Davidson v. Com.
| Decision Date | 15 November 1968 |
| Citation | 436 S.W.2d 495 |
| Parties | Archel DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Francis Dale Burke, Burke & Justice, Pikeville, for appellant.
John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., George F. Rabe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.
Archel Davidson, Bryce Sanders, and James Harold Myhand were charged in two indictments with violations of the false pretenses statute, KRS 434.050. Each was convicted and received a sentence of one year on each charge. Only Davidson has appealed from the judgment which ordered his two sentences to run concurrently.
The indictments charged that the three accused obtained property by the fraudulent use of an oil company credit card. Two credit cards issued by Texaco, Incorporated, to P. K. DeVuono and Jack Cales, respectively, were used.
Julius Tackett, an employee at the Bowling Texaco Service Station, Virgie, testified that Davidson called about ten o'clock in the morning, identified himself, and said that he was sending three boys to pick up a load of tires and was sending credit cards with them. Later, Myhand and Sanders and a third, unidentified, person appeared and presented cards which seemed to be authentic. Tackett verified the validity of the cards with the local Texaco office. He sold them a quantity of tires, some antifreeze, and a battery. The merchandise was listed on three Texaco invoices on which the credit card information was impressed. Two of the invoices bore the purported signature of Jack Cales. The third invoice bore the purported signature of P. K. DeVuono. Cales and DeVuono were nonresidents of Kentucky. They denied signing the invoices. Shortly after Sanders, Myhand, and their companion had departed, Davidson called Tackett and inquired if he had let them have the tires.
Charles Bowling testified that upon being notified about the transaction, he found Davidson, who took him to a house where he recovered his property from three men who were unknown to him.
Appellant urges that the indictments and proof failed to show that the defrauded party relied upon any false representation of appellant. It is insisted that the property was parted with by the reliance of Tackett on the verification of the validity of the credit cards. While Tackett may not have said so specifically, it is implicit in his testimony that he did in fact part with the merchandise on the false representation that the purchasers had authority to use the credit cards issued in the names of Cales and DeVuono. This is grounded in part on the call made by Davidson beforehand that he was sending some boys over with credit cards to buy tires and corroborated by his later call to see if the purchase had been consummated. The proof makes this clear.
It is unnecessary that such reliance be specifically charged or proven if such reliance is made clear from the language of the indictment and from the testimony. Smith v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 534, 133 S.W. 228. The indictments and testimony here are sufficiently plain to advise the appellant of the charge against him and to show the necessary reliance on the false pretense of the ownership or authorization to use the cards.
This, in effect, answers the second contention made that this is a case of false personation. Appellant argues that the offense of false personation is not covered by KRS 434.050, citing Rowland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 292. False personation and false pretenses are discussed in Rowland, but the judgment was reversed because there was a failure to show the essential elements of defrauding and reliance.
Appellant contends that the offense committed is not properly a violation of KRS 434.050, the false pretenses statute, but more like a violation of KRS 434.060, the false personation statute. In Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 333, it was held: 'If the same act may constitute either of two offenses, or if a single act is common to two offenses, the grand jury may elect to indict on either.' Here, the grand jury elected to indict under KRS 434.050....
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