Davidson v. Stringer

• Decision Date: 11 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 4:20-cv-01478-DDN,4:20-cv-01478-DDN
• Parties: DEAN BRYAN DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. MARK STRINGER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

DEAN BRYAN DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. MARK STRINGER, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:20-cv-01478-DDN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

January 11, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Dean Bryan Davidson for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, this action will be dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must "accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8^th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8^th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to "accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation").

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8^th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8^th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8^th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to "assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint"). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently committed to the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center (SMMHC) in Farmington, Missouri. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint names Missouri Department of Mental Health Director Mark Stringer; Chief Operating Officer of the SMMHC Denise Hacker; Denise Boyd; Sonya Gammon; Stephanie Hintz; Dewane Robertson; Jaime Walley; Janet Latty; and the Fulton State Hospital(FSH). (Docket No. 1 at 1-2). Defendants are sued in their official capacities only. (Docket No. 1 at 1).

In his "Statement of Claim," plaintiff states that his "rights were violated when [his] legal mail was tampered with," keeping him from following up with "legal matters for years."¹ (Docket No. 1 at 8). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that "Denise Boyd confessed to opening, reading and then [disposing] of [his] legal mail without allowing [him] to know of its contents."

Plaintiff states his belief that he is entitled to restitution of at least $1,000,000 because he could have gotten a settlement with regard to a medication called desmopressin that almost killed him in 2007. According to plaintiff, in 2007, he suffered a seizure that led to a fall, causing a head injury. (Docket No. 1 at 9). He was taken to the hospital where he was placed into a medically-induced coma. Plaintiff was told his injury had been caused by "too much fluids," but plaintiff attributes it to taking desmopressin. He states that Dr. Sternberg did not report to the trauma center that he was taking desmopressin, which he deems dangerous.

Following a period in which he was not taking desmopressin, plaintiff states that he was again prescribed the medication from 2012-2018. During this time, he was put on fluid restrictions and subjected to blood draws. However, since desmopressin has been discontinued, he states that his sodium is "excellent," and that "what they thought to be true about [his] fluids no longer is [true]." Nevertheless, plaintiff claims that he was placed into a supervised living home because "they thought [he] needed [his] fluids supervised," even though his "illness has been in remission" since it was learned that he is allergic to desmopressin. Since then, plaintiff states that he has hadno delusions, and has been non-aggressive both physically and verbally. Plaintiff alleges that because "they tampered with [his] mail [he] couldn't learn what med almost killed [him] before."

Plaintiff also contends that the purported tampering with his mail kept him from corresponding with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. (Docket No. 1 at 8). He states that the Patent Office "thought [he] had abandon[ed] [his] patent applications[,] costing [him] a loss of money," which he had spent applying for patents.

As a result of these incidents, plaintiff is seeking $1,000,000 in punitive damages to compensate for his unsuccessful attempt at "getting a case in court." (Docket No. 1 at 10).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is under commitment at the SMMHC. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the tampering of his mail denied him access to the courts. For the reasons discussed below, this action must be dismissed without prejudice.

A. Official Capacity Claims Against Defendants Stringer, Hacker, Boyd, Gammon, Hintz, Robertson, Walley, and Latty

Plaintiff has sued defendants Stringer, Hacker, Boyd, Gammon, Hintz, Robertson, Walley, and Latty in their official capacities only. (Docket No. 1 at 1). In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually "against the governmental entity itself." See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8^th Cir. 2017). Thus, a "suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer." Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8^th Cir. 1999). See also Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8^th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy "must be treated as a suit against the County"); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8^th Cir. 2016) (stating that a "plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer"); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8^th Cir. 2006) (statingthat a "suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent").

Here defendants are alleged to be employees of either SMMHC or FSH. Both are institutions run by the Missouri Department of Mental Health. As such, plaintiff's official capacity claims against these defendants are actually claims against the State of Missouri itself. Those claims fail because the State of Missouri is not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because plaintiff's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

i. State of Missouri is Not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Person

"Section 1983 provides for an action against a 'person' for a violation, under color of law, of another's civil rights." McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8^th Cir. 2008). See also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8^th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only"). However, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8^th Cir. 2017) (stating that a "State is not a person under § 1983"); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8^th Cir. 2016) (stating that "a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983").

Here, plaintiff has sued employees of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for money damages. Those claims are treated as claims against defendants' employer, which is the State of Missouri. As noted above, a state is not a § 1983 "person" for purposes of such a claim. Because the State of Missouri is not a person, plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983. Therefore, these claims must be dismissed.

ii. Sovereign Immunity

"Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent." Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state's own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8^th Cir. 2018) ("The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court"); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8^th Cir. 1995) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars...