonetheless could not "opine that anybody at Children's fell below the standards of care in maintaining Brandon's IV." He also stated, "I certainly don't have any idea as to how the IV tubing got wrapped around Brandon's neck." He further testified that, from his review of the medical chart, "everything seemed appropriate."
Nurse Rom testified to the facts surrounding Brandon's strangulation, including the following:
I found Brandon with his -- from the waist down sitting in the crib. He was hung -- the top part of him was being hung...
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