David v. Strelecki
| Decision Date | 20 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. A--105,A--105 |
| Citation | 51 N.J. 563,242 A.2d 371 |
| Parties | Joseph M. DAVID, Defendant-Respondent, v. June STRELECKI, Director of Division of Motor Vehicles, State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Hoffman, First Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant (Arthur J. Sills, Atty. Gen., attorney, Virginia Long Annich, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).
Patrick T. McGahn, Jr., Atlantic City, for defendant-respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered
The facts of this case are set forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division. 97 N.J.Super. 360 and 375, 235 A.2d 195 (1967).
We agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge Carton that the Appellate Division majority improperly weighed the evidence in the case, thereby exceeding the appellate court's limited function of determining whether the administrative finding was based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 149, 179 A.2d 732, 96 A.L.R.2d 602 (1962). Substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Carton's opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the Director of Motor Vehicles with instructions to impose a suspension consonant with the Director's valid finding that David operated his automobile in a careless manner and failed to keep to the right hand side of the roadway. As noted in the dissenting opinion, the Director should modify so much of the penalty as may rest upon the rejected finding that David's consumption of alcoholic beverages affected his ability to operate the motor vehicle safely.
In the circumstances of this case, we think it appropriate that this Court expressly stated its view on the applicability of the doctrine of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) in suspension or revocation proceedings before the Director of Motor Vehicles pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5--30. We are satisfied that the Miranda rule is not constitutionally compelled in proceedings where no Punitive sanctions are to be imposed. Although it is clear that a driver appearing before the Director of Motor Vehicles in a suspension or revocation proceeding is entitled to those 'incidents of fairness which underlie procedural due process,' Bechler v. Parsekian, 36 N.J. 242, 256, 176 A.2d 470, 478 (1961), it is equally clear that the special rules attaching to criminal proceedings do not extend to administrative hearings of this nature. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938); 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 2.13 (1958). The statutory purpose of the proceeding before the Director is not to punish the driver for infractions of the Motor Vehicle Act--that function is left to the courts. It is settled that, although the suspension or revocation of his operator's license may inconvenience the driver, 'the primary object * * * is to foster safety on the highway and not to impose criminal punishment to vindicate public justice.' Atkinson v. Parsekian, supra, 37 N.J. at p. 155, 179 A.2d at p. 738. The action rests on a determination 'that the highway would be a safer place for the public if the violator were removed as a driver for some period of time.' Ibid. Compare, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), where a proceeding for the forfeiture of an automobile used in transporting illicit liquor was held to be quasi-criminal because the forfeiture was designed to be a Penalty for the violation of a criminal statute. The decision announced in Miranda by its terms deals with a problem of 'criminal jurisprudence' (supra 384 U.S. at 439, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1609, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 704), and...
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...Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Brady, 121 N.J.Super. 62, 296 A.2d 78 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 61 N.J. 514, 296 A.2d 68 (1972); David v. Strelecki, 51 N.J. 563, 242 A.2d 371, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 291, 21 L.Ed.2d 269 The Legislature's intent not to impose the procedural requirements o......
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