Davie v. Wingard, Civil Action No. C-2-95-513.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. C-2-95-513. |
| Citation | 958 F.Supp. 1244 |
| Parties | Michael Douglas DAVIE, Plaintiff, v. Curtis WINGARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Michael D. Davie, Chillicothe, OH, pro se.
Todd Robert Marti, Ohio Atty. Gen., Corrections Litigation, Columbus, OH, for defendants.
Plaintiff Michael Douglas Davie, an inmate incarcerated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, brings this action alleging that defendants have enforced the Department's grooming policy contrary to his religious beliefs, discriminated against him on the basis of his gender, and caused him mental anguish and violated other constitutional rights. This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Abel's January 16, 1997 Report and Recommendation that defendants' May 31, 1996 motion for summary judgment be granted.
No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed. Upon de novo review as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. Defendants' May 31, 1996 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter JUDGMENT for defendants. This action is hereby DISMISSED.
Plaintiff Michael Douglas Davie is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Ross Correctional Institution ("RCI"). He. brings this action against certain officials of the State of Ohio, and employees of the Madison Correctional Institution ("MCI"), where he was previously incarcerated. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that the enforcement of prison grooming policy contrary to his religious beliefs violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have discriminated against him on the basis of gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants have caused him mental anguish and violated other constitutional rights.
Mr. Davie claims that he is a "Nazarite," and that his religious beliefs center on the Nazarite vow, which appears in the Old Testament of the Bible, and provides:
All the days of the vow of his separation there shall no razor come upon his head: until the days be fulfilled, in the which he separateth himself until the Lord, he shall be holy, and shall let the locks of the hair on his head grow.
Numbers 6:5.
Prison regulations include a grooming code for male inmates which provides in part:
(D) .... Hair and hairstyle shall be clean, neatly trimmed and shall not extend over the ears or the shirt collar. Hair and hairstyle shall not protrude more than three inches from the scalp. ....
....
(H) Forced haircuts shall only be given if the inmate is issued a conduct report by the rules infraction board determining that the hairstyle or length is contrary to this rule. .... Inmates shall conform their appearance to the standards set forth in this rule. Inmates refusing to do so shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, which may include requiring an inmate's hair to be cut or trimmed against his will.
Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25.
Mr. Davie alleges that on January 23, 1995, he was summoned to come to Chaplain Josiah. Opata's office to discuss his religious beliefs. Complaint § IV. After speaking with Chaplain Opata, Mr. Davie was ordered to get a hair cut by Chaplain Opata and C.O. J. May. Complaint § IV. Mr. Davie refused to allow his hair to be cut, on a religious basis. Complaint § IV. Mr. Davie was taken to Captain Harris' office and reprimanded for refusing to get a hair cut. Complaint § IV. Captain Harris ordered Mr. Davie to be removed to segregation. Complaint § IV.
On January 25, 1995, Mr. Davie appeared before Lt. Fisher, Mr. Smith and C.O. Lambert, members of the Rules Infraction Board, for disobedience of a direct order to get his hair cut. Complaint § IV. Mr. Davie was found guilty, and was penalized for the infraction. Complaint § IV. Mr. Davie was also referred to the Progressive Readjustment Inmate Development Environment ("PRIDE") unit, a behavioral modification training program. Complaint § IV. Mr. Davie was also forced to get a hair cut. Complaint § IV. On January 29, 1995, Mr. Davie filed an informal complaint with the Unit Manager Gasenheimer, and refused to eat or drink in protest of the infringement on his religious beliefs and placement in the PRIDE unit.
On February 5, 1995, Mr. Gasenheimer assured Mr. Davie that the Board's decision would be reviewed, and that Mr. Davie would probably be removed from the PRIDE unit. Complaint § IV. However, the Board's decision was upheld by Mr. Wingard, the Warden. Complaint § IV. Mr. Wingard's decision was appealed to the Director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC"), Reginald Wilkinson. Complaint § IV. The Warden's decision was upheld by Defendant Wilkinson. Complaint § IV.
Mr. Davie alleges that placement in the PRIDE unit caused him mental anguish. Complaint Claim II, Count 1. Mr. Davie also alleges that he was denied adequate access to the law library while he was in the PRIDE unit. Complaint Claim II, Count 3. Mr. Davie further alleges that legal documents from his lawsuit against MCI were stolen or misplaced by prison officials while he was in segregation. Complaint Claim II, Count 6. Mr. Davie also claims that he was denied physical exercise, participation in his culture, full commissary privileges, and reading materials of his choice while in the PRIDE unit. Complaint Claim II, Counts 4, 5.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The plain language of this rule mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish an essential element upon which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact. "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The standard for summary judgment mirrors that of Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) for a directed verdict; that is under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. On a motion for summary judgment, a court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
Mr. Davie argues that Defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. RFRA provides that:
(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). Defendants argue that Mr. Davie's religious freedom has not been substantially burdened, and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policy must be upheld because it serves a compelling government interest in the least restrictive means possible.
In order to state a prima facie claim that a policy constitutes a substantial burden on free exercise, a plaintiff must show that the policy burdens a religious belief, rather than a philosophy or a way of life, and that the plaintiff sincerely holds the burdened belief. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Although Defendants express doubt regarding the sincerity of Mr. Davie's beliefs, they are willing to assume for the sake of argument that the policy is a substantial burden on Mr. Davie's religious beliefs. Defendants maintain, however, that the policy serves compelling government interests through the least restrictive means. The Court will likewise assume that Mr. Davie's beliefs are sincere, and that the policy is a substantial burden, and analyze whether the policy serves compelling government interests through the least restrictive means.
Defendants cite safety, security, and discipline as compelling government interests justifying the hair length regulations. Defendants offer evidence that ODRC is operating at 179.6% of the rated capacity of its institutions, the highest rate in the United States. Wilkinson Affidavit ¶ 3, Exhibit F to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Ohio has the second highest ratio of inmates to staff in the United States. Wilkinson Affidavit ¶ 3, Exhibit F to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, 21.8% of the ODRC inmates are classified at close or high security, more than twice the national average of 9.5%. Wilkinson Affidavit ¶ 3, Exhibit F to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Given these statistics, security is of utmost importance to Ohio...
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