Davies v. Cheadle

• Decision Date: 28 February 1903
• Citation: 31 Wash. 168,71 P. 728
• Parties: DAVIES et al. v. CHEADLE et al.*
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

71 P. 728

31 Wash. 168

DAVIES et al. v. CHEADLE et al.*

Supreme Court of Washington

February 28, 1903

Appeal from superior court, King county; Boyd J. Tallman, Judge.

Action to quiet title by Ellen Davies and another against Raphael Cheadle and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs defendants appeal. Affirmed.

W. F. Hays and J. P. Houser, for appellants.

John E Humphries and Harrison Bostwick, for respondents.

HADLEY J.

This action was brought by respondents against appellants to quiet title. Respondents are husband and wife. They allege in substance that on the 6th day of October, 1901, one Lamar Cheadle, then a resident of King county, Wash., departed this life; that said Lamar Cheadle was unmarried, and left no wife, children, father, or mother surviving him, his only heirs at law being his brother and sister, the appellants herein, Raphael Cheadle and Marinda Schaffer; that said Raphael Cheadle is the administrator of the estate of said Lamar Cheadle; that said Lamar Cheadle, being then the owner of certain real estate described in the complaint, did, on the 13th day of July, 1901, enter into an oral contract with respondent Ellen Davies, by the terms of which it was agreed between them that said Ellen Davies should move into the house occupied by said Lamar Cheadle, which was situate upon the real estate described, the same being farming land; that she should take possession of the land superintend the farm and household duties connected therewith, live upon the farm with said Lamar Cheadle during his life, and administer to him and care for him as far as lay within her power during the remainder of his life; that she was to have all the products of the farm, the use of the farm, farming utensils, household furniture, and other property, the same as if all were her own, during the lifetime of said Lamar Cheadle, and she was to pay him one-third of the money received from the sale of products of the farm during his lifetime; that at his death all of the real estate in the complaint described, together with the household furniture, farming implemenets, live stock, and all other personal property belonging to or connected with said farm, should become the property of said Ellen Davies; that said Lamar Cheadle agreed to give, devise, and bequeath all of said property to said Ellen Davies in consideration that she should perform the contract on her part to be performed. It is further alleged that said Lamar Cheadle, as evidence of said agreement, and relating to the property described in the complaint, did, on July 13, 1901, execute and deliver to said Ellen Davies a statement in writing, of which the following is a copy 'Adelaide, Wash. July 13, 1901.

'This is to certify that I, Lamar Cheadle, have this day entered into a contract with Mrs. Ellen Davies whereby she agrees to take charge of my farm at Adelaide, Wash., and conduct my house and farm and board and care for me during my lifetime and also give me one-third of the cash proceeds accruing from said farm, from the sale of fruit, stock and product on said farm during my life, and I agree to bequeath ot Mrs. Ellen Davies at my death said farm, together with all stock, farming implements and household goods and furniture belonging thereto. The reason for not making my last will and testament at once is that I have important business interest that must be adjusted before that can be done, but that as soon as said business matters can be arranged I agree to complete this contract according to the terms herein specified.

'Lamar Cheadle. [Seal.]

'Witness:

'D. F. Davies. Rose E. Rhodes.'

It is further averred that said Ellen Davies, in pursuance of the terms of said contract, took full and complete possession of said farm and personal property, the same having been delivered to her by said Lamar Cheadle on or about July 13, 1901, and that she at once entered upon the performance of her contract, and fully performed the same by administering to said Lamar Cheadle and caring for him until the time of his death; that said respondent has been in full and complete possession and control of all of said property, since the death of said Cheadle, under the terms of said contract. It is further alleged that the deceased left ohter property sufficient to discharge all his indebtedness existing at the time said contract was made; that said estate is wholly solvent, and that there is sufficient property aside from that included in said contract to pay all debts and liabilities of the estate, including funeral expenses. It is averred that the appellants are claiming that the administrator is entitled to the possession of said personal property and to the control of said real estate, and that said Raphael Cheadle and Marinda Schaffer are claiming to be the owners and entitled to the possession of said real estate, and are demanding of said respondent Ellen Davies that they shall be let into possession of all of said property; that said claim of appellants constitutes a cloud upon the title of said Ellen Davies; that in equity said property belongs to her, and that appellants have no right, title, or interest therein. It is alleged that respondent David F. Davies, at the husband of said Ellen Davies, released to her all community rights in the proceeds of said contract, and that the same is her separate property. The complaint demands that the title to said property be quieted in respondent Ellen Davies. Such proceedings were had that issue was joined upon said complaint, a trial was had before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of respondents in accordance with the demand of the complaint. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

It is assigned as error that the court overruled appellants' demurrer to the second amended complaint. The demurrer is general, and simply challenges the complaint as not stating a cause of action. We have above set forth with some particularity the material facts stated in the complaint more especially to serve the purposes of the discussion of this assignment of error. We think the complaint states a cause of action within the rule of many authorities. It alleges, it is true, an oral agreement to convey real estate; but it further alleges a complete performance of that agreement on the part of the respondent Ellen Davies, and a part performance on the part of the deceased. The face of the complaint shows that the deceased placed the said respondent in full possession under the agreement; that she fully discharged her obligations under the contract during the lifetime of the deceased, is still in possession thereunder, and that nothing remains undone to fully execute the contract except a formal conveyance...