Davidson v. Baydoun, No. M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 7/31/2009)
| Decision Date | 31 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV.,M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | SPYDELL DAVIDSON v. NADER BAYDOUN. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County; No. 08C-2631; Hamilton V. Gayden, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
Beau E. Pemberton, Dresden, Tennessee, for the appellant, Spydell Davidson.
Darrell G. Townsend and Hugh C. Gracey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Nader Baydoun.
Frank G. Clement, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell, P.J., M.S., and Andy D. Bennett, J., joined.
The issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice is barred by the statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(2). In the Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his former attorney committed malpractice by failing to present relevant evidence at trial of damages he had sustained, thereby depriving the plaintiff from recovering those damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) on the ground the plaintiff's malpractice claim accrued more than a year before he commenced this action. We have determined the plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant's professional negligence during the previous trial, which was more than a year before he commenced this action. The plaintiff, however, did not sustain an actual injury as a result of the defendant's negligence until weeks after the trial, when the trial court's final order was entered, which was within one year of the commencement of this action. A claim for legal malpractice accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should have known, the attorneywas professionally negligent and the plaintiff sustains an actual injury as a result of that negligence. These two essential elements did not exist more than one year prior to the commencement of this action; thus, the plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice did not accrue more than one year prior to the commencement of this action. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the Complaint.
The matters before the court arise from the Complaint filed in this action by Spydell Davidson against attorneyNader Baydoun for damages allegedly resulting from Baydoun's negligent representation of Davidson during the trial of a civil action between Davidson and Mid-South Industries, Inc.
In 2004, Mid-South filed suit against Davidson for breach of contract. Davidson responded by filing a Counter-Claim against Mid-South for breach of contract and fraud. Davidson represented himself pro se in the Mid-South litigation until November 18, 2005, when he retained Baydoun to represent him in that matter.
Signs of significant discontent with Baydoun's representation appeared as early as September 2006, as evidenced in two letters Davidson sent to Baydoun. In the letters, Davidson expressed his displeasure with Baydoun's representation, including, inter alia, pre-trial discovery responses Baydoun had submitted to Davidson for his approval.1 Davidson scolded Baydoun for his "sub" standard performance.2 Baydoun responded to Davidson's criticism in a reply letter. Thereafter, Davidson and Baydoun apparently mended fences, and the case proceeded to trial with Baydoun representing Davidson at all times during the trial.
The three-day trial of the Mid-South action began on June 19, 2007. During the trial, Davidson complained to Baydoun about his representation, stating that Baydoun had negligently failed to present evidence of his various damages.
At the conclusion of the trial on June 21, 2007, the trial court announced its ruling from the bench, including findings of fact.3 Although our record does not provide the specific terms of the court's bench ruling, it appears the trial court found that Davidson was entitled to recover damages from Mid-South, but the exact amount of the damages Davidson was entitled to recover would have to be recalculated based on the findings announced from the bench.4
The Final Order in the Mid-South litigation was entered on August 23, 2007, resulting in an award in favor of Davidson in the amount of $49,088.02. The award was less than Davidson believed he was entitled to recover from Mid-South. This is evident from Davidson's August 30, 2007 letter to Baydoun wherein he stated, in no uncertain terms, that he had been damaged by Baydoun's negligent representation during the trial.5 Thereafter, for reasons not explained in the record, Davidson waited until August 12, 2008, to commence this action against Baydoun.
In his pro se Complaint, Davidson alleged that Baydoun negligently failed to present relevant evidence during the Mid-South trial, and that Baydoun's negligence was the reason the trial court did not award Davidson all of the damages he was entitled to recover from Mid-South, and that Davidson was injured by Baydoun's negligent representation.
Baydoun filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the grounds that the applicable statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(2), barred Davidson's claim. Specifically, Baydoun contended that Davidson suffered a legally cognizable injury when the trial court announced its ruling from the bench on June 21, 2007. Davidson opposed the motion contending that he did not suffer a legally cognizable injury until the Final Order was entered on August 23, 2007, which was less than one year prior to the commencement of this action. After hearing arguments on the motion, the trial court found that Davidson's legal malpractice claim was time barred because it accrued on June 21, 2007, more than one year prior to the commencement of this action. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order granting the Motion to Dismiss, from which Davidson appeals.
The purpose of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) Motion to Dismiss is to determine whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12 motion only challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999). It does not challenge the strength of the plaintiff's proof. Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must liberally construe the complaint, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696-97 (Tenn. 2002); Pursell v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 937 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would warrant relief. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999); Fuerst v. Methodist Hosp. S., 566 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tenn. 1978). Making such a determination is a question of law. Our review of a trial court's determination of an issue of law is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 712-13 (Tenn. 2002); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).
An action for legal malpractice must be brought within one year from the date the cause of action accrues. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(2).
A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations is triggered when: 1) the defendant committed negligence; 2) the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff to suffer a "legally cognizable" or actual injury; and 3) the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that the injury was caused by the defendant's negligence. Hartman v. Rogers, 174 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 28, 30 (Tenn. 1995); Ameraccount Club, Inc. v. Hill, 617 S.W.2d 876, 8787-9 (Tenn. 1981); Caledonia Leasing & Equip. Co. v. Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride & Prewitt, 865 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). In a legal malpractice action, "the one-year statute of limitations starts to run when the client suffers a legally cognizable injury resulting from an attorney's negligence . . ., and the client knows or should know the facts sufficient to give notice of that injury." Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
[T]he rules governing when a person suffers legally cognizable injury from litigation malpractice must take into account that not every misstep leads to a fall. Because negligence without injury is not actionable, the legal malpractice statute of limitations does not begin to run until an attorney's negligence has actually injured the client. And there is no injury until there is the loss of a right, remedy, or interest or the imposition of a liability. Before that time, any injury is only prospective and uncertain. There is no legally cognizable injury where there exists only the mere possibility of harm.
Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted).
This case was dismissed upon a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss; therefore, we will limit our analysis to the relevant facts asserted in Davidson's Complaint, presume the alleged facts to be true and give Davidson the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those factual allegations. See Trau-Med of Am., Inc., 71 S.W.3d at 696-97; Pursell, 937 S.W.2d at 840. The Complaint, in pertinent part, states that Davidson entered into a contract for the sale of used metal working equipment with Mid-South Industries, Inc.; that Mid-South sued Davidson for breach of contract in 2004; that Davidson represented himself pro se until retaining the legal representation of Baydoun on November 18, 2005; and that Baydoun represented Davidson thereafter, throughout the trial of the Mid-South litigation. The Complaint also states that...
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