Davidson v. Stringer
| Decision Date | 24 March 1933 |
| Citation | 147 So. 228,109 Fla. 238 |
| Parties | DAVIDSON v. STRINGER et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Original proceeding in prohibition by W. M. Davidson against Fred L Stringer, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial Circuit, and another.
Prohibition awarded.
COUNSEL H. M. Hampton, of Ocala, for petitioner.
Wilson & Boswell, of Bartow, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding in prohibition to restrain the circuit judge from entertaining jurisdiction in a foreclosure suit by appointing a receiver for the mortgaged property at the instance of the mortgagor, after the property has been foreclosed upon by a final decree under which a sale has been made and deed to the purchaser executed.
The facts of the case are as follows: Frank W Kells gave a mortgage to % w. m. d/avidson. Davidson instituted a foreclosure suit which resulted in the making of an interlocutory order against the defendant in foreclosure (the mortgagor) who has appealed to the Supreme Court therefrom. The appeal from the interlocutory order was without supersedeas.
As a result of this, the suit in the court below proceeded to a final decree of foreclosure against the mortgagor. Sale was had under the final decree and the property sold to the mortgagee (complainant). This sale was confirmed, deed was executed and delivered pursuant to it, and the purchaser went into possession of the foreclosed premises he had obtained a deed for under the foreclosure sale. For other details concerning the controversy here involved see the opinion rendered when this case was once before considered here on appeal. Kells v. Davidson, 102 Fla. 684, 136 So 450.
The property involved consists of an orange grove, with bearing citrus trees situate therein having fruit thereon ready to market. After the court had confirmed the foreclosure sale, and the complainant had gone into possession under his deed as a purchaser of the mortgaged property, the chancellor, without notice, upon the petition of the defendant mortgagor, appointed a receiver of the property, authorizing the receiver to gather and market the crop and hold the proceeds for the benefit of the parties to the pending appeal from the interlocutory order which had been entered and appealed from before the final decree was entered, though without supersedeas.
So the question here to be decided is this: Should a chancellor be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to conserve the fruits of mortgaged land, when it appears that an interlocutory order has been made, and has been appealed without supersedeas in a foreclosure case, which has gone to final decree and to sale of the mortgaged property, subject to any decision the appellate court might make with reference to the appeal from the interlocutory order, the petition for the receivership being filed as a part of the foreclosure case pending on appeal to the Supreme Court in so far as the interlocutory order was concerned?
We are of the opinion that the mere pendency of an appeal without supersedeas taken to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order that was entered in a foreclosure case prior to a final decree of foreclosure and confirmation of sale of the mortgaged property, does not preserve to the chancellor any jurisdiction to continue to exercise original jurisdiction in the cause, after his final decree has become conclusive. All of his jurisdiction has been exhausted by a final conclusion of the suit, subject only to the result of the interlocutory appeal in the appellate court.
A court, having obtained jurisdiction, retains it until final disposition of the cause, but after a final judgment or decree has been once duly rendered and the parties dismissed and the judgment or decree has become final and is no longer open to be considered, because the time for doing...
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General Capital Corp. v. Tel Service Co.
...entered and the time for filing petition for rehearing or motion for new trial has expired or same has been denied. Davidson v. Stringer, 1933, 109 Fla. 238, 147 So. 228; Batteiger v. Batteiger, Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 602; State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Kehoe, Fla.App.1961, 133 ......
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Kozel v. Kozel
...over that action is terminated, except that it retains continuing jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. See Davidson v. Stringer, 109 Fla. 238, 147 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1933) (stating that when a judgment becomes final "the jurisdiction of the court is exhausted, and it cannot take any furthe......
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Paulucci v. General Dynamics Corp.
...proper entry of judgment or decree is made and that the rights determined and fixed by it are properly enforced." Davidson v. Stringer, 109 Fla. 238, 147 So. 228, 229 (1933) (emphasis supplied). More recently, we have reaffirmed that "a trial judge has the inherent power to do those things ......
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Orth v. Orth
...at 799 (altered to lowercase). The Court answered the question in the affirmative. Id. The Court stated that in Davidson v. Stringer, 109 Fla. 238, 147 So. 228, 229 (1933), it recognized that "[w]hen a judgment or decree has once been rendered, the court loses jurisdiction over the subject-......
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Florida's third species of jurisdiction.
...2005); MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000). (17) The origin of this rule is Davidson v. Stringer, 147 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1933) ("When a judgment or decree has once been rendered, the [c]ourt loses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, other......