David v. Biondo

Decision Date22 October 1998
Citation703 N.E.2d 261,680 N.Y.S.2d 450,92 N.Y.2d 318
Parties, 703 N.E.2d 261, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 8981 Lisa DAVID, Appellant, v. Vincent J. BIONDO, Respondent.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

Plaintiff David sued her former dentist Biondo in March 1986 for dental malpractice. The instant civil case and appeal originate in alleged damage ensuing from the removal of orthodontic braces in 1985.

David had also filed a grievance with the Office of Professional Discipline (O.P.D.) of the New York State Education Department which, after investigation, preferred disciplinary charges against the dentist in early 1988. O.P.D. prosecuted the allegations during the next several years. A comprehensive hearing and fact finding led, in 1991, to the State Board of Regents dismissing all specifications of professional misconduct.

This appeal involves only the civil action for damages that has continued on its own track over the past 12 years. Supreme Court dismissed this case in 1995 solely on grounds of collateral estoppel, based on the 1991 Board of Regents' resolution of the disciplinary phase of this imbroglio. The Appellate Division, in 1997, affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal, and this Court granted leave to appeal to David. We now reverse and reinstate David's malpractice complaint.

The collateral estoppel issue is the only focus and fulcrum of this appeal. The disposition centers on whether plaintiff David can be legally deemed to be in privity with the disciplinary prosecutor, O.P.D. To equate these two parties and so hold, this Court would have to be satisfied that David had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her civil claims against Biondo within the juridical and practical confines of the disciplinary proceeding.

Our holding is that David may not be turned out of court, as a matter of law, on collateral estoppel grounds, predicated on the Board of Regents' dismissal of the professional disciplinary proceedings against Biondo. The firm foundation for this conclusion rests on several considerations. First, David was not the legally recognized party in interest in the disciplinary proceeding; rather, the State, as the representative of the public interest, was the party in interest. Second, the remedy flowing from that proceeding would have been professional discipline, but for the Regents' outright dismissal; in contrast, David's civil action seeks traditional money damages. Next, O.P.D. is statutorily invested with exclusive control and responsibility for the prosecution of the professional disciplinary proceeding; distinguishably, David, despite her role in instigating the disciplinary investigation, enjoyed no legal or practical opportunity to litigate her civil law grievances within the framework of the O.P.D. proceeding.

O.P.D. is statutorily charged with investigating each complaint of professional misconduct brought to it. It is vested with discretion, however, to determine whether further disciplinary action should be undertaken, or whether a matter should be closed (Education Law § 6510[1][b] ). Here, after initial investigation of David's complaint, O.P.D. preferred six specifications of professional misconduct, including the charge of negligent practice of dentistry.

The dentist was given a hearing date (Education Law § 6510[1][d] ). A six-day hearing was held before a five-member hearing panel of the State Board of Dentistry, comprised of four dentists and a public representative (Education Law § 6510[3][b] ). Counsel for O.P.D. presented all the evidence (Education Law § 6510[3][c] ). Biondo, who was represented by his own counsel, testified and was cross-examined only by O.P.D. counsel. David, also represented by her own counsel, testified at the hearing solely as an O.P.D. witness and was also cross-examined. Notably, at all other times David was not present, nor was her counsel permitted to examine witnesses or given any other representational or participatory role.

The hearing panel issued its report to the Regents Review Committee (Education Law § 6510[4] ). The dentist appeared and was represented by counsel before the Regents Review Committee (Education Law § 6510[4][b] ). The statute makes no provision for the appearance of a complainant at this stage of disciplinary proceedings. The Regents Review Committee adopted the hearing panel's determination, which concluded that, "the charges contained in the first through sixth specifications have not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence".

The Regents Review Committee passed its written report up to the Board of Regents and recommended that the factual findings be accepted (Education Law § 6510[4][b] ). The Regents, vested with exclusive discretion and final authority to determine the disciplinary matter, accepted the recommendations of both the hearing panel and its own Review Committee. It determined to dismiss all disciplinary charges.

Considering the legal and functional entirety of the disciplinary process, we are persuaded that an averred victim of professional misconduct should not be deemed in legal privity with a professional regulatory body, under circumstances such as are presented here. Pertinently, this Court ruled on an analogous privity question, for purposes of collateral estoppel availability, in Matter of Juan C. v. R.C. Cortines, 89 N.Y.2d 659, 657 N.Y.S.2d 581, 679 N.E.2d 1061 [1997], shortly after the Appellate Division issued its decision in the instant matter.

As set forth in Matter of Juan C., the doctrine of collateral estoppel rests on the interest of reducing needless litigation and conserving the resources of courts and litigants. Part of the doctrine's justification is the unfairness and inefficiency of otherwise permitting a party to relitigate an issue which has previously been decided against that person, or a party in privity with that person, in a proceeding in which the person had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the point again in question (see, id., at 667, 657 N.Y.S.2d 581, 679 N.E.2d 1061). The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior adjudication and is decisive in the newly presented circumstance and forum. To block the use of estoppel, a contestant can show the absence of a full and fair opportunity to present relevant views in the prior contest (see, id.).

David has conceded the identity of issues involved in the disciplinary proceeding with the instant civil litigation. Thus, the determinative question shifts to whether she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her personal claim in the proceeding before the O.P.D. and Board of Regents. The examination of her functional...

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