Davidson v. City of Beaufort
| Decision Date | 03 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-199 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Amy Davidson, Appellant, v. City of Beaufort, Branch Banking & Trust of South Carolina, Collins Engineering, Inc., Brantley Construction Company, Inc., and Tidal Wave 23, LLC, Defendants,of whom Collins Engineering Inc., Brantley Construction Company, Inc., and Tidal Wave 23, LLC, are Respondents. Phillip Davidson, Appellant, v. City of Beaufort, Branch Banking & Trust of South Carolina, Collins Engineering Inc., Brantley Construction Company, Inc., and Tidal Wave 23, LLC, Defendants,of whom Collins Engineering Inc., Brantley Construction Company, Inc., and Tidal Wave 23, LLC are Respondents. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Beaufort County
Honorable Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity
AFFIRMED
James H. Moss and Kimberly L. Smith, both of Beaufort, for Appellants.
Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Phillip S. Ferderigos, both of Charleston, for Respondent Tidal Wave 23, LLC.
R. Patrick Flynn, of Charleston, for Respondent Brantley Construction Company, Inc.
H. Michael Bowers, of Charleston, for Respondent Collins Engineers, Inc.
Mary A. Lohr and William B. Harvey, both of Beaufort, for Respondent City of Beaufort.
Edward K. Pritchard, III, of Charleston, for Respondent Branch Banking & Trust of South Carolina.
Appellants, Amy Davidson and Phillip Davidson (the Davidsons), each brought separate negligence actions against Respondents, Tidal Wave 23, LLC (Tidal Wave), Brantley Construction Company, Inc. (Brantley), and Collins Engineering, Inc. (Collins) (collectively Respondents), after they were abducted from Tidal Wave's parking lot and assaulted by two men. The City of Beaufort (the City) and Branch Banking & Trust of South Carolina (BB&T) were also named as Defendants in each action. The circuit court consolidated the two actions, and the Master-in-Equity granted Respondents' respective summary judgment motions. The Davidsons seek review of the master's order granting summary judgment. We affirm.1
In 2005, the City awarded a contract to Brantley for repairs and upgrades to the Henry C. Chambers Waterfront Park in downtown Beaufort, along the Beaufort River. The City also hired Collins to oversee the daily construction activities to ensure that Brantley performed according to contract specifications. On May 26, 2006, during the time period in which Brantley performed construction in the Waterfront Park, the Davidsons traveled to the City's waterfront area for the purpose of meeting with friends at Saltus Riverfront Bar and Grill (Saltus), located at 820 Bay Street and adjacent to the Waterfront Park.2 When they arrived at the waterfront area, they parked their car in a parking lot adjoining the office building at 706 Bay Street, owned by Tidal Wave, which was also adjacent to the Waterfront Park. BB&T operated in this building and maintained a 24-hour ATM in the corner of the parking lot. There was a "No Parking" sign at the parking lot's entrance from the Carteret Street side, 3 and the space that the Davidsons parked in was marked "For BB&T Customers Only." It is undisputed that the Davidsons did not use BB&T's ATM.
After the Davidsons visited Saltus, they returned to their car at approximately 1 a.m. Tragically, two men attacked, carjacked, and robbed them and sexually assaulted Mrs. Davidson. The Davidsons later filed these negligence actions, alleging that Respondents breached their duty to provide sufficient lighting and security for Tidal Wave's parking lot. The Davidsons maintained that this breach proximately caused their abduction as well as resulting physical and mental injuries.
The complaint also alleged that there were multiple signs directing the public to park in Tidal Wave's parking lot. Additionally, the complaint stated that Brantley and Collins were on notice of a prior abduction from Tidal Wave's parking lot, and, therefore, they had a duty to provide lighting to the premises. The complaint cited numerous other crimes committed in the waterfront area in the recent past due to the lack of lighting and other unspecified "dangerous conditions" in the construction area. The complaint asserted that these crimes were "publicized and generally known to the community."
During discovery, Tidal Wave served the following Requests to Admit on the Davidsons:
The Davidsons did not submit a timely response to these Requests to Admit, and, therefore, they were deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 36(a), SCRCP.4 However, at the summary judgment hearing, the master asked the Davidsons' counsel "[A]re ya'll going to move to work that out or strike that or are they admitted?" Counsel responded:
No, there are a couple that we don't admit to, namely that I believe the one that says the Public Parking sign is on... City of Beaufort property, and the reason for that being even in the depositions of the people from the City, we couldn't figure it out. Nobody will take credit for who put the sign there or who, you know, who it belongs to.
The master replied "Gotcha." There is nothing in the record indicating that counsel ever filed a formal motion to withdraw these two admissions.5
The master concluded that based on their admissions, the Davidsons could not be classified as invitees and, therefore, there was no South Carolina precedent creating a duty on Respondents' part to protect the Davidsons from the criminal acts of third parties. The master granted summary judgment to Respondents and denied the Davidsons' motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
1. Did the master properly grant summary judgment to Tidal Wave when the Davidsons presented no evidence that BB&T or Tidal Wave invited or gave consent for them to enter and use the parking lot in question?
2. Did the master properly grant summary judgment to Brantley and Collins when there existed no legal duty on their part to the Davidsons?
3. Did the master properly grant summary judgment to Respondents despite the fact that discovery had not yet been completed?
On appeal from the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard as that required for the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 379, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Adamson v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 332 S.C. 121, 124, 503 S.E.2d 752, 753 (Ct. App. 1998). "To determine if any genuine issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] party." Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003). Further, "in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the [nonmoving] party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009).
"The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite disposition of cases [that] do not require the services of a fact finder." George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). "Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases in which plain, palpable and undisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ." Priest v. Brown, 302 S.C. 405, 408, 396 S.E.2d 638, 639 (Ct. App. 1990). "It is not sufficient that one create an inference [that] is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine." Id.
Once the moving party meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings but must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), SCRCP; Boone v. Sunbelt Newspapers, Inc., 347...
To continue reading
Request your trial