Davies v. State
Decision Date | 28 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 48A04-0103-CR-102.,48A04-0103-CR-102. |
Citation | 758 N.E.2d 981 |
Parties | Joshua James DAVIES, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Richard Walker, Anderson, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joseph A. Samreta, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-defendant Joshua James Davies ("Davies") appeals the sentence he received after pleading guilty to murder,1 a felony, burglary2 as a Class A felony, and criminal deviate conduct3 as a Class A felony. We affirm.
Davies raises one issue for review, which we restate as the following three:
I. whether the trial court properly considered certain aggravators and mitigators;
II. whether the trial court properly ordered Davies' sentences to run consecutively; and
III. whether his sentence is manifestly unreasonable.
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on May 3, 2000, while under electronic monitoring for violating his parole, sixteen-year-old Davies broke into his next-door-neighbor's home by cutting a screen and opening a kitchen window. Davies then unlocked the back door, entered the bedroom of thirteen-year-old J.L., hit her on the head with a hammer, and attempted to rape her. Unable to achieve intercourse, Davies inserted his finger into her vagina. To stop J.L. from screaming, Davies hit her on the head at least three, but as many as eleven, times with the hammer. Sometime during this encounter, J.L.'s screams woke her stepsister, L.H. L.H. rushed to J.L.'s room where Davies hit her in the head with the hammer until she "blacked-out". J.L.'s father awoke and chased Davies as he fled the premises through the unlocked back door, but could not catch him.
J.L. was rushed to the emergency room but died because of multiple blunt force injuries to her head. Soon after the incident, the police apprehended Davies and charged him with criminal confinement, rape, child molesting, burglary, aggravated battery, murder, criminal deviate conduct, and eight counts of death penalty enhancement. On December 27, 2000, Davies pled guilty to murder, burglary, criminal deviate conduct, and aggravated battery.4 In accordance with the plea, the State dismissed all but two of the death penalty enhancements and reduced the remaining enhancements to life in prison without parole.
The trial court conducted a bifurcated hearing on February 5, 2001, to determine Davies' intent5 and sentence, during which the trial court found as follows:
Concerning parental neglect and abuse, again, I believe that is entitled to minimal weight as a mitigator. At first, I was inclined to reject this proposed mitigator altogether. The evidence is convenient and self-serving. A convenient excuse, at least that was my initial assessment. But, when thinking about this and piecing it together with all the other evidence, the cumulative effect does require, it seems to me, some weight be given to this mitigator. The Babe Ruth Coach witnessed lack of supervision. He reported to us seeing [Davies] out at 2:00 in the morning. "Observed that no one seemed to be there for [Davies]." Counselor at Boot Camp reported, Associates and friends of his parents described his parents as "self-consumed, unavailable." His third grade teacher told us his parents were not engaged. Again, many children are unsupervised with parents who are emotionally absent. Few of them commit violent crimes. The language of the Statute is, "Extreme emotional disturbance." The Statute [sic] does not support such a finding. Beyond that, [Davies] has an older sister who, I think we can assume, suffered from the same kind of neglect. She committed no crimes. For that reason, I think neglect and parental abuse is entitled to only minimal weight, but at least some weight.
(Paragraph format altered from original.)
In its written sentencing order, the trial court gave the intentional killing and multiple victim aggravators significant weight and gave moderate weight to Davies' pattern of delinquency and the nature and circumstances of the crime. As for the mitigators, the trial court gave significant weight to Davies' age, minimal weight to FAE and parental neglect and abuse, and no weight to remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Finally, the trial court concluded that the aggravators substantially outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Davies to sixty-two years for murder, twenty years for burglary, and twenty-six years for criminal deviate conduct, to be served consecutively for a total of 108 years.
We will only reverse a sentence upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. See Allen v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)
. In order to enhance a sentence, the trial court is required to "`(1) identify all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and, (3) articulate the court's evaluation and balancing of the circumstances.' " Id. (quoting Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 9 (Ind.1999)). A single aggravating factor is sufficient to sustain an enhanced sentence. See Cleary v. State, 638 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). Finally, our review is not limited to the written sentencing order; we are required to look at the entire record including the sentencing hearing. See Allen, 722 N.E.2d at 1254.
Davies does not dispute the trial court's...
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